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This collection of papers is a reflection of an ongoing debate about the relationships between religion, the 
citizen and the state. It is a debate that is far from settled, and indeed one which may be unsettling, but a 
debate which too often generates more heat than light. It is, however, a crucial discussion since it goes to the 
heart of our understanding of modern citizenship, the role of the state and the struggle for equality.
Runnymede was especially pleased to partner with colleagues at the Centre for Refugees, Migration and 
Belonging (CRMB) at the University of East London in co-hosting the two conferences from which these 
papers are drawn. CRMB’s serious and engaged approach to relating political theory to political action 
enabled academics, commentators and practitioners to share a platform where disagreements were aired 
and constructive debate and discussion enabled. We hope that the conferences act as a model for the 
deliberations which are necessary to address the thorny challenges raised by the authors. Many of these 
disagreements are reflected in the papers presented here. The collected papers discuss faith-based 
schooling, the veil, honour based violence, religious arbitration, and the delivery of public services by faith 
communities. All of these issues remain very much alive in contemporary public policy debates in the UK 
and beyond.
Since the conferences were held we have seen further attempts in the UK of politicians and policy makers 
seeking to address the relationship between state, religion and the citizen. Most notably, using the vehicle of 
a British government delegation to the Vatican, the only Muslim cabinet member, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, 
made a speech seeking to recalibrate the relationship between religion and state, arguing:  
… to create a more just society, people need to feel stronger in their religious identities and more 
confident in their creeds…. My concern is when secularization is pushed to an extreme, when 
it requires the complete removal of faith from the public sphere. So I am calling for a more open 
confidence in faith, where faith has a place at the table.1 
This collection of essays and papers critically engages with the question of what ‘a place at the table’ for 
faith means in practice and what it means for efforts to promote equality. The relationship between faith and 
state is increasingly seen through the lens of multiculture and the exemplar nodes of the discussion regularly 
focus on issues that impact on people from minority ethnic communities. This makes it a debate which is vital 
in Runnymede’s ongoing mission to support the creation of a successful multi-ethnic Britain. 
While I doubt that this collection will be the last word in this debate, I hope that the approach that it suggests 
of evidence based, well argued, engaged discussion between theoreticians, researchers and those working 
within communities will be a welcome addition to our understanding.
Rob Berkeley
Director, Runnymede
April 2012
Note
1. Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, ‘We stand side by side with the Pope in fighting for faith’, The Daily Telegraph, 
13 February 2012. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9080441/We-stand-side-by-side-
with-the-Pope-in-fighting-for-faith.html
Foreword
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We are very pleased to introduce this publication, 
which follows annual conferences in 2010 and 
2011 co-organized by the Runnymede Trust and 
CMRB - the Centre for Research on Migration, 
Refugees and Belonging at the University of East 
London. The concerns that brought us together, 
attracting large audiences of academics, activists, 
professionals and policy makers, are focused on 
ways in which issues of migration, racism and 
religion have recently been interrelated in practices 
and experiences of migrants and in public and 
policy discourses. 
In Britain, the three areas of racism, migration 
and religion have been viewed as distinct – less 
in terms of social and political realities than in 
the ways that groups and organizations which 
address them have developed along separate, if 
not separatist lines. For many years, groups and 
organizations which formed to contest racism, 
such as the Commission for Racial Equality and the 
Institute for Race Relations, focused on what Stuart 
Hall called ‘new ethnicities’ - immigrants among 
whom most had entitlement to British citizenship, 
as they and their families originated in what were 
once called NCWP (New Commonwealth countries 
and Pakistan). In 1981, a British Nationality Act 
deprived many of them of this entitlement, while 
the character of migration to the UK started to 
change, becoming closer to that of other European 
countries in which rights were withheld even from 
those able to gain legal entry. At the same time, 
organizations such as the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants and a greatly expanded 
Refugee Council developed specifically to deal 
with issues raised by new patterns of migration.
We believe there is an urgent need to discuss, 
reconfigure and re-conceptualize relationships 
between these two sets of issues. Matters 
of colour and of ‘race’ are of importance for 
institutional and inter-subjective racializations but 
intersected factors have also become matters of 
crucial importance. These include diverse formal 
residency and citizenship status, class, gender 
and generation, and the social, political and civil 
entitlements attached to them. They play major 
roles in hegemonic racialization processes which 
naturalize ‘autochthonic’ boundaries constructed 
by various political projects of belonging, notably 
Introduction: Migration, Racism and Religion
Philip Marfleet & Nira Yuval-Davis 
University of East London
those advanced by hegemonic government 
policies and by the extreme Right.
We wished to relate matters of racism and 
migration to another issue which has been 
prominent in contemporary discourses and 
practices of racialization and the struggles against 
them – that of religion. Since the 1988 ‘Rushdie 
Affair’, and even more so after September 11th 
2001, religion in general and Islam in particular 
have occupied a special role in constructions of 
the racialized ‘Other’. 
These developments are associated with increased 
emphasis in official discourses in Europe and North 
America on culture as a source of tension and 
conflict. With the end of the Cold War, influential 
academic analyses and strategic assessments 
in the United States argued that global affairs 
would be influenced profoundly by problems of 
cultural difference. Huntington’s proposition that 
international politics would be dominated by a 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ was taken up by a host of 
conservative theorists, for whom problems of world 
order were to be understood as confrontations 
between a progressive Western bloc and a 
recalcitrant Islam. This refurbished Orientalism 
had its impact in Europe, where ideologues of the 
European Union and those associated with local 
nationalisms found a ready means of addressing 
increased social tension at a time when ‘new 
migrations’ from conflict zones of the Global South 
were bringing large numbers of people in search of 
sanctuary.
Across Europe, the state was retreating from 
commitments to protection of vulnerable migrants, 
including international agreements such as 
the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees. 
Governments spoke of ‘modernizing’ the 
Convention and of ‘hardening’ borders against 
migrants they saw as opportunist, threatening, 
and – in the light of greatly increased use of 
irregular networks – probably criminal. Mobilizing 
language that drew upon well-established patterns 
of prejudice, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
described such migratory movements as ‘the dark 
side’ of globalization. 
It was in this context that, during the 1990s, a 
series of new laws established ‘Fortress Europe’. 
European states combined to close territorial 
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SECTION I: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
1. Secularism and Conflicts about Rights
Chetan Bhatt 
Department of Sociology at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
During the period of the mass black, Asian and anti-
racist movements of the 1970s and 1980s, one of 
the common slogans that was used in a number 
of campaigns was ‘We are here because you were 
there’. That slogan is important because it said 
that migration in the 1960s and 1970s – against 
which there was a vicious mobilization by some 
mainstream politicians and neo-fascist movements 
alike – is part of an historical process. The histories 
of migrants did not begin in Britain but were shaped 
by British colonialism, plantation slavery, expansion 
and exploitation.
The demand that black and Asian people in the UK 
should be seen as part of an historical process is 
something that racism effectively denies. (Gilroy, 
2002). It is an important demand. It means that 
we have to address fully the histories – including 
the political histories – of people before they 
arrive in the UK or Europe.  These histories have 
many consequences that travel well beyond 
the characterization of people simply as victims 
of racism or producers of benign and colourful 
cultures, or people who only become significant 
when they need help.  
One consequence is that some progressive 
discussions about racism and migration can be 
very narrow, since these only look at the history 
of migrants once they have passed through 
immigration control at Heathrow or Stansted or 
Dover.  It is a paradox that progressive anti-racist 
discussions also reproduce a narrow kind of British 
nationalism that can be largely unconcerned with 
the world outside Britain, unless it can be related 
to Britain and its history of colonialism. Progressive 
anti-racism can also produce a kind of ‘racial’ 
victimhood that is outside history and politics. 
We need to also consider the way that racism has 
changed over the last two decades.  These new ideas 
around racism can challenge the understanding 
of racism that has been shaped by postcolonial 
migration since the end of the Second World War. 
When we talk about postcolonial migration, we are 
talking about processes that largely occurred up to 
more than half a century ago. In terms of patterns 
of movement and settlement, post-war migration 
was highly predictable and largely consistent.  One 
knew where a Kashmiri or Gujarati would come from. 
You knew not just the town, but probably also the 
village. You probably knew their sub-caste or sect 
and a range of other affiliations as well.  You could 
probably tell with some certainty where they were 
going to reside or settle in the UK.  
The human geography of movements of people 
across the globe today is very different.  It often 
occurs through the paths and enclaves that 
sanctuary seekers are forced to use or because of 
other varied movements of people.  The East African 
Asian migrants to the UK in 1968–74, for example, 
had already moved once and had made homes and 
families in another continent far away, well before 
coming to Britain. Many went on to have families 
dispersed across several continents. So we are not 
talking about the one-directional movement that is 
quite common in migration studies – for example 
from rural areas into the city and from the periphery 
to the metropolis. So we need to ask: Are terms 
such as migration and migrants always relevant? 
Do these terms adequately address the variety of 
movements of people today across the globe, often 
as a consequence of war and conflicts.
Equally important, for many sanctuary seekers, is the 
changed nature of militarism, humanitarism, war and 
conflict. We do not yet have adequate languages 
to grasp the variety of movements of people today 
across the globe, or the transformations of war and 
regional conflict since the late-1980s that have 
caused many of these movements.
Many dominant understandings of racism that have 
been shaped by the Asian, Caribbean and African 
experience may not necessarily be valid anymore, 
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or at least not valid in the way that is commonly 
thought.  Partly this is about being alive to new forms 
of racism and fascism that have very little historical 
relationship with the movements of the 1920s and 
1930s.  These are fascisms that don’t look at all like 
the fascism we are familiar with.  Yet they are often 
skilful philosophical projects whose loathing can be 
as intense as that of older fascism. 
If the lives and histories of migrants are considered 
as much more than the struggle against racism in 
the UK, and if their histories are considered in their 
fullness, in a way that a genuine antiracist approach 
has to, then other issues arise, like religion and faith. 
If we start talking about religion or about civil society, 
and about what makes a desirable civil society and 
what should be the place of religion within it, then 
this is inevitably where our disagreements start. We 
might begin to disagree about the relations between 
religion and the state and religion and public policy. 
We might begin to disagree about the role of religious 
organizations in progressive initiatives or as allies 
of progressive movements. I would be surprised 
if progressive people didn’t ‘appreciate and value 
diversity in a positive way’. But I expect that some 
of them might be wary of being asked to respect 
diversity independently of other considerations of 
equality, of women’s rights, and of human rights. 
We know the areas of disagreement well. For some, 
religions and faith organizations are seen as tools 
for ‘cohesion’ or manifestations of inalienable rights 
or the basis for legitimate political action.  But for 
others, they are deeply divisive.  When gender-
based discrimination or violence is considered, 
these disagreements multiply.  We have a clear 
division between secular universal human and 
women’s rights on the one hand and authoritarian 
versions of religious faiths on the other.  We also 
have an ethos of secularity that some may wish to 
see in civil societies and this is vigorously opposed 
by others in favour of a supposed cohesiveness that 
is brought about by religion.  These types of issues 
are typical in British debates.
Let’s take this outside Britain for a moment.  In 
Gujarat in 2002, there was a large-scale pogrom in 
which some 2000 Indian citizens, mostly Muslim, 
were killed and up to a quarter of a million people 
displaced from their homes.  The ensuing carnage, 
which is often called the Gujarat genocide, was 
undertaken by movements of the Hindu religious 
right.  Members of UK affiliates of those same 
Hindu religious right organizations have been 
involved in a variety of inter-faith initiatives in the UK, 
including at the highest levels of government. Those 
sympathetic to the Hindu Right and those who 
have defended the Hindu Right have been, among 
others, a government appointed commissioner on 
social cohesion (Gilligan, 2007).  The chief minister 
of Gujarat state, widely thought to have played a key 
role in the 2002 violence, is regularly invited to the 
UK – though secular south Asian political groups 
have frequently sought to prevent his arrival here.  
More broadly, the involvement of the religious right 
in policy areas is a common pattern, and it says 
something about the way the state in Britain relates 
to religion and culture.  It also demonstrates how 
minority groups in civil society are conceived in 
policy terms.  The state seeks ‘community leaders’ 
for minority groups (and creates them if they don’t 
already exist, especially with Asian populations).  For 
example, Lord the Goldsmith’s report on citizenship 
in 2007 (Goldsmith QC, 2007) listed as having 
been consulted – as you would expect – politicians, 
academics and policy experts, groups that are 
specialists in some way or another on citizenship 
and migration areas.  But the remainder were 
religious organizations and many were figures that 
were sympathetic to the religious right.  How does 
civil society become ‘substituted’ by a collection of 
religious groups, many of them claiming marginality 
and therefore demanding representation?  One can 
go very far in claiming that one is marginal, but what 
are the consequences of the religious rendering of 
civil society in these consultations?
I want to consider another example, from another 
vantage point.  In 1971, in what was East Pakistan 
and is now Bangladesh, there was a monumental 
genocide with estimates regularly putting the 
number of people killed at between 2–3 million and 
in the war that led to Bangladesh’s independence. 
It was a systematic genocide targeting intellectuals, 
communists, progressive journalists, feminists, 
lawyers and so forth.  Religious militia acting with 
the Pakistani army were directly involved in the 
genocide.  After Bangladesh’s independence, 
some members of the militia or members of the 
political party that spawned the militia could not 
stay in Bangladesh for obvious reasons.  Some of 
them came to the UK (along with numerous others 
who were refugees from the war and genocide itself) 
and later became involved in inter-faith and policy 
activities at the highest levels in the UK. Some were 
even implicated in war crimes and other atrocities. 
They are regularly opposed by secular Bangladeshi 
groups in the UK, all left-wing but who have no left-
wing allies to speak of since many on the UK Left 
are aligned with the same religious right party that 
was implicated in the genocide. Now for the Left in 
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South Asia, it is very clear what real dangers the 
movements of the religious right represent. These 
religious movements are not inexperienced, but 
have been in existence for some 60–80 years.  They 
are often massive and well-organized movements 
with a large number of wings – youth, women’s, 
education wings and so forth.  They are part of the 
histories of several of the countries of South Asia.  It 
is then a paradox that the Left in the UK works with 
the UK representatives of the same movements that 
are attacking Left groups in South Asia. 
Now I want to give a local example that illustrates 
other changes since the 1980s.  Some of you will 
remember the terrible racist murder of Altab Ali in 
Tower Hamlets in 1978 and the subsequent rise 
of Bengali youth movements.  Various conflicts 
occurred between the local community and the neo-
fascist National Front or the British movement.  In 
the 1980s and 1990s there were various campaigns 
and struggles concerning discrimination in housing 
and other public sector provision and the rise of 
several women’s organizations.  One of the key 
characteristics of the movements, groups and 
organizations, and the immense variety of cultural 
youth activities that emerged from that anti-racist 
period was that they were virtually universally 
secular in orientation.  In this period, let’s say, from 
the 1970s right through to the early 1990s, the term 
‘Asian’ was a secular term of common affiliation.  
There is a powerful history of secular Asian anti-racist 
and women’s struggles over almost the past 30 years 
or so.  These groups were important in facing down 
the real threat from organized fascism in the 1970s, 
as well as consolidating an independent political 
sphere that was well sustained right up to the 1990s. 
Such histories are written out of the discourses of 
multiculturalism and the faith agenda.  They are 
also erased by the Asian religious Right who wish 
to impose an altogether different understanding on 
those histories – histories that they played virtually 
no part in.  In this remarkably neglected history of 
secular Asian struggles in Britain, the ferocity of 
the racism that Asians faced and fought is at risk 
of being forgotten entirely by younger Hindus, 
Muslims and Sikhs.  For some of those people, 
the term ‘Asian’ evokes disgust. They are instead 
keener to celebrate the supremacy of their religions, 
monuments or civilizations.  We can mourn the loss 
of the memory of that history, or we can attempt to 
rescue it, but I doubt that there is a strong secular 
presence anymore that can challenge the ceaseless 
communalization of Asian politics in the UK.
Some people on the Asian religious right wish to 
replace this history with the politics of religious 
identity.  It is one of the peculiarities of this period 
that some young Hindus, for example, vehemently 
‘oppose colonialism’ by claiming to be the real 
Aryans, just as some young Muslims claim that a 
Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy governs the 
world.  Opposing racism and fascism can dovetail 
with other ideologies of communal purity. 
We often hear of the transformation of official 
anti-racist initiatives, which started in the 1980s 
after which they became something like an 
official multiculturalism and then, more recently, 
multifaithism.  At some point mutlifaith initiatives and 
other initiatives around social cohesion became 
linked.  After 2001, more insistently after 2005, these 
linked initiatives became unevenly associated with 
counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism. 
At a different, community level communal identity 
politics increasingly became the naturalized norm. 
The issue becomes not ‘How are we Asians going to 
live with each other?’, but instead ‘Who am I? How 
can I be purer in who I want to be?’ This becomes 
the register for thinking about anything to do with 
south Asians in the UK.  Why should this be so?  
Why indeed is the thinkability of Asians in this 
country inseparable from the view of them as 
target communities that need representation from 
unelected leaders?  Minority populations receive 
institutional recognition primarily as communal 
groups. This recognition takes a form that advances 
the undemocratically-derived political interests of 
those groups that wish to make communal claims. 
Those groups tend to be dominated by the political 
parties of the South Asian and middle-Eastern 
religious right. So what is the democratic deficit 
here?  Is this a kind of inferior citizenship?
Particularly after the 2001 disturbances in the 
Northern towns in the UK, some Hindu and Sikh 
groups demanded not to be addressed as ‘Asians’, 
and instead to be recognized as high achievers in 
employment and education, and as loyal, model 
minorities committed fully to Britishness. Here one 
can see how the rush to embrace British nationalism 
can link with ideas of communal purity.  In this same 
process, class divisions in Asian populations came 
to be articulated as religious divisions, with some 
successful Hindus and Sikhs claiming to be a world 
away from the Muslims they rubbed shoulders 
with daily:  the ‘good’ minorities against the ‘bad’, 
an absolute border created between the most 
proximate of peoples. 
These communal dynamics pose other issues 
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Liberalism and Diversity
‘Secularism’ and ‘the politics of belonging’ often 
appear to stand in opposition to one another. 
Currently -  and not least in the United Kingdom - 
the politics of belonging often articulates religious 
identities among immigrant and ethnic minority 
populations.  This is disorientating for many radicals 
and liberals. We can see some of the reasons for 
this in retrospect. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
people who campaigned against racially inspired 
immigration controls, and those who supported the 
race relations acts that tried to outlaw some forms of 
discrimination, were also found to be supporters of 
a broad roster of libertarian reforms. These causes 
endorsed the relaxation of censorship (the Penguin 
publication of Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960 
provided a landmark judgment under the Obscene 
Publications Act), and the legalization (under 
certain conditions) of both male homosexuality 
and abortion. In all these cases, the rising tide of 
reform weakened the authority of religious doctrine 
and undermined the capacity of religious leaders 
to legislate for the country’s morals. Moreover, the 
feminism and anti- racism causes were also aligned 
when, in 1975 and 1976, Parliament legislated 
against sex discrimination and racial discrimination 
(Joppke, 1989). 
In the four decades that followed the arrival of SS 
Windrush in 1948, there was no shortage of conflict 
and controversy attached to rising immigration and 
ethnic diversity. However, discord and debate in 
these years was overwhelmingly secular. It was the 
impact of immigrants on labour markets, housing, 
sex, crime and public order which shaped debate in 
parliament, in the press, in pubs and on the street in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  From the late 1970s, debate 
shifted from concern with immigrants alone to 
encompass ethnic minorities. This transition carried 
with it the recognition that it was not only immigrants 
but, increasingly, English-born minority groups who 
lived with the burdens of racial discrimination and 
cumulative social and economic disadvantages. 
The rise of multiculturalism in education was, in part, 
a reflection of this perception. Famously, the Swann 
report of 1985, which outlined the outcome of an 
Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic 
Minority Groups, presented multiculturalism as a 
vision for a modern Britain, not just for its education 
system. It disavowed assimilation and called both 
for ‘a framework of commonly accepted values, 
practices and procedures’, and for ethnic minority 
communities to be assisted ‘in maintaining their 
distinct ethnic identities’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
1992).  At the same time, a number of Labour-run 
cities and boroughs adopted ethnic monitoring and 
took positive action to increase the ethnic minority 
share of council staff as a way of addressing the 
consequences of racism and racial disadvantage. 
In the late 1980s this almost exclusively secular 
focus to public debate was challenged. In 1989 
the clashes that followed the publication of 
Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses were 
explosive. The offence it caused many Muslims 
and their demonstrative reaction which was most 
dramatically manifested in the form of a staged 
public burning, were an indication of this change. A 
second indication is the shift in policy as politicians 
and policy-makers increasingly spoke of Britain 
as a multi-faith society as well as, or instead of, 
a multi-ethnic society (Modood, 1990; Feldman, 
2011).  Yet despite these undeniably novel features 
the multicultural politics of the last two decades 
have striking and revealing antecedents in British 
history. In order to understand this, we have to 
discard the idea that multicultural societies are a 
new phenomenon in British history. Of course, the 
term ‘multicultural’ is relatively new – its use in the 
UK going back only as far as the 1970s. Certain 
features of ‘multiculturalism’ are novel too: above 
all, the radical claim that diverse religious and 
ethnic identities have an equal claim on the public 
sphere. However, the problem of how to make law 
and govern a society which contains more than one 
cultural community is not a new one in the history 
of the British state. We can see this by looking at 
three areas in particular: the multinational character 
of the United Kingdom; the practice of rule in the 
Empire; and the response to religious pluralism at 
home. This essay suggests that if we examine the 
strategies and practices employed by the British 
state as it governed diverse societies in the past we 
will gain some insights into the dynamics and forms 
of multiculturalism in the present.  
2. Conservative Pluralism and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism
David Feldman
Birkbeck College, University of London
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The Origins of 
Conservative Pluralism
The United Kingdom is, of course, dominated by 
England. Yet the subjugation of Wales, Ireland and 
Scotland to English hegemony has gone hand-
in-hand with the incorporation, not the erasure, 
of these subordinate nationalities. Home Rule, a 
sort of autonomy within the United Kingdom, was 
the preferred Liberal solution for the Irish problem 
between 1886 and the First World War. But once 
this became definitively unattainable, following the 
creation in 1920 of the Irish Free State, a sort of Home 
Rule was applied to Northern Ireland through the 
devolved administration at Stormont. The Scottish 
and Welsh assemblies are more recent creations 
which date from 1999. However, these nations also 
have a long history in which they have been allowed 
space to assert a degree of separateness. Even in 
the case of Wales, where English rule had destroyed 
independent political and legal institutions, from 
the late 19th century there was a national revival 
which was in part sponsored by the Westminster 
government. By the early part of the last century, 
Welsh language and literature were being taught in 
Welsh schools and the country boasted a national 
library and university. In the case of Scotland, 
following incorporation in the United Kingdom in 
1707, the country retained its own ecclesiastical, 
legal and educational systems (Feldman, 2011).
In much of the empire, pluralism became the vehicle 
for British rule. This was the policy of indirect rule 
developed by Lord Lugard in Nigeria and widely 
adopted elsewhere. British policy in Asia and Africa 
aimed to conserve the power of traditional rulers 
and established rulers – or those who the British 
(sometimes mistakenly) imagined these figures to 
be. Inevitably, this produced a strong preference 
for native law in civil and criminal cases. As the 
Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron, 
declared, the aim was not to turn Africans into 
Europeans but to encourage them to become better 
Africans. Slavery was outlawed, as was witchcraft, 
but this apart, British colonial policy tended to judge 
the validity of local customs by local standards 
not metropolitan ones (Poulter, 1998). This had 
important consequences for the people subjected 
to British rule. The Empire endorsed and helped to 
perpetuate the rulers and institutions it sanctioned. 
From the middle of the 19th century pluralism also 
became the predominant political response to 
religious diversity at home. By that time, as population 
growth outstripped Anglican church-building during 
the industrial revolution, large numbers of Christians 
affiliated themselves to non-Anglican denominations 
or simply ignored formal Christian observance 
altogether. As a result, pluralism became the guiding 
principle of the state’s religious policy. Not only was 
Parliament opened up to Catholics and Jews but 
the state soon offered these other groups financial 
support for some of their activities. Post-1833, the 
state began to fund education.  Within twenty years 
taxpayers’ money was being used not only to support 
Church of England schools (voluntary schools, as 
they became known) but Catholic, Wesleyan and 
Jewish schools as well. At the start of the 20th 
century, this policy was extended considerably. 
By this time, Anglican voluntary schools were in 
dire straits financially. They were rescued by the 
1902 Education Act which determined that secular 
education in these schools would be paid for by the 
rate-payers. However, the same support was also 
extended to Catholic and Jewish schools.  In an 
increasingly democratic society, it was no longer 
possible for the Conservative Party to prop up the 
Anglican Church without extending the favour to 
other religions (Feldman, 2011).
The implications of this pluralism are doubly 
conservative, for it not only carries a strategy of 
governance but also has weighty implications for 
the communities who are incorporated in this way. 
For example, when the British State acknowledged 
religious minorities it also bolstered the claims of 
figures and institutions to represent those minorities. 
One expression of religious pluralism was the 
Marriage Registration Act of 1836. For the first time, 
this allowed men and women to marry outside of the 
Anglican Church. Jews were just one of the groups 
that benefitted from this measure. The state, in effect, 
sub-contracted the regulation of Jewish marriages 
to the Board of Deputies of British Jews and to its 
religious authority, the Chief Rabbi, whose job it was 
to ensure marriages were performed correctly and 
recorded. This was convenient for the state, but also 
had a huge impact on the Jewish community.  The 
Board and the Chief Rabbinate were able to use the 
power invested in them to discipline congregations 
and exert sanctions on those who challenged their 
authority. When some reform-minded Jews created 
the West London Synagogue in 1842, they were 
not only excommunicated but the synagogue was 
refused a marriage licence (Feldman, 1994).   
The Past and the Present 
Over a period of two centuries or more, within the 
multinational Kingdom, in the empire and in relations 
between the state and different religious traditions, 
governments of all political parties have developed 
pluralist solutions. In each case, these solutions 
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SECTION II: SECULARISM, 
RELIGION AND SOCIAL 
COHESION 
Introduction: The Rising 
Prominence of ‘Faith’
Religion has been conspicuous in the recent 
development of social and community cohesion 
discourse in the United Kingdom and other nation 
states. Religion is seen simultaneously as a problem 
and a solution, a cause of social division and 
bloody conflict, but also a resource in building civic 
‘partnership’, inclusive local governance, ‘strong 
communities’ and a vibrant civil society. This public 
prominence of ‘faith’ and ‘faith communities’ is a 
relatively recent development, a cause, variously, 
for surprise, dismay, celebration and often febrile 
debate.  
Secularization, the draining of social significance 
from religious thinking, practice and institutions 
(Wilson, 1966), had been regarded as irreversible 
and ultimately universal. A defining feature of 
modernity in the West has been the ascription 
of religion to the private realm and to issues of 
personal religious practice and spirituality, distinct 
from the public and secular sphere of the state and 
politics. In England, despite the established status 
of the Church of England, this division has been 
particularly pronounced. Academic marginalization 
has also been evident, with religion often reduced to 
an epiphenomenon, a surface manifestation beneath 
which the ‘real’ causes of human development 
and conflict (specified in terms of such concepts 
as ethnicity, class and gender) can be uncovered 
(McTernan, 2003). Relatively little public research 
funding in the UK has been assigned to religion, 
while social policy debate in the decades after 
1945 was preoccupied by the scope and delivery 
of state-funded welfare, with religious organizations 
accorded a subordinate role. 
The secularization thesis continues to draw strength 
from the sharp decline in participation at formal 
worship in the main UK Christian denominations 
(see, for example, Brierley, 2000; Bruce, 2002). 
But other commentators point to the persistence, 
and indeed revival, of religion across the globe, 
with ‘only secular Western Europe and Australasia 
… appear[ing] to be conforming to the demise 
of the public deity so confidently pronounced by 
the founding fathers of modern social science’ 
(Ruthven, 2004: 196).  Parekh goes further, arguing 
that ‘the kind of inexorable and comprehensive 
secularization predicted and hoped for by secular 
writers has not occurred even in advanced western 
societies’ (Parekh, 2006: 323).
Moreover, although it remains a personal matter for 
many, religion also refuses to remain confined to the 
private realm. Many Christians in the UK act in the 
‘public square’, giving contemporary expression 
to longstanding social and political engagement, 
motivated by religious belief. Furthermore, the 
western distinction between public and private 
is liable to be less firmly drawn by the growing 
numbers of people of non-Christian religion in the 
UK:
...[Although] there was always recognition 
within Muslim societies of distinction 
between the public and private leading to 
a de facto division of powers,...  the Divine 
Spirit touches all of man’s actions whether 
this worldly or other worldly - in fact God 
is the Guide in all affairs [and] Muslim 
societies saw a fusion of religious, political, 
economic and social life. (Hussain, 2004: 
92-93)  
Much of this global religious resurgence is 
associated with separation and conflict, reflecting a 
defensive reaction to the uncertainties and risks of a 
globalized and ‘liquid’ world (Bauman, 2004; Sennett, 
1998). The UK government’s community cohesion 
3. Beyond ‘Social Glue’? ‘Faith’ and Community 
Cohesion
Robert Furbey
Sheffield Hallam University
Runnymede Perspectives14
agenda has developed in a context punctuated by 
the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, 
the London bombings of July 2005 and subsequent 
attempted bombings in UK cities.  Perhaps most 
immediately significant in the development of UK 
community cohesion policies were the disturbances 
in northern British cities and towns in 2001. Here, 
religion was implicated, together with ethnicity and 
social class, in socio-spatial segregation and the 
development of what the influential Cantle report 
termed ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001). Yet, despite 
these negative associations, the UK government has 
emphasized the positive social impact of religion.  
This chapter explores policy assumptions about faith 
and social cohesion. The first section explores the 
officially prescribed role of faith as ‘social glue’ and 
documents the government’s support for the social 
engagement of ‘faith’, followed by an assessment 
of the contribution of religious organizations, 
communities and their members to social cohesion 
on the government’s terms. The chapter then 
provides a critical account of the complexity of 
‘religion’ and ‘faith’ and their capacity to present an 
independent challenge to the state.  The concluding 
section draws on empirical research to assess the 
potential of faith communities and organizations to 
question the official definition of ‘social glue’ and to 
move beyond it, working with others in a free civil 
sphere marked by cross-boundary association, 
deliberation and empowered citizenship.        
Faith’s Prescribed Role 
For centuries, the Church of England was both 
an instrument of social care and social control, 
reaching down into every locality.  Churches 
and religious bodies were, after the family, the 
major source of welfare support.  Christian social 
thought, campaigning and philanthropic action 
(Nonconformist and Catholic as well as Anglican) 
have been important in shaping social policy and 
practice (Farnell et al, 1994). Even at the high-point 
of secular welfarism in the decades after 1945, this 
religious influence persisted through the legacy of 
figures such as R.H.Tawney and Archbishop William 
Temple. 
Nevertheless, the post-1945 welfare state was 
embraced, popularly as well as officially, as ‘an 
effective guardian of the common good [that] should 
be the principal provider of welfare’ (Forrester, 1985: 
14), reducing the role in public policy of religious 
and indeed other voluntary organizations. It is only 
in the last fifteen years that ‘faith’ appears to have 
‘come in from the cold’.
The recent governmental ‘turn to faith’ in the UK pre-
dates the advent of New Labour. The Inner Cities 
Religious Council (ICRC) was established in 1992 
during the Major Conservative administration. Since 
1997 the Labour government has been consistent 
in engaging with ‘faith communities’, retaining 
the ICRC as a forum where faith representatives 
‘can work together on urban renewal and social 
exclusion’ (DETR, 2001: 1). 
In 1997, a report by the Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (DETR) made a positive 
case for faith community involvement in urban 
regeneration:
They can help regeneration partnerships 
to understand the needs and concerns 
of people living in particular areas, or 
groups of people with particular needs… 
In terms of their active membership, 
churches, mosques, temples, synagogues 
and gurdwaras are often among the 
most substantial community-based 
organizations within an area. They have 
as much right to contribute to discussions 
concerning regeneration as residents’ or 
tenants’ organizations. (DETR, 1997: 149)
In the wake of the 2001 urban disturbances and 
9/11 attacks, government partnership with faith 
communities was explicitly linked to community 
cohesion and became increasingly consolidated 
within the Home Office and its Cohesion and 
Faiths Unit within the Race, Cohesion and Faith’s 
Directorate.  In April 2006, the government 
combined the ICRC and the Home Office’s Working 
Together Steering Group in a new Faith Communities 
Consultative Council (FCCC). The Council is a non-
statutory body, including representatives of major 
world faiths, which: 
… aims to provide a national forum, 
chiefly concerned with issues related to 
cohesion, integration, the development of 
sustainable communities, neighbourhood 
renewal, and social inclusion. [It also 
has] general oversight on engagement 
between central government and faith 
communities [and has the overarching aim 
of] giving faith communities a strong role 
and clear voice in improving cohesion, 
regeneration and renewal in local 
communities. (http://communities.gov.uk/
index.asp?id=1504813)
The place of faith in public policy and cohesion 
Secularism, Racism and the Politics of Belonging 15
strategies has been defended at regular intervals 
by senior politicians and key official documents. 
Tony Blair gave his strong endorsement early in 
his premiership: ‘Our major faith traditions – all of 
them more historic and deeply rooted than any 
political party or ideology – play a fundamental role 
in supporting and propagating values which bind us 
together as a nation’ (Blair, 2001).
In 2004, the Local Government Association 
(LGA) collaborated with the Home Office and the 
government-supported Inter Faith Network to 
produce a guidance manual for local councils 
working with faith groups, commending the latter 
as sources of community cohesion (LGA, 2002).  In 
2005 an interim report on the third sector included 
a positive assessment of the potential of faith 
communities in building networks and trust within 
civil society (ODPM / Home Office, 2005).  Soon 
afterwards, faith communities were identified in 
a Local Government White Paper as having an 
important part to play in achieving ‘strong and 
prosperous communities’ (DCLG, 2006: 54).
However, the overall tone of these policy documents 
is instrumental.  Faith communities are groups to 
be harnessed in order to address government 
objectives.  Moreover, religion is seen in essentially 
functional and consensual terms: as a social glue 
to be pulled out of the toolkit to bind community 
and society.  Before critiquing this simplistic view, 
which neglects the complexity and independence 
of religion, the following section explores the 
contribution of faith in the government’s own terms. 
Contributions of Faith
The 2001 Census of Great Britain included a question 
asking people: ‘What is your religion?’  People 
assigning themselves to the category of ‘Christian’ 
constituted a large majority (71.82%), while the non-
Christian religious population constituted 5.56%. 
The largest groups within the latter were Muslim 
(2.78%), Hindu (0.98%), Sikh (0.59%), Jewish 
(0.47%), Buddhist (0.26) (ONS, 2004).  People 
stating ‘no religion’ constituted 15.05% and 7.76% 
did not enter any response. However, these broad 
categories can mask a complex ‘range of diversities’ 
and ‘create an unhelpful abstraction that is not 
adequate to historical reality’ (ODPM, 2006: 8-9). 
Moreover, the Census question sheds little light 
on the significance that people attribute to religion 
in their lives and the extent to which it influences 
their personal and social practice.  When the 
European Values Survey asked respondents about 
the importance of religion in their life only 12.6% of 
respondents in Great Britain said ‘very important’ 
and  24.8% said ‘quite important’, while 33.0% said 
‘not important’ and 29.7% said ‘not important at 
Table 6.1: Formal volunteering in 12 months before interview, by 
whether respondent currently practises a religion within ethnic 
group (%)
Ethnic group Percentage of people who have 
engaged in formal volunteering
White
Practises a religion
Others
58
41
Asian
Practises a religion
Others
36
34
Black
Practises a religion
Others
51
34
Source: NCVO (2007), drawing on the Citizenship Survey of 2005 (DCLG, 
2005).
all’ (Halman, 2001: 33 – cited in 
ODPM, 2006: 7). 
This gap between affiliation and 
the significance which people 
attach to religion varies across 
the major faith traditions.  The 
fourth Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI) survey found that 95% of 
Muslims, 89% of Hindus and 
86% of Sikhs regarded religion as 
‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important in their 
lives.  The comparable figures 
for White members of the Church 
of England and White Roman 
Catholics were 46% and 69% 
respectively (Modood, 1997: 301 
– cited in ODPM, 2006: 7).  
When assessing the contribution 
of ‘faith communities’ and ‘people 
of faith’ to social cohesion 
and its perceived component 
elements, this division between 
passive affiliation and positive 
commitment is underlined. Thus, 
the Home Office Citizenship 
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Survey of 2001 found that religious affiliation made 
little difference to levels of informal and formal 
volunteering (Home Office, 2001). The Citizenship 
Survey of 2005 found a similar pattern in relation to 
participation in civic activities and charitable giving 
(DCLG, 2005).  However, volunteering and civic 
participation were, in general, above the national 
average among people claiming to practise a 
religion, as shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
A similar pattern emerges in the context of charitable 
giving.  Religious affiliation correlates positively with 
giving but the active practice of religion is associated 
with a further increase in levels of donation (DCLG, 
2005).
This data requires further exploration. There is some 
unevenness between groups and in the forms in 
which ‘contributions of faith’ are made. Variations 
between religions and broad ethnic groupings 
are likely to reflect differences and inequalities in 
material, human and social capital; religious and 
cultural histories; and diversity in theology and 
tradition.  Overall, however, religious commitment 
is associated with above-average levels of 
volunteering, civic activity and financial giving 
amongst individuals which address issues of social 
and community cohesion.  
In relation to the role of collective activity through 
faith organizations, it was estimated that there were 
over 54,000 places of worship in the UK in 2005 
(Christian Research, 2005).  In addition, there are 
many and diverse organizations which are prompted 
and shaped by faith but not necessarily engaged 
in explicitly ‘religious’ activity. In August 2006, over 
23,000 organizations stated in their returns to the 
Charity Commission that they engaged in religious 
activity. Many more organizations do not classify 
themselves formally as religious even though they 
are based on religious principles. Furthermore, faith 
community members engage in a multitude of social 
activities of varying scales which are not found on 
official registers. The National Council for Voluntary 
Associations concluded that: ‘the institutional 
manifestations of faith are embedded in society, in 
the fabric of the voluntary and community sector’ 
(NCVO, 2007: 16).  In terms of social cohesion, 
however, much depends on what these faith 
communities and organizations actually do. There 
can be negative social, and indeed ‘spiritual’, capital 
which, in extremity, may ultimately be expressed in 
terrorism and murder.  
An accumulation of recent research evidence 
indicates that many of the activities undertaken by 
faith groups may reasonably be seen as contributing 
implicitly to social and community cohesion. One 
study, notable for its scale and scope, was made 
in north-west England (Northwest Development 
Agency, 2003). This research surveyed over 2,300 
faith groups and organizations, encompassing nine 
religions (and including nine Christian traditions). 
The researchers found over 5,000 social projects, 
Table 6.2: Participation in civic activities, by whether respondent practises a religion 
within ethnic group (%)
Ethnic group Percentage of people who have participated in civic activity 
(civic activism, civic consultation or civic participation) 
Civic activism Civic consultation Civic participation
White
Practises a religion
Others
13
  8
25
  9
45
37
Asian
Practises a religion
Others
  8
  8
16
18
27
29
Black
Practises a religion
Others
13
  9
22
18
29
29
Source: NCVO (2007), drawing on the Citizenship Survey of 2005 (DCLG, 2005).
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involving over 45,000 volunteers across the region. 
These initiatives addressed diverse issues including 
homelessness, asylum, racism, crime, drug and 
alcohol abuse, health, skills development, art, 
music and environment. Studies in other regions 
and in specific cities have produced similar findings 
(see, for example, Yorkshire Churches, 2002; Lovatt 
et al, 2005; and Cairns et al, 2005).  
This research confirms the significance of 
individual action by faith group members and the 
provision by faith communities and organizations of 
charitable local social care and welfare.  However, 
a closer reading of this research also suggests 
engagement at a more structural level. Thus, a 
study commissioned by the Church of Scotland 
concluded that ‘[Church of Scotland] congregations 
make important contributions to the institutional 
infrastructure and social cohesion of many 
Scottish communities’ (Flint and Kearns, 2004: 18 
-emphasis added). This prompts an assessment 
of the contribution, present and potential of faith 
groups in a wider official project of civic renewal, 
working explicitly across boundaries to achieve 
community cohesion as distinct from ‘parallel’ social 
cohesion. Research for the Home Office (Lowndes 
and Chapman, 2005) and studies funded by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Farnell et al, 2003; 
Furbey et al, 2006) found evidence for a substantial 
contribution of faith in these contexts. But they also 
identify obstacles, misunderstandings and tensions. 
Any simple view of faith as handy ‘social glue’ is 
challenged by the complexity and independence of 
Britain’s faith communities.  
Misunderstanding 
Faith – Complexity and 
Independence
The instrumental tone of much official policy 
discourse and its underestimation of the complexity 
and independence of religious faith have already 
been noted.  With regard to complexity, if religions 
indeed ‘grow out of experiences, just like all other 
kinds of human knowledge’ (Taylor, 2003: 27), then 
the faith landscape will be highly diverse (see also, 
Armstrong, 1999). This places major demands on 
the ‘religious literacy’ of government policy-makers, 
all actors in local and regional governance, which 
include  political, official, academic, community, and 
indeed faith. There are few who are able currently 
to meet these challenges. ‘Faith communities’ exist 
at different spatial scales from global to local, with 
policy tending to focus on the local when religion 
is also a primary carrier of globalization. World 
faiths are all marked by internal differences of 
belief, interpretation, tradition and practice. Local 
‘faith communities’ that may seem homogeneous 
can exhibit significant internal diversity. Failure 
to recognize this can lead to false assumptions 
regarding such issues as the identity of ‘faith 
leaders’; their legitimacy in representation; the 
establishment of ‘faith seats’ on regional assemblies 
and local partnership boards; and the existence of 
a discrete ‘faith sector’ view within a wider, similarly 
diverse, voluntary and community sector.
Complexity is related to independence. Although 
government ministers have approved the ‘values’ 
that faiths bring to civic renewal and community 
cohesion programmes and have sought the moral 
validation of faith, the main official endorsement of 
faith involvement in public policy is with regard to the 
resources and organizational capacity which they 
can offer as a distinctive part of the voluntary sector. 
At local level it is faith communities themselves that 
are more likely to stress the distinctive significance 
of both values and beliefs (Lowndes and Chapman, 
2005): not only the concrete actions and institutional 
commitment of ‘religious capital’, but also ‘spiritual 
capital’ defined as: ‘the motivating basis of faith, 
belief and values (sometimes expressed in tangible 
forms as worship, credal statements and articles of 
faith, or more intangibly as one’s own  ‘spirituality’) 
that shapes the actions of faith communities’ (Baker 
and Skinner, 2006).
Of course, faith communities and their members 
have no monopoly of values, or indeed of faith 
and belief, although secular organizations may not 
readily use these latter words.  Yet participation 
in a worshipping community accords a particular 
centrality and regular reminder of ultimate sources of 
motivation.  Baker and Skinner observe that: ‘Some 
of the contributions of spiritual and religious capital 
naturally overlap with the practices and values of 
secular civil society – others are more distinctive 
and can create dissonance and discomfort’ (Baker 
and Skinner, 2006: 9).  While not universal, therefore, 
it is in the nature of faith members, communities 
and organizations to assert varying forms and 
directions of independence from official agendas 
and vocabularies of ‘regeneration’, ‘well-being’ and 
‘prosperity’ (see for example, Commission on Urban 
Life and Faith, 2006). 
An earlier article on urban regeneration and 
faith (Furbey and Macey, 2005) risked the over-
simplification just signalled by drawing upon a 
typology used by Castells to explore responses 
to globalization and its challenge to personal and 
collective identity (Castells, 1997). Castells refers 
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first to those who seek to assume the ‘legitimising’ 
identities offered and approved by dominant 
institutions. The evidence presented earlier in 
this chapter confirms the relative strength of 
engagement by faith communities, organizations 
and their members in voluntary action and varying 
‘legitimate’ civic activities. However, even here 
independence is soon evident and what, from the 
state’s perspective, might seem the ‘cuddlesome’ 
virtues of faith in assisting the ‘delivery’ of official 
policies and programmes is joined by ‘troublesome’ 
challenge.  Thus, competing with their commitment 
to engagement with the state, faith communities and 
their members also experience (often in common 
with secular organizations) a sense of ‘capture’ 
and mission compromised (as argued strongly 
by Bretherton, 2006), pressed to redirect limited 
capacity to public initiatives that disappoint in their 
outcomes and involve contrasting understandings, 
priorities, processes and timescales to their own 
(Farnell et al, 2003; Baker and Skinner, 2006; 
Furbey et al, 2006). These experiences, refracted 
by the doctrines, beliefs, values and collective 
knowledge of faith communities themselves, can 
prompt critique and resistance.
Resistance is the second of Castells’ types, a 
response that he sees as essentially defensive. In 
these terms, ‘resisting’ religious community offers 
strong internal bonding, separation from ‘the world’ 
and an emphasis on personal spirituality, piety 
and experience. Resistance can also involve the 
digging of ‘trenches’ of ‘survival’ (Castells, 1997: 
9), designed to hold on to physical, cultural and, in 
the case of faith, theological turf.    Such responses 
place more emphasis on internal social cohesion 
than on ‘bridging’ community cohesion.  
But these fortifications can, in time, become 
bridgeheads, a basis for more active advance back 
into society.  Re-engagement may take various 
forms, including the proselytising of individuals, but 
also social and political action.  Whether they have 
a ‘spiritual’ or a ‘social’ emphasis or elements of 
both, such outwardly directed activities can begin 
to connect with Castells’ final type, the ‘project’ 
identity. Here, the community or group goes on the 
offensive to empower people as subjects, transform 
society and to achieve a different life. People may 
be prepared for projects of this kind by the negative 
experiences and the capacity-building stemming 
from ‘legitimising’ activity, or by frustration with 
retreat as a mode of resistance. 
Of course, much project activity, as well as resistance, 
is inimical to the boundary-crossing associated 
with community cohesion, not least in a religious 
setting and particularly in a religious fundamentalist 
context.  Ruthven underlines the origins of the term 
‘fundamentalist’ in Christian Protestantism in North 
America and is careful to recognize the differences 
between world ‘fundamentalisms’.  Nevertheless, 
he identifies what he terms their shared ‘family 
resemblances’:  ‘Put at its broadest, it [religious 
fundamentalism] may be described as a ”religious 
way of being” that manifests itself in a strategy by 
which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve 
their distinctive identity as a people or group in the 
face of modernity and secularization’ (Ruthven, 
2004: 8).  But religious fundamentalism rarely 
involves only the resistance of retreat, because: 
‘For the activist fundamentalist (as distinct from the 
passive traditionalist) the quest for salvation cannot 
be realized by withdrawing into a cultural enclave’ 
(Ruthven, 2004: 57).  
The consequences can certainly be ‘troublesome’, 
and not only for governments.  A key question is 
therefore whether in terms of social and community 
cohesion, faiths must either be the ‘cuddlesome’ 
instruments of government or divisively troublesome, 
or whether they have a more independent and 
positive potential.   
Faith in Civil Society – 
‘Admirably Troublesome’?
Shortly after the London bombings of July 2005, 
Bernard Crick, a vice-president of the British 
Humanist Society, used the phrase ‘admirably 
troublemaking’ in reference to the East London 
Tenants Organization (TELCO). This organization 
(now part of the wider London Citizens network) 
is a coalition of faith and secular groups, whose 
beliefs, values and collective experiences motivate 
campaigns on issues of poverty, citizenship and 
empowerment. TELCO, Crick observes, ‘stretched 
their ecumenicity’ by electing him as an honorary 
fellow. He explains his reason for acceptance in 
these terms:
I risked a humanist blasphemy trial gladly, 
because all their practical actions were 
motivated by a morality of social justice. 
That is what they had in common… their 
real religious differences, if insisted on 
at every turn, would render impossible 
their common commitment to concrete 
objectives of justice and human rights. 
(Crick, 2005)
This example serves to question the assignment 
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of ‘faith’ to a Durkheimian role as social glue with 
which to ‘stick the teapot back together’ – a source 
of ‘binding’ values, a stock of physical and human 
resources, a compliant ‘partner’ in governance, an 
agent of a ‘responsibilized’ moral community, and 
a means to restore neighbourhood ‘governability’ 
(Atkinson, 2003). Rather, we see here a particular 
expression of the ’independence’ of faith as a critical 
and oppositional presence and its detachment from 
a purely civic role to one in the freer ‘space’ of civil 
society.  
An influential advocate of an ‘associational politics’ 
of civil society was Paul Hirst who came to advocate 
a decentralized liberal politics, with ‘associations’ 
working with government to secure better services 
based on local democratic involvement and 
enabling social groups to build their own social 
worlds in civil society. He makes this particular 
reference to religion: ‘At present [writing in 1994], 
it is not the old political forces of the left – who 
continue to advocate failed collectivist solutions - 
but religious and community groups who see the 
need for activism and co-operation to build a “civil 
society” for the poor and excluded’ (Hirst, 1994: 10 
– emphasis added).
The idea of ‘associationalism’ has been developed 
more recently by Chapman (2005) in relation to 
Christian theology and social practice in the age of 
New Labour. He contrasts the communitarianism, 
managerialism and nationalism of New Labour 
and ‘its depoliticized public sphere’ with a much 
more bottom-up pluralist society composed of 
participative communities characterized by the 
willingness and skill to resolve conflicts through 
deliberation and negotiation.  Chapman refers to 
the ‘premature harmony’ of  official ‘partnership’ 
and draws a parallel with what he regards as the 
oppressive notion, influential in Christian social 
theology, of a ‘common good’ as an end state. With 
Hirst, he prefers to focus on a process which involves 
communities which recognize the rights of others to 
be different and have a willingness to learn through 
dialogue, recognize complexity, and develop the 
qualities and skills of deliberation and negotiation 
(Chapman, 2005, chapter 7). These attributes seem 
highly congruent with those identified by Parekh for 
cohesion in a multicultural future:  ‘Our task today 
is to encourage this process of unplanned social 
and cultural integration by creating conditions in 
which our different communities can carry on their 
formal and informal conversation and help to evolve 
a shared but plural way of being British’ (Parekh, 
2005 – emphasis added).  Similarly, Amin contrasts 
the frequently exclusionary, defensive, divisive and 
reactive character of the politics of ‘community’ 
with a more open life in the wider public realm 
which demands the negotiation of difference and a 
willingness to ‘transgress’ the normal boundaries of 
interaction (Amin, 2002).  
A faith contribution to such deliberation, conversation 
and transgression demands of faith communities 
and organizations, not the fix of social glue, but an 
ability to contribute as a lubricant in the outworking 
of what Modood terms ‘an inclusive and work-in-
progress concept of national identity’ (Modood, 
2007).  In order to examine the potential and the 
limitations of faith organizations and their members 
in such a devolved and exploratory politics, the 
following discussion draws on evidence from two 
recent research studies (Farnell et al, 2003; Furbey 
et al, 2006). 
With regard to the limitations of faith, earlier 
discussion has referred to assertive world religious 
fundamentalisms which define themselves in terms 
of boundaries.  Further religious traditions involve 
a socially and politically passive retreat from ‘the 
world’. In the language of social capital, both 
embody strong ‘bonding’ but exhibit very limited 
‘bridging’ and ‘linking’.  
Secondly, many faith groups are not internally 
democratic and democracy may co-exist or conflict 
with scripture, tradition and charisma as principles 
of authority, reflected in internal exclusion and 
inequality on lines of gender, generation, ethnicity, 
class and sexuality. While such divisions and 
inequalities are not unique to ‘faith’ and may often 
have cultural rather than scriptural origins, barriers 
can arise which test the trust and understanding 
of other faith and non-religious groups and create 
tensions in the use of faith buildings for common 
civil endeavour.  
Third, there is substantial inequality between faith 
communities in their capacity to engage across 
boundaries.  The declining membership, the 
increasing average age of many ‘mainstream’ 
Christian congregations and the poor state and 
limited adaptability of religious buildings across the 
main traditions all raise issues of sustainability in civil 
engagement.  The allocation of resources to external 
networking activities often has to be balanced 
against members’ need for care. Non-Christian 
and Christian Black-majority faith communities 
and organizations vary greatly in size and material 
resources.  However, compared for example with 
the Church of England, capacity in terms of physical 
capital, organizational development, training 
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and capacity is typically much less. In all faith 
communities and organizations, leaders may lack 
the awareness and training required for boundary-
crossing encounter and deliberative politics. 
More positively, however, faith communities can be 
important contexts which develop the motivation, 
skills and qualities needed for ‘lubricating’ activity 
in civil society.  First, ‘bonding’ within a faith 
community can provide the individual with the 
required confidence, purpose, identity and ongoing 
sustenance, as many distinguished public lives 
confirm (the connections between Methodism 
and the Labour Party provide one example). 
Second, although faith communities may seem 
homogeneous to the outsider, many are internally 
very diverse compared with other voluntary and 
community groups. This provides a context for 
the practice of deliberation, negotiation, conflict 
resolution, and the exploration of other traditions 
and cultures. Third, faith communities are not just 
neighbourhood organizations. Rather, they are 
usually multi-layered, linked in varying degrees to 
national and international organizations, giving them 
access to wider networks of knowledge and material 
resources. Hence, although there is considerable 
diversity between local faith communities, they 
are not to be understood simply as locally bonded 
and ‘parochial’ in vision.  For example, Church 
Action on Poverty (CAP) is a national organization 
which connects and supports local groups and, 
in turn, draws on their experiences in developing 
campaigns. CAP and a partnership of local churches 
established the Community Pride organization, 
building networks with secular community groups to 
achieve a voice in the regeneration of Manchester 
and Salford.  
Fourth, although we have seen that faith buildings 
can be regarded as alien to members of other faiths 
and of no religious belief, there are multiplying 
examples of faith buildings which are being 
‘opened up’ so that cross-faith and cross-cultural 
encounter and collaboration can occur. The 
importance of such physical ‘spaces’ is magnified 
in the many neighbourhoods which have become 
‘social deserts’ through the closure of other contexts 
for civil activity. The Gujarat Hindu Society centre 
in Preston is adjacent to a magnificent temple and 
forms a major facility for Hindus in the city and 
well beyond. It serves to ‘bond’ and support local 
Hindu people through a range of services, but it 
also important in facilitating engagement with wider 
civil society and civic participation. The St Peter’s 
Centre in Coventry and the St Mary’s Church and 
Community Centre in Sheffield are two examples 
of finely adapted churches which permit inter faith 
and faith-secular encounter and joint-working in civil 
society (see Finneron and Dinham, 2002 for further 
discussion of faith buildings).      
Fifth, faith organizations and their leaders are often 
(although by no means always) trusted. This trust, 
stemming often from long-term presence and 
commitment in the field, and the wider institutional 
capacity of faith communities and organizations, 
can create various non-physical spaces which serve 
to connect and support the associations of civil 
society. An example here is the Churches’ Regional 
Commission for Yorkshire and the Humber, formed 
in 1998 with a particular focus on equipping people 
for confident engagement with public policy. This 
organization has a good reputation and its resources 
permit the support and connection of both faith and 
secular groups. A more ‘liquid’ example of a ‘space’ 
is found in Together for Peace in Leeds (T4P) which 
has an institutional dimension in the form of a council 
of reference composed of individuals from a range 
of faith and secular backgrounds and ongoing links 
with the local authority. However, its overriding 
quality is that of a network, composed of individuals, 
often with no, or limited, connection with a formal 
religious congregation, but with beliefs that inform a 
‘vision for peace’. At the centre of T4P is a biennial 
cultural peace festival in Leeds.  Between these 
festivals there is an ongoing programme of activity 
(theatre, film, music, sport, spiritual reflection and 
debate) on issues of peace and collaboration with 
others in events and campaigns.  
Many of the preceding examples can be located 
in ‘legitimate’ and state-approved ‘cuddlesome’ 
activity. Yet they also signal the many contexts in 
which faith communities, organizations and their 
members are engaged with people of other faiths 
and of no religious faith in processes, which can 
contribute to a stronger, more independent and 
yet cohesive civil society, marked by associational 
politics and the qualities of negotiation and 
deliberation. Such processes can ‘mess up’ the tidy 
‘finality’ of governance and issue in ‘troublesome’ 
campaigns, oppositional politics and, in Castells’ 
term, ‘projects’, as in the cases of London Citizens, 
Church Action on Poverty and, on a national scale, 
Jubilee 2000.  These activities, joined by the rapid 
growth of national and local inter faith forums, 
all seem to contribute to a less programmatic 
understanding of ‘social’ and ‘community’ cohesion 
than that expressed in the idea of ‘social glue’.
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Conclusion
This chapter has identified both the potential 
divisiveness of religion but also its complexity.  The 
major faith traditions all have central beliefs which 
motivate activity that can build and sustain social and 
community cohesion, as reflected in the substantial 
commitment by faith communities, organizations and 
their members in voluntary action and civic and civil 
participation. A strong element of instrumentality is 
evident in the government’s prescribed role for faith, 
presenting faith communities and organizations 
with both opportunities and dilemmas – a place at 
the table and an expanded role in service delivery, 
governance and civic and civil renewal, but at risk 
of capture and a compromise of mission.  
Nevertheless, faith communities and organizations 
have not been reduced simply to the compliant 
applicators of consensual social glue. While they 
contribute substantially in ‘legitimate’ ways that 
accord with state priorities, they also operate in a freer 
mode in collaboration across faiths and with secular 
groups and organizations, contributing as lubricants 
and participants in the processes of associational 
politics in civil society which can challenge state 
and market and offer a more durable, if not easily 
measured, social and community cohesion.   
Of course, not all faith actors are equally motivated, 
equipped or adept. If, as is so often stated, the 
practice of democratic citizenship has to be 
learned, then funding, substantially independent of 
government, must be found by faith communities 
to develop understandings, skills and qualities of 
deliberation, negotiation and wider democratic 
practice. Here we encounter the controversy at the 
heart of the debate on faith in the public realm. 
The ‘strong’ secularist argument is that, when allowed 
public expression, religion is liable to be divisive and 
destructive because communal religious allegiance 
runs counter to political loyalty to the secular liberal 
state; religions are inherently averse to compromise; 
a religious contribution to debate will be tied 
unhelpfully to closed belief systems which obstruct 
rational debate; and that religion is concerned only 
with the transcendent, not the material. While this 
chapter has recognized religious traditions which 
display such characteristics, it has also identified 
very different expressions of faith, individual and 
collective, which contribute significantly to cohesion. 
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4. Faith Organizations and Migrants Today: The Gender 
Question?
Pragna Patel 
Southall Black Sisters & Women Against Fundamentalism
Introduction
Since the inception of Southall Black Sisters (SBS), 
the demands that women from a variety of different 
minority and ethnic women have made, especially 
in the face of gender-related violence and lack 
of state protection, have always compelled us to 
address needs arising from racism and gender 
discrimination and inequality – simultaneously. In
meeting those demands, we have developed 
autonomous but also secular spaces, because of 
the failure of the state and indigenous community 
institutions to address the specific problems 
encountered by black and minority women.
Since 2000, however, the UK has seen a concerted 
assault on secular spaces in the wake of the civil 
unrest in northern cities in 2001, the 9/11 atrocity 
and the 7/7 London bombings of 2005. In the guise 
of the ‘War on Terror’, the state’s response to the 
threat of Islamist terrorism has been dominated 
by a two-pronged approach to minorities – first, to 
counter the direct threat of terrorism with draconian, 
anti-civil liberties measures; and, secondly, the 
development of the cohesion and faith-based 
approach to minorities to replace the previously 
dominant ideological framework of multiculturalism 
for mediation between state and minority 
populations.  Both these approaches contribute to 
what I would term as the de-secularization of public 
culture.
The process of de-secularization is having far-
reaching consequences in re-ordering and 
undermining the democratic nature of civil society 
with very specific consequences for all progressive 
struggles but especially those waged by minority 
women. This process is occurring hand-in-hand with 
other overarching themes of governance in the UK 
including the dismantling of the welfare state and 
shifting responsibility for social and economic well-
being onto local communities themselves and the 
pursuit of a racist anti-immigration agenda which 
has euphemistically been described as ‘managing 
migration’ by the government.
My view is that the new cohesion and faith-based 
approach to minorities has become a political 
resource used by the state and the religious right 
within minority populations to aid the de-secularization 
process. This has immense implications for minority 
women in particular, particularly as religious leaders 
jostle for the control of community representation. 
My argument is that struggles for gender equality, 
especially by minority women, and secularism now 
overlap and have taken on a sense of urgency 
because it is the human rights of minority women 
that are being traded in the various social contracts 
that are emerging between state and the dominant 
religious right minority leaderships in the UK.
The SBS Experience
To illustrate the problems that we now face, I want 
to take as my starting point the experiences of SBS 
in 2008, when we campaigned against a decision 
made by the local authority (Ealing Council) to 
cease critical funding used by SBS to provide life-
saving frontline services for minority women subject 
to violence and abuse in the family. What began as 
a local funding dispute soon came to signify a much 
larger struggle for equality and for the right to exist 
as an autonomous, secular, anti-racist and feminist 
organization.
In 2007, Ealing Council decided to cut funding to 
SBS on the grounds that specialist services for black 
and minority women worked against the interest of 
‘equality’, ‘diversity’ and ‘cohesion’. Our very name 
and existence was deemed to be unlawful under the 
Race Relations Act 1976 because the Council said 
that it excluded white women and we were therefore 
seen as discriminatory and divisive! Instead, in the 
name of ‘best value’ for money, the Council decided 
to commission a borough-wide generic domestic 
violence service using exactly the same funds that 
had previously been awarded to SBS – funds critical 
to SBS in meeting core costs which were not easily 
available from other grant-making bodies because 
most prefer to fund specific projects rather than 
overall running costs.
We were concerned that, if left unchallenged, 
Ealing Council’s approach would have allowed 
public bodies to redefine the notion of equality in 
ways that stripped it of its progressive content. It 
had come to be defined by Ealing Council as the 
need to provide the same services for everyone, in 
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an attempt to address some resentment amongst 
the white majority population that it was the majority 
white population rather than the minorities that had 
historically been discriminated and ‘excluded’ from 
civic regeneration policies. The notion of equality in 
this sense was no longer linked to the needs of the 
most vulnerable and deprived, but instead viewed 
as reflecting the needs of the majority community. 
Our fear was that this approach would be replicated 
with confidence elsewhere in the country, leading to
the widespread closure of similar organizations set 
up to counter racism and to provide minority women 
with real alternatives to patriarchal community 
(religious and cultural based) mechanisms for 
dealing with disputes in the family. In any event, the
process by which Ealing Council had arrived at 
its decision was also unfair since it did not take 
account of the equality legislation and its own 
equality policies in reaching its decision.
SBS therefore brought a legal challenge against 
Ealing Council which culminated on 18 July 2008 
when, at the High Court in London, we won an 
important affirmation of our right to exist as a secular 
specialist provider of domestic violence services to
black and minority women. In court, SBS submitted 
that Ealing Council’s approach to equality in effect 
meant that the race equality legislation in the 
UK could not protect those who are historically 
disenfranchized and discriminated since it rejected 
the notion of positive action in addressing racism. 
We argued that the Council’s ‘one size fits all’ 
approach was misconstrued because it ignored 
unequal structural relations based on class, gender
and race. We argued further that specialist services 
for minority women are needed for reasons to do 
with language difficulties and cultural and religious 
pressures, and because of the need for advice and 
advocacy framed within a democratic and secular 
ethos in complex circumstances where racism and 
religious fundamentalism are on the rise in the UK 
and worldwide.
SBS also argued that Ealing Council’s approach 
to cohesion was fundamentally wrong because it 
failed to recognize that, far from causing divisions, 
the provision of specialist services may sometimes 
be necessary to address substantive racial and
other forms of inequality, and that in turn is central 
to achieving a more cohesive society. We pointed 
out that the SBS project was in fact an example of 
how cohesion is achieved organically, borne out 
of collective struggles for human rights, and not 
by the imposition of ill-conceived social policies 
from above. We described how black and minority 
women from various national, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds learn to co-exist in the secular space 
provided by SBS. In doing so, they both tolerate
religious and cultural differences and at the same 
time challenge those religious and cultural practices 
that stifle their common desires and aspirations to 
live free from violence, abuse and other constrictions 
on their lives.
Cohesion – A New Policy 
Framework for Minorities
Cohesion is a malleable term that has never been 
precisely defined by the government. Official 
definitions refer to cohesion as a ‘process that must 
happen in all communities to ensure that different 
groups of people get on well together’. At the 
national and local level a ‘cohesive’ community is 
described as one in which there is a common ‘vision 
and sense of belonging for all communities; where 
the diversity of people’s different backgrounds 
and circumstances is appreciated and positively 
valued; where those from different backgrounds 
have similar life opportunities and where there 
are strong and positive relationships developing 
between people from different backgrounds and 
circumstances in the workplace, in schools and 
within neighbourhoods.1
As the SBS example so clearly shows, the cohesion 
approach promoted by the Government is now the 
dominant framework for dealing with minorities. 
It is a policy objective that is linked to the other 
overarching themes of governance in the UK today, 
greater civic engagement increasingly on the basis 
of faith identity if you happen to be from minorities; 
preventing violent Muslim extremism; ‘managing 
migration’ with a view to assimilation and the shift 
in state (institutional) accountability towards faith 
based organizations and institutions.
Whilst the rhetoric of cohesion appears to have 
laudable aims and locates the responsibility for 
community cohesion on all communities including 
the majority community, in reality the government has 
linked the issue with race (assimilationist policies) 
and the need for faith groups to play a greater 
role in civic regeneration. As a policy objective, 
its roots can be traced back to July 2001 and the 
civil disturbances in the northern cities of Burnley, 
Bradford and Oldham when largely Asian and white 
male youths clashed in the midst of simmering 
racial tensions and immense deprivation. We all 
know that the disturbances were rooted in structural 
problems of industrial decline, social segregation in 
housing and education, weak ‘kowtowing’ political 
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and community leaderships and the failure of social 
policies to redistribute resources equitably. But 
instead of dealing with structural inequality – the 
poverty and racism that was experienced and which 
lay at the root of the problem – the Blair Government 
blamed minorities for eroding cohesion and decided 
to use the opportunity to reject multiculturalism, and 
to ‘manage migration’, a euphemism for draconian 
border controls and immigration policies. The Blair 
government set about dismantling the multicultural 
framework. Significantly it cut short policies and 
developments on anti-racism that followed the 
publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report 
in 1999,2a which recognized the fact of institutional 
racism, following the racist murder of black 
teenager, Stephen Lawrence. At the same time, in 
a somewhat contradictory fashion, the government 
also set about encouraging more educational 
apartheid through state funding of separate faith 
based schools, and it set about encouraging 
unaccountable and self styled religious leaders to 
assert control over community resources.
Local Authorities around the country have therefore 
divested themselves and their areas of their ‘race’ 
equality departments and officers and replaced them 
with Community Cohesion Directorates. They have 
also targeted long standing single identity groups 
(more often than not, progressive and secular) for 
funding cuts at the same time as encouraging faith 
based groups to emerge.2b
This dual process was vividly evident at the height 
of SBS’s funding crisis. The irony of the situation in 
which SBS found itself was that at the same time 
that Ealing Council decided to withdraw financial 
assistance, Ealing’s Cohesion Strategy was, and 
continues to be, dominated by the need to promote 
faith based (largely Muslim) groups to deliver local 
welfare services.3a
The following objectives, for instance, dominate 
Ealing’s cohesion strategy, though they are by 
no means exhaustive: work with faith based 
groups; publish a faith directory; hold inter-faith 
conferences and improve inter-faith working; deliver 
Ealing Muslim Community engagement project by 
working with Muslim children and young people 
on issues, problems and social tensions affecting 
Muslims and how to engage Muslim communities 
to engage in the formation of public policy; deliver 
a faith volunteering project for schools, hospitals 
and the police targeting Muslim volunteers; provide 
conflict mentoring training for young Muslim 
children and people; hold a conference that will 
emphasize a scholarly interpretation of Islam that 
supports integration and citizenship; launch a 
Muslim network; build the capacity of third sector 
organizations that will explore the values of Islam; 
develop questionnaire to gather the views of 
Muslims.
Ealing Council’s Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) 
strategies carry on in a similar vein – reflecting 
a major preoccupation with engagement with 
Muslims only. Of the £45m made available by the 
government to local authorities to tackle extremism
amongst Muslims, Ealing Council received a total 
£205,000 for 2008–2009, rising to £225,000 for 
2009/10 and £286,000 for 2010–11. Ealing’s PVE 
agenda 2008 to 2011 seeks to ‘gather greater 
understanding of the issues/concerns facing Muslim
communities; provide space for greater dialogue 
and discussion around Muslim identity and 
understanding Islam values; provide more 
opportunities for engagement with the wider 
community through volunteering; and establish 
greater support networks for Muslim women. Under 
the theme of ‘Engaging with Muslim Women’, the 
Council has made a grant of £35,000 available to 
local groups to ’foster in young Muslim women a 
greater willingness to express their own views and 
influence their local community, a greater awareness 
on how to access public services offered by 
statutory bodies such as the Council, and a greater 
awareness on how to become involved in local 
decision-making processes.3b Youth services have 
also been provided with £10,000 to engage with 
Muslim girls in secondary schools through lunchtime 
sessions to discuss the concerns of the Muslim 
girls.4 Yet the very group that was empowering such 
women was being shut down!
Whilst Ealing Council maintains that the PVE focus 
‘compliments the emerging borough ‘Integration 
and Community Cohesion’ strategy developed in 
2007, in practice, the Council’s PVE and Cohesion 
strategies are indistinguishable one from the other. 
One consequence of Ealing Council’s cohesion 
approach is that it has encouraged the development 
of faith based initiatives including the creation of 
Muslim women only projects, without any reference 
to the politics and ethos of such projects and even 
though there are no visible demands for such 
organizations.5
We don’t think Ealing is unique in this respect. This 
approach is being repeated throughout the UK and 
the organizations that have so far been closed or 
threatened with closure are secular organizations for 
black and ethnic migrants, secular women’s refuges 
for black and minority women, disability groups 
and rape crisis centres. Following SBS‘s lead, 
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organizations confronting similar funding problems 
with their local authorities have mounted legal 
challenges against their Councils using the equality 
legislation but whilst some have been successful, 
others have not. Paradoxically, the emphasis 
on funding faith-based groups have led some 
previously secular black and minority organizations 
to re-fashion themselves as faith based groups – this 
has the effect of reinforcing the view that questions 
of identity within minority communities can be 
reduced to questions of religious values only.6
The state’s multi-faith approach has opened up the 
space for a reactionary politics of identity based on 
religion to flourish and has put power and authority 
into the hands of religious leaders. The conflation of 
issues around race with religious identity as defined 
by the state and fundamentalist and conservative 
religious leaderships, has also, paradoxically, 
led to the direct sponsorship of fundamentalist 
or reactionary organizations such as the Muslim 
Council of Great Britain, The Muslim Association 
and the Hindu Forum of Britain,7 all of whom claim 
to be ‘moderates’ and all of whom have enjoyed or 
enjoy an unprecedented influence on state policy 
towards minorities.
The so called ‘moderates’ may profess to keep 
law and order on the streets of Britain and decry 
the extremists in their midst but many are linked to 
violent fundamentalist movements abroad where 
violence is routinely used to subjugate women.8 
Nor are they moderate on the question of women’s 
rights in the UK. Many have used the space opened 
up by the government’s faith and cohesion agenda 
to put themselves forward as the ‘authentic’ voice 
of their communities and make demands which 
are primarily about limiting and policing women’s 
participation in the public sphere and maintaining 
the private sphere of the family as the only legitimate 
arena of female existence.
Dilemmas and 
Contradictions of Faith-
based Welfare Support
It has to be recognized that religious groups can 
and do play an important role in helping to combat 
poverty, homelessness and destitution faced by 
immigrants and asylum seekers, for instance, but 
they do this whilst remaining in the private sector, 
raising funds through their own membership and 
from other sources. Their users are relatively free 
to exercise choice in whether or not they wish to 
use their services. But what is harmful about the 
cohesion and faith-based approach is the fact that 
in the name of equality, religious groups are being 
brought into the public domain through public 
funding to provide services on the basis of their 
religious ethos and belief systems. The danger is 
that through need and individual circumstances 
coupled with a lack of alternatives, as funding and 
state support dries up, vulnerable minority women 
and other sub groups have no choice but to use 
the services offered by religious organizations. 
Needless to say, and as the experience of women 
and sexual minorities shows, those who do not share 
the ethos and values of such organizations will find 
themselves discriminated against and excluded.
Increasingly, we are caught in a double bind in 
this respect. SBS has always sought to challenge 
mainstream religious leaders for their claims to 
be the ‘authentic’ voice of their constituencies. 
The entrenchment of faith-based welfare projects 
represents a particular threat for women, particularly 
in regions where there are no effective alternative 
voices to counteract the religious institutions or 
the stranglehold of religious leaderships which are 
more often than not patriarchal, conservative, if not
fundamentalist, homophobic and discriminatory 
towards other groups.
We have had cases of migrant women with insecure 
status and who have been subject to domestic 
violence and abuse who have been forced to sleep 
on temple floors or in gurdwaras, that are unable or 
unwilling to protect them from abuse and harassment 
and who cannot offer appropriate services.
Yet the continuing dismantling of the welfare state 
also forces us more and more into the hands of those 
very institutions, to provide basic services for the 
women that we see. We have often had no choice 
but to turn to churches, temples and gurdwaras 
and to appeal to their charitable values to help with 
housing and providing food.
However, for obvious reasons in these situations, 
where possible and practicable, we have to insist 
on being involved to deal with casework aspects 
– whilst they use their resources to provide more 
immediate needs. But this situation is fraught with
considerable difficulties since it tends to privilege 
religion as the main basis of belonging to a 
community or expressing identity and legitimizes 
religious leaders and their institutions as ‘authentic’ 
community representatives.
A key component of community cohesion policies is 
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to emphasize the role of religious leaders and their 
institutions as ‘effective community representatives’ 
with whose aid the greater integration of minority 
communities can be achieved. Thus, the cohesion 
agenda privileges religion or faith as the main basis 
of belonging to a community, or of expressing 
identity. The findings of the interviews conducted 
with 21 women from different religious backgrounds 
who use the SBS centre, reveals that this is a 
deeply problematic assumption. Indeed, it is in this 
sphere that the respondents were not only critical 
of religious leaderships but also of the current 
emphasis in policy which treats their identities 
as fixed and unproblematic and which allows 
leaders as representative of various faith-based 
communities to take power over their lives. This is 
especially pertinent because many of the women 
are at the forefront of personal and political struggles 
to redefine their identities and their environment in a 
positive way. Instead of this being valued and used 
as the basis for creating a more harmonious and just 
society, the effect of current official cohesion policy 
is to create ossified and reified religious identities 
forcing abused women and other vulnerable groups 
to remain at the margins of the wider society!
The state’s immigration and asylum policies are not 
only a major factor in the creation of poverty and 
marginalization but they can also lead many to faith-
based organizations, often out of desperation to meet 
immediate needs for food and housing. However, 
this brought about a series of other problems such 
as exploitation which cannot be regulated easily. It 
can also force some to adopt religious identities and 
lead even more segregated lives than they would 
otherwise choose to. The neoliberal policies which 
roll back what were once essential functions of the 
State also helped to reinforce the role of religious 
institutions as more than just places of worship.9
Florence had fled her native Kenya due to gender 
persecution (escaping tribal rituals and customs 
which posed a serious threat to her life because they 
insisted that as a widow she marry her husband’s 
brother who was HIV positive) but in the UK, she is 
unable to work because her asylum claim and her 
application for NASS support was still pending. She 
is homeless and penniless and depends on a local 
Pentecostal church to provide her with a roof over 
her head and food. In return, Florence undertakes
voluntary work for the Church – taking part in its 
various activities. She is very grateful for the help 
that she receives but she is also ambivalent about 
the relationship she has with the church and its 
congregation which is not entirely a matter of choice. 
She has been moved from member to member in 
respect of her accommodation needs, but she also 
feels exploited because she is made to do all the 
cleaning and cooking and other domestic chores 
for the people that she is staying with:
...I knew that the pastor would help me with 
voluntary work and with accommodation. 
The pastor helped me when I was crying 
and said that I had nowhere to stay and 
he announced in church and a sister 
agreed. I have kept moving because 
they can’t keep me for long because 
they have families. They take advantage 
of me – doing the house chores and you 
have to do the cleaning and shopping and 
sometimes you are tired but you just have 
to go because you are at their mercy. You 
just can’t let them down. Sometimes, I am 
not in the mood for cooking but just have 
to do it because you are in their house…  
(Florence)
The state’s policies on immigration and asylum not 
only increase destitution but encourage a culture 
of dependency on religious organizations which 
are not always welcome. In addition there are no 
safeguards against the forms of exploitation that
occur due to the vulnerability of members who have 
no means or access to other essential support. 
For Florence, her over-dependency on religious 
based institutions has created its own forms of 
marginalization since there is little or no opportunity 
for her to mix with anyone other than those of the 
same religious backgrounds and with the same 
religious beliefs within the congregation.
...If I had my own accommodation and was 
working – I would still do voluntary work 
in Church but I wouldn’t be as dependant 
on the Church. I would prefer to volunteer 
in the community – to reach out to all the 
people not just in the Church. I wouldn’t 
be so religious, because I don’t want to 
block people from reaching me and I like 
to be integrated with all…. I wouldn’t like to 
stick to only religion so that I don’t speak to 
another person of a different community or 
religion. (Florence)
The relationship between the respondents and their 
religious institutions is clearly not straightforward. 
Nor are such places often the most appropriate 
places in respect of the support and assistance that 
is often needed to address the complex family and
immigration problems and the attendant trauma 
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that ensues that women who attend SBS present 
with. Often lack of support in these matters can 
even be dangerous since many refugees and 
immigrants are involved in issues of life and death. 
In Florence’s case, although the Church offered 
her accommodation and food, it did not consider 
offering her assistance to address her immigration 
problems:
...SBS help with immigration problems 
and accompanying me. The Church didn’t 
offer to help me with immigration - they 
know but they didn’t take me anywhere 
for advice because they were thinking 
they would have to pay. They told me that 
it is very expensive – they know I had a 
problem but they could only help me with 
accommodation. They didn’t show me 
SBS. I got it from the internet. (Florence)
The isolation and marginalization that women like 
Florence feel is often not alleviated by a religious 
organization which although it gives them some 
support and perhaps even peace of mind, may not 
be the place that women identify with completely or
wish to unburden themselves in respect of their 
personal problems:
…I identify with women’s institutions so 
when I was down and I wanted to look for
women’s places, the first thing I found was 
SBS and I was surprised as I lived in
Southall but did not know. I had not found a 
place where somebody would listen to
me and I was relieved when I came to SBS. 
(Florence)
The links between poverty, racial discrimination 
and migrant communities are now well recognized, 
although both central and local governments 
have had little or nothing to say on these links in 
respect of their cohesion policies, despite talk of 
promoting equality. What is even more glaring is 
that even where there is some critique or recognition 
of the connection between poverty and minority 
populations, there is no proper recognition of 
the gendered dimensions of poverty and racism 
as experienced by women in their daily lives. 
Women’s experiences of poverty is the result of a 
combination of factors both internal and external 
to their communities. On the one hand, patriarchal 
dynamics of family and community gave them little 
control over their lives, but on the other, lack of skills, 
insecure immigration status and racism result in 
their casualized and insecure positions in the labour 
market. The failure of cohesion policies to focus 
on poverty – a vital component of segregation in 
society – impacts not only on how poverty and well-
being is experienced and tackled but also diverts 
attention towards superficial cultural manifestations 
of segregation in society. This approach obscures 
another overarching aim of the state which is to cut
back the welfare state and shift responsibility for 
economic well-being on to communities themselves, 
thus sowing the seeds of further discord between 
different groups and sub-groups competing for 
scarce resources.
The Gurdwaras and the 
Concept of ‘Sewa’
Although, even here, we question the way in which 
such services are provided. For example in Southall, 
gurdwaras have a strong tradition of carrying out 
‘sewa’ and providing welfare housing and food for 
the destitute. This has taken on a new meaning 
recently with the wave of students from abroad – 
in our case from the Indian sub-continent who find 
themselves in the UK having been lured by bogus 
colleges or even if they have arrived legitimately, 
thinking that they can get jobs to enable them to 
study here. The recession has of course meant that 
they cannot find jobs and the situation of destitute 
students in Southall reached a peak in September
2009. In response the Sikh Awareness Society 
set up a helpline to provide housing and help for 
destitute students.
However, it was interesting to see that the helpline 
was advertised for female Sikh students only. 
When I asked about this the answer was that it 
was a massive problem and as a non-government 
funded body could not help the men but felt that the 
women were more vulnerable and therefore needed 
their immediate support. I was also told that once 
they were housed with well-meaning Sikh families, 
they were looked after and guided in the right 
direction. When asked whether they would benefit 
from referrals to SBS to provide further support and 
assistance the answer was a resounding ‘No’ and 
that amongst the congregation, they had all the 
skills they needed to help.
Perhaps this was a well-intentioned intervention – it 
is hard not to argue that women who are destitute 
are more vulnerable to sexual exploitation. However, 
when you look closely at the Sikh Awareness 
Society (SAS) associated with a well-known radical 
and fundamentalist gurdwara in Southall, which had 
set up the helpline you find that the society was 
established as a response to growing concerns about 
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the so-called ‘grooming’ of youth into criminality and 
drugs and interestingly their conversion to Islam. 
They claim to deal with problems affecting the Sikh 
community, to set up counseling and rehabilitation 
programmes, promote greater understanding of 
Sikh religious concepts and history; provide ‘Big 
Brother’ and ‘Big Sister’ support for Sikh youth and 
act as a liaison body between the Sikh youth and 
the committees of the gurdwaras.
However, on its website the SAS lists as one of its 
main aims the prevention of young Sikh girls from 
forced conversion into Islam and states that it has 
supported a family in trying to track down a runaway 
daughter who they argue was being forcibly 
converted to Islam (in fact, Hindu and Sikh leaders 
made much of this issue of forcible conversions 
categorized as ‘extremist grooming – and even 
had the Metropolitan Police devote considerable 
resources to this – even though there is little or no
evidence of such forcible conversions). It would 
appear that both Hindus and Sikhs are using this 
argument as a means of distancing themselves 
from Muslims, and to mobilize state resources to 
also be directed at meeting the needs of Hindu 
and Sikh communities (in other words, they 
endorse and encourage the communalization 
of Asian communities, even when they profess 
that communalization can cause racist tensions). 
Indeed the SAS’s entire welfare approach is based 
on bringing the youth back into the religious ‘fold’ 
so to speak and in this respect targeting destitute 
and runaway women – whose minds and bodies 
are often used by religious fundamentalists or 
communalists as signifiers of the boundaries of 
community and cultural and religious values makes 
complete sense! The SAS argues that they have 
had great success in garnering support from Sikhs
including getting millionaires and trustees of the 
gurdawara to pledge support. They stated that they 
had more rooms than they knew what to do with – 
but when pressed as to why those resources are not 
being used for destitute male students, they argued
that they do not have the resources because there 
is a ‘massive problem’ of male Indian Sikh students 
in Southall and surrounding areas who arrive as 
bogus or legitimate students but who cannot survive 
because the jobs that they hoped to get are no longer 
available and the constant raiding of workplaces by 
immigration officers has made it difficult to find any 
informal work.
When I questioned why the helpline was limited to 
women, when a number of organizations in the area 
(including SBS) can help, the spokesperson argued 
that they have set up a sister charity S.W.A.T. This 
charity the - Sikh Welfare Awareness Team is a 
new charitable organization set up to combat drug 
and alcohol involvement amongst Sikh youths by 
providing youth with activities and organized events 
to participate in. The Sikh Welfare Awareness Team 
(or S.W.A.T.) is currently working to bring awareness 
to the growing number of Sikhs, many who are 
recent immigrants from Punjab and are homeless 
living on the streets of Southall. Many of these men 
(and women) living on the streets have turned to 
drugs as a means of coping in their circumstances. 
While local Gurdwaras are feeding these young 
men, S.W.A.T. is helping to provide clean clothes, 
bedding, medical referrals and help for those who 
wish to return to Punjab.
This all sounds fairly innocuous until you get to the 
main point of the organization. The organization also 
notes that many local churches are also helping 
these young men by providing them with hot 
showers and counselling services. S.W.A.T. states
that two young men have converted to Christianity 
through the efforts of the missionaries and asks why 
our own community is not doing more. So, one can’t 
help but think that this is the real fear – conversions 
to Christianity – and with it the loss of control over 
youth and identity.
The vacuum that is created by the failure of the 
state to give adequate support to those who are 
destitute, especially migrants and asylum seekers 
who are unable to work or claim benefits to meet 
essential living costs, is increasingly filled by 
religious organizations. However, this does highlight 
significant contradictions in the cohesion rhetoric 
since it perpetuates exclusionary practices within 
the state and in community organizations because 
religious organizations are encouraged to provide 
welfare services on the basis of religious identity 
and membership and not need. This creates and 
reinforces segregation and division along various 
axes of power according to age, gender, caste, 
class, sexuality and so on. Women like Florence 
who are denied basic rights to live and work in 
the UK and who have the least socioeconomic 
and political power within and outside of their 
communities, bear the brunt of such segregation, 
resulting in further marginalization, disadvantage 
and disempowerment.
Conclusion
Unsurprisingly, the implementation of the cohesion 
and faith based agenda has set religious right 
forces and feminists within the minority communities 
in particular on a collision course. This is perhaps 
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5. The Diversity of Muslims and the Necessity of Secular 
Rule
Sami Zubaida
Birkbeck College, University of London
Introduction
There is a widespread tendency to present Islam 
as a unitary entity, exemplified in the reference to 
the ‘Muslim World’. This totalization is shared by 
Muslim spokesmen indulging in identity politics 
as well as public discourses in the West, in the 
media and political pronouncements, notably 
President Obama’s 2009 Cairo address to the 
‘Muslim world’. Islam, like Christianity, is a corpus 
of sacred texts, traditions, rituals and laws, diverse 
and even contradictory, which allow a wide range of 
constructions. There is no unitary ‘Islam’, but many 
sorts of Muslims, for whom religion plays diverse 
roles, or could be of little importance.
In the context of modern political discourses, 
in both the Middle East and among Muslim 
populations in the West, the presentation of Islam 
as a common identity plays an important part. We 
may identify what I call ‘Umma nationalism’, the idea 
that Muslims in the world are a unitary community 
under attack from hostile forces also identified as 
Christians (‘Crusaders’), Jews and Hindus: a clash 
of civilizations cast as religious communities, and a 
representation of international relations as religious 
communalism. There are some militant and pious 
groups for whom this caricature is a central motif. 
But for many Muslims, even some secular Muslims, 
Umma nationalism is a floating discourse on which 
they occasionally draw for political pronouncements. 
Most Muslims, for instance, would not follow the 
Taliban or the late Bin Laden in their obscurantist 
and violent enterprises, yet may, on occasion, see 
them as a balance against an imperialist West, or 
would view manifestations of the ‘war on terror’ as 
an attack on Muslims in general.
Part of this Umma nationalism is to view certain wars 
or conflicts as attacks on Muslims as a whole, such as 
those occurring in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine 
and Iraq. This conception obscures the imperialist 
and geo-political nature of these conflicts, and the 
fact that almost all of them involve conflicts in which 
Muslims fight on opposite sides. In Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Iraq, it is primarily Muslims who have 
killed large numbers of other Muslims over the 
past years. Sectarian and doctrinal identities are 
superimposed on conflicts over power, territory and 
resources. Muslim rulers and dynasties, notably the 
impeccably Islamic Saudis, are intimate allies of the 
US. To label all these conflicts and wars as attacks 
on Muslims is not only wrong but politically counter-
productive, for it obscures the real issues at stake.
The Diversity of Muslims
Muslims in Britain and the west consist of diverse 
populations, differentiated by ethnicity, class, 
gender, generation and religious orientation 
following those other factors. Many are secular 
or indifferent to religion or ‘cultural Muslims’. 
Those with religious commitment vary between 
conservative/salafi, militant jihadi, modernist/
reformist and traditional ethnic Islam, including Sufi 
orientations, or mixtures of those types, given that 
few people are ideologically consistent. There is, in 
addition, the bond of family and community, which 
is important to some, such as the Pakistani working 
class communities in the north of England, where 
the community and ethnic bonds are maintained 
through networks of connections with the home 
village and the import of brides and grooms. 
Elsewhere, we find patterns of individualization. 
Individuals, escaping the ethnic and communal 
bonds, can be secular or adherents of one or 
other of opposing religious orientations present in 
the current discursive fields: modernist reformism 
or Wahhabi rigour, both of which seek, in different 
ways, an Islam ‘purified’ of its ethnic and popular 
accretions. These are the ideological Muslims. 
Here, we should distinguish between ‘culture’ and 
‘ideology’: many of the individualized Muslims are 
culturally assimilated into the mainstream, and 
their dissent, if they are oppositional, is ideological, 
often expressed in the idiom of the ambient culture: 
language, idiom and conceptions of politics and 
society. This distinction is missed in the ‘multi-
culturalism’ advocacy.
Superimposed on all these are formal communal 
organizations and leaderships with claims to 
‘represent’ Muslims to the State and the wider 
society, and also with attempts to impose religious 
authority. Let me expand a little in this question of 
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SECTION III: THE GENDERED 
DEBATE ON SECULARISM 
6. Secularism, Racism and the Contemporary Politics of 
Belonging: Muslim Women in the UK
Haleh Afshar
University of York
Introduction
It is the contention of this paper that the notion of 
secularism as an inclusive political framework is 
deeply flawed. It is blind to the embedded nature 
of faiths that provide both a moral compass and a 
daily pattern of rituals, both in the public and often 
in the private domains. If secularism is identified as 
pivotal to defining nationhood and belonging then 
those who choose to be different are, by definition, 
rafts of peoples of faiths who view religion as part 
of their identities in theory and practice and would 
feel excluded and ‘otherized’. In this context faith 
becomes a newfound surrogate for race and 
ethnicity in erecting barriers to the equality of rights 
and entitlements of many citizens. It is my contention 
that the demands of politicized radical Islam, in terms 
of the prescriptions that it makes, are not rooted in 
an antipathy between Islam and democracy, but 
rather in the failure of some democracies to meet 
the needs of Muslims. Furthermore, there is a highly 
gendered aspect to Islamic radicalism which may 
well be understood differently by Muslim women, 
including the mohajabehs –women born and raised 
in the UK who are demonized for their dress code 
and seen as a threat not only to norms and cultures, 
but also to national security. 
Secularism became the preferred framework for 
nation building in the 20th century. Yet arguably the 
veneer of secularism hides the reality of Christianity 
as both the norm and the fundamental parameter 
of laws and politics in the West and Islam in the 
Middle East. For a democracy to live up to its name, 
it has to be accommodating of the nation’s religious 
values and sentiment, if it is to reflect the popular 
will. Therefore it may be argued that for those who 
are religious a secular government could be said to 
be failing to represent their views and values and 
therefore could be considered not to be altogether 
democratic. If and when secularism becomes a 
quasi-religion in itself then it can actively bar the 
way to democracy, free choice of citizens to their 
faith and personal laws and in the case of women to 
their dress codes.
This is particularly problematic in contexts of 
Western democracy where even a constitutional 
commitment to laïcité, as in the case of France or 
the US has masked the prevalence of Christianity 
as the fundamental norm that shapes daily activities 
and provides legal and political frameworks. In 
his acceptance speech, the American President, 
Barack Hussein Obama invokes the God of 
Christianity and the President of secular France, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, claims France as ‘the eldest 
daughter of the Church’. In the UK, the Bishops in 
the House of Lords have the right to speak up for the 
faith and be heard. 
It may be argued that the commitment to secularism 
by states had in some cases offered an opening 
for the social inclusion of some minorities including 
Muslims, who were not immediately recognized 
by their dress codes or the colour of their skin as 
’the other’. There was a level of fluidity that enabled 
them to be of a different faith – a good Muslim or 
a good Jew – and be a good citizen. However, 
that option was closed after 9/11 and in particular 
in the UK after 7/7 when once more the Muslims 
found themselves demonized as a category and 
branded as the enemy within. The question that 
then arose was that a newly constructed demonic 
status has been erected that bars the way to the 
fluidity of identities and demands of Muslims to 
choose between Britishness and their faith. The 
emotional barrier to belonging and national identity 
has been particularly hard to accept for second and 
third generation Muslims, many born and raised in 
this country, who were beginning to hope not to be 
classified as ‘immigrants’ any longer. 
Decades of hard learned conformity, cohesion and 
collaboration over the divides were suddenly broken 
asunder as the barbaric behaviour of a handful 
of young men was described by the media and 
remarked on by some politicians as the true nature 
of Islam. Islamophobia was born, fully formed and 
vehemently aggressive as an effective means of 
‘otherizing’ an entire category of people who, with 
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the exception of their faith, may well have little in 
common.
Presidents and Bishops have the luxury of 
proclaiming and practising their faith. When it 
accords with the mainstream underlying beliefs 
of the nation, religion becomes merely another 
indicator of belonging to the mainstream. Flouting 
secularism by a Christian may be considered 
curious by some but is accepted as fitting well 
within the parameters of liberal values. But when 
a Muslim does so, it is construed as divergence, 
or even a potential forerunner of extremism and a 
national threat.
Yet the self identification by faith does not in any way 
undermine commitment to the nation. As a matter of 
fact, as the 2007 Gallup and the Coexist Foundation 
survey indicated, despite rampant Islamophobia, 
77 per cent of British Muslims identified with the UK, 
compared with 50 per cent of the general public. 
But whereas the vast majority of British Muslims 
(82%) felt Muslims were loyal citizens, the general 
public remained suspicious of them. 
It is hardly surprising that there was a deep 
sense of confusion for these Muslims. Faced 
with Islamophobia in their everyday lives, many 
found it extremely hard to deal with the sudden 
feeling of alienation. The paucity of channels of 
communication led to the realization that the views 
of the Muslim communities were not heard and 
represented at the levels of legislature and decision 
making. The identification of the Muslims of all 
colours and varieties of the creed as one and the 
same made democracy and secularism into hollow 
promises. Political despondence and intensification 
of Islamophobia suddenly may have made the 
alternatives offered by groups such as Hizbut-
Tahri seem attractive (http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/
english/).
Islamophobia
What was unexpected then was that secular 
countries, the media and government suddenly 
began defining a group of their citizens in terms 
of faith and demonizing Muslims as ‘the other’–
the unwanted cuckoo in the nest, the terrorist, 
sexual attacker and the abductor of ‘white’ girls. 
Islamophobia created a wide gap between the 
Muslims’ perception of who they are and the ways 
that they are viewed by the host society. In the 
words of Baroness Sayeeda Varsi (Daily Telegraph, 
20 January 2011), Islamophobia has passed the 
dinner party acceptability threshold. 
The question that arose was: if a dispersed and 
diverse group of different colours, ethnicities and 
antecedence is demonized as representing a single 
threat, then how do the adherents to the faith respond 
to this ascribed identity? Many chose to abandon 
their Muslim identity, change their name and seek to 
become ‘real’ British by denying their creed. But for 
the majority such a deception was not an alternative, 
either because of their commitment to Islam, or by 
colour, or by a deep sense of entitlement to being 
both British and Muslim.
Some Muslims chose to adopt the ascribed 
identity of Muslim as a badge of honour ‘to use 
Islam specifically as a means of creating political 
allegiances and solidarities. A new Islamic ideology 
gained momentum as a radical and viable political 
alternative’ (Mirsepassi, 2000: 59-60). They too 
announced that it was no longer possible for the 
youth in the UK to be both British and Muslim 
and that it was necessary to ‘choose’ between 
faith and nationality (Sunday, BBC 4, 24 August 
2003). Islamist groups such as the Al Muhajerun 
announced ‘You are either with the Muslims or with 
the Kaafir’ (The Guardian, 9 September 2004). 
They  paraded their ‘choice’ in London by calling a 
conference on the 11 September 2003 to glorify the 
suicide bombers, calling them the ‘Magnificent 11’. 
Although in October 2004 Al-Muhajerun closed its 
website and announced that it was dissolving and 
ceasing its activities (The Guardian, 13 October 
2004), it is not clear whether they have simply been 
driven underground or have really disbanded. 
However, other groups such as Hizbut-Tahrir have 
retained a presence. They define themselves as a 
‘political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics 
is its work’. 
The fears engendered by Islamophobia led to a 
political backlash on both sides and can play into 
the politics of groups such as the far-right British 
National Party (BNP) who capitalize on fear of the 
other. At the same time, restrictive policies that 
specifically target Muslims are fuelled by measures 
such as the US Patriot Act and the UK Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001. Not surprisingly the 
riots in the outskirts of Paris led to wholesale arrests 
of Muslims. French born and bred Muslims suddenly 
found themselves branded as ‘scum’, ‘foreigners’ 
and the ‘enemy within’. A legal technicality that 
requires citizens at the age of 18 to make a positive 
decision to be French was used by the Minister of 
Interior Affairs, Nicolas Sarkozy, to order the arrest 
and ‘sending back home’ of young men to countries 
that they may not have even visited before (New 
York Times, 10 November 2005). By November 2005 
rafts of ‘scum’ and ‘young hooligans’ were arrested 
(The Observer, 6 November 2005) under the French 
emergency measures. As a matter of fact, they 
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had rioted to gain equality, not Islamic laws (Paris 
Reuters, 17 November 2005). Nevertheless they 
were to be ‘expelled from the country, regardless 
of whether they [we]re in France legally or illegally’ 
(New York Times, 10 November 2005). 
The plight of the French merely highlights the 
difficulties that Muslims were experiencing. By 
November 2005 an estimated 800,000 Muslims were 
imprisoned across the world accused of ‘terrorism’. 
Some were sent to countries that permitted torture 
in order to extract information from them (The 
Guardian, 18 November 2005). Many had no access 
to lawyers or entitlement to due process. It is still 
not unusual at gatherings of Muslims to find that the 
majority have either been stopped and searched or 
arrested themselves or this has happened to friends 
or relatives. 
In the UK the situation became daunting after 7/7 
and the realization that there was a shoot to kill 
policy that could threaten their lives (The Guardian, 
14 September 2005). The combination of these 
measures locates Muslims in general and Muslim 
youth in particular as sometimes unwilling emblems 
of combative Islam at the crossfire between faith 
and state policies. It is at such points of crisis that 
some Muslims hanker back to the days of Islamic 
glory and find the call for the supranational identity 
of umma to be alluring.  
The fear of otherization by Muslims was intensified 
in February 2004 when the French government 
decided to ban the head scarf from schools and bar 
access to education to anyone wearing religious 
insignia. The obligation to choose a specific dress 
code as an indication of Frenchness was problematic 
for many since it was not nuns that were prevented 
to dress as they chose, but Muslim women. In the 
name of secularism, young women born and bred 
in France were not permitted to exercise their right 
to education without abandoning what they saw 
as their religious demand to cover.  Since these 
measures were introduced in the name of equality, 
it was perhaps unavoidable that the Muslim youth 
would, in the long run, protest as they did, to seek 
their elusive equal citizenship rights.
However, the demand for Muslims to recognize 
themselves primarily in terms of their faith makes an 
assumption about uniformity of the faith that is far 
from the truth. Though a powerful call, that maybe 
appealing in theory, in practice they have adopted 
the mantle of ‘the other’ in the name of a single 
Islam since the Koran is addressed directly to the 
believers and there are no intermediaries between 
the text and the faithful, unless the latter chooses to 
consult an alem (scholar). Yet, since each person’s 
understanding is shaped by the experiences of 
time, place and the ability to understand the true 
meaning of the classical verses in Arabic, it is 
hardly surprising that there are many different 
understandings and interpretations of the faith. In 
practice Islam is divided in its implementations by 
different schools of law and differing traditions of 
formulating and applying Sharia, religious laws. 
The Mohajabehs
Men and women are likely to respond differently 
to the call for unity, not only because by and large 
terrorism is imagined to be the domain of men, but 
also because there is a gendered perception of 
Islam. Thus, although there is a shared experience 
of Islamophobia, for Muslim women this experience 
is not bounded by race and ethnicity. Islam 
subsumes, without excluding, their race, ethnicity 
and nationalities. Nor is it impermeable to feminists’ 
demands for active political participation at all 
levels. For Muslim converts the decision to wear 
the hijab in the West is a public political assertion 
of the right to belong to the community of Muslims, 
but, particularly for convert women, it is not a 
rejection of home and hearth and kinship relations 
with their non-Muslim families and parents. Within 
liberal democratic states and feminist contexts their 
decision to wear the hijab is a matter of faith and 
identity and a political act of solidarity, but not one 
that alienates them from their kin and communities. 
Hence, umma becomes part of the fluid identity 
that is inclusive rather than one that delineates 
boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Women from ethnic minorities, particularly the 
mohajebeh, may have more in common with 
their ‘white’ British-Muslim sisters than their male 
brethren. Thus though there is a shared experience 
of Islamophobia, for Muslim women the umma 
means that this experience is not bounded by 
race and ethnicity. The umma subsumes, without 
excluding, their race, ethnicity and nationalities. 
Nor is it impermeable to feminists’ demands for 
active political participation at all levels. For Muslim 
converts, the decision to wear the hijab in the West 
is a public political assertion of the right to belong 
to the community of Muslims, but, particularly for 
convert women, it is not a rejection of home and 
hearth and kinship relations with their non-Muslim 
families and parents. Within liberal democratic 
states and feminist contexts their decision to wear 
the hijab is a matter of faith and identity and a 
political act of solidarity, but not one that alienates 
them from their kin and communities. Hence umma 
becomes part of the fluid identity that is inclusive 
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rather than one that delineates boundaries between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.
Yet with the rapid rise of a virulent new form of 
Islamophobia, women who cover find themselves at 
the heart of the hatred and are targeted both in the 
media and in the public domain at large. According 
to one estimate after September 11, there was an 
average of 3.8 attacks a day on Muslims, mainly 
women (The Guardian, 8 December 2001). Strikingly, 
this number is only a reflection of those assaults that 
had been reported to the authorities; many of the 
violent assaults – hammer attacks, petrol bombs – 
remained unreported. A human rights activist who 
had received obscene phone calls noted: ‘It’s as 
if there is no confidence in the authorities to stop 
it’ (Chrisafis, The Guardian, 8 December 2001). 
Muslim women had already been defined as clear 
examples of the barbarism of Islam. Kilroy–Silk had 
already announced that:
...Muslims everywhere behave with equal 
savagery. They behead criminals, stone to 
death female – only female – adulteresses, 
throw acid in the faces of women who 
refuse to wear the chador, mutilate the 
genitals of young girls and ritually abuse 
animals… they are backward and evil, and 
if it is being racist to say so then I must 
be and happy and proud to be so. (Daily 
Express, 15 January 1995)
The situation got far worse after the 7 July bombings. 
As a young woman explained: 
...We don’t walk alone [since 7/7] because 
of attacks on Muslim Asian women like 
a Muslim Asian woman was physically 
abused in Roundhay Park. (Murtuja, 2006)
Embedded in these statements was the assumption 
that the West and its warriors must rush to bomb the 
Middle East to democracy and liberate the Muslim 
women from the chains imposed on them by their 
faith. Such an analysis, by its very nature, makes the 
mohajebeh, women who cover, into an object of pity 
if not fear. They are seen as having been forced to 
cover and must therefore be liberated, in the West 
as well as in the East; even if this has to be done 
at the expense of closing the doors of schools to 
them. Feminists of all shades were urged to step 
forward to ‘save’ the Muslim woman from her plight. 
Many forgot that if feminism is about anything it is 
about celebrating difference and respecting the 
choices that women make. Commentators who 
could imagine that the very act of veiling may imply 
some element of choosing to be publicly labelled as 
Muslim, saw this very action not only as ‘threatening 
to the very fabric of society’ (Barry: 2006:26) but 
also an act of desperation and thus a dangerous 
deed (Moore, 2006). 
In this discourse of hate, covered women were 
singled out as the living example of backwardness 
and fearful subordination. Islam was considered 
to have defined itself ‘through disgust for women’s 
bodies’ (Polly Toynbee, The Guardian, 28 September 
2001). Toynbee in fact lashed out announcing that 
the veil arouses lasciviousness. More moderate 
versions of the garb – dull, uniform coat to the 
ground and the plain headscarf – have much the 
same effect, inspiring lascivious thoughts they are 
designed to stifle (The Guardian, 5 October 2001).
Such fears have been central in shaping ‘secular’ 
government policies such as banning the scarf from 
the schools in France. As Marieluise Beck (2004), 
the German Green politician in charge of immigrant 
affairs, notes, there has been a ‘demonization’ of 
the headscarf across Europe. The result is that 
many women who have worn a headscarf for a long 
time can no longer function in the countries where 
they have lived for a considerable time. What one 
participant in our conversations with Muslim women 
across Britain told us was typical of many similar 
stories:
...My mum wears the hijab. She’s a little old 
lady in her sixties. She lives in a white area. 
Now young kids are throwing things at 
her – bottles and cans – every time there’s 
something in the media about Muslim 
extremism. (She Who Disputes, 2006:8)
The ‘otherization’ ban in turn has become part 
and parcel of the public debate so that many 
politicians begin by condemning the cover and 
women’s choices as being different. Even the 
Prime Minister has chosen to denounce diversity 
and multiculturalism as a cause for terrorism to be 
countered by ‘muscular liberalism’ (http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/mobile/uk-politics–12371994, 
5 February 2011).
It is therefore time to consider whether secularism 
as a stated political requirement by definition denies 
the rights of citizens to exercise their faith as they 
see fit? Should British-born, British-educated, 
young, articulate and intelligent women who actively 
chose to cover, despite the virulent Islamophobia, 
submit to the intense pressures on them to take off 
the hijab? Is it the case that a ban on headscarves in 
schools has pushed ‘Muslim women into the hands 
of Islamic fundamentalists’ (Beck, 2004) or is it a 
choice? Yet as many more participants in our year 
long conversation with Muslim women told us:
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First, an apology: I am going to argue strongly 
against essentialization but use many sweeping, 
polemical statements in the process. This is a 
contradiction caused by the pressures of space.
The question of how to advance the family law rights 
of women in Britain’s Muslim communities is bound 
up with problems of racism and sexism. It touches 
upon some of the big binaries in public policy and 
sociological analysis, such as universalism vs. 
cultural relativism; individual vs. collective rights; 
rights vs. culture, and so on.
This is often reduced to a question of how to 
‘balance’ rights and culture.  I shall be making four 
main points:
1. First, the mistaken use of the terms ‘sharia 
law’, ‘sharia’ councils, and ‘religious 
arbitration’ in Britain are founded on gross 
misunderstandings about formal and 
informal law in Britain and misinformation 
about Muslim family laws here and globally;
2. Second, the claims and counter-claims of 
all parties to this debate are founded on a 
significant lack of empirical evidence;
3. Third, plural legal systems are neither the 
ultimate solution to the lack of access to 
justice for minority women nor are they the 
embodiment of all legal evil; and
4. Fourth, I shall provide suggestions for 
constructive ways to go about considering 
culture and women’s rights. 
Misunderstandings About 
‘Sharia Law’ and Sharia 
Councils
Progressive Muslim theologians and scholars – men 
as well as women, both in classical Muslim thinking 
and in today’s highly animated debates – have 
pointed out that while sharia (which means the path 
outlined by God) is divine, its interpretation in the 
shape of concrete laws and rulings governing daily 
lives is most definitely human. That interpretation 
is highly contested and diverse across time and 
geography. Polygamy is just one small example: 
7. Having our Cake and Eating It: Women’s Quest for 
Justice and Equality in the Family in Britain’s Muslim 
Communities
Cassandra Balchin
Muslim Women’s Network
banned under an interpretation of Qur’anic verses 
in Tunisia, polygamy is permitted without restriction 
in the Gulf and subject to conditions in Pakistan, 
Malaysia and North Africa. If everything were agreed 
and crystal clear in the holy texts, there wouldn’t be 
22 different laws on divorce in 22 different Muslim 
countries according to Women Living Under Muslim 
Laws’ (WLUML) 10-year Women & Law research 
programme. 
It is all a matter of human interpretation. And when 
humans get involved, there is power, contestation 
and politics. Thus the interpretations of, for example, 
women’s right to divorce by the sharia councils must 
be seen as an ideological statement. Having married 
and divorced in Pakistan, having edited Knowing our 
Rights, the international synthesis out of WLUML’s 
W&L Programme, and having assisted dozens of 
women in crisis in Britain who have interacted with 
the sharia councils, I can confidently state that the 
sharia council interpretations here are among the 
most conservative and gender discriminatory in the 
world. 
As a member of the Muslim Women’s Network UK, I 
can tell you that Muslim women in Britain today are 
waking up to the fact that what they have been told 
is ‘correct Islam’ is decades if not centuries behind 
the experience of their sisters in other Muslim 
contexts – whether working from within the religion 
or from non-religious perspectives. And they are 
asking why this is so. The uncomfortable answer is 
that their ‘community leaders’ and the successive 
British governments who have promoted them do 
not see women in Muslim communities as having 
the same right to equality as other citizens.
So, Muslim laws are not divinely ordained and most 
sharia council members have a discriminatory, 
right-wing agenda. Unfortunately, not only do most 
Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain believe that the 
discriminatory position is ubiquitous and divinely 
mandated, most Muslim and non-Muslim members 
of the public, many policy makers and even some 
rights activists are also thoroughly confused about 
the actual legal status of decisions by sharia 
councils. Sharia councils are not ‘courts’ and their 
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decisions have no legal validity in this country. 
Indeed, their decisions carry no weight even in most 
Muslim jurisdictions abroad. For instance, a British 
civil divorce is regarded as a valid divorce between 
Muslims by the Pakistan courts whereas the validity 
of a sharia council decision would be litigated right 
up to the Supreme Court. Iran’s courts resolutely 
require any decision by any foreign forum to be 
reviewed by an Iranian Court. The only decisions 
by non-state Muslim forums in this country that 
have some validity are decisions by forums set up 
under the 1996 Arbitration Act. Only one or two such 
tribunals have been set up, confirming the difficulty 
faced in their establishment. And the law does not 
actually allow them to arbitrate marriage and divorce 
– that they do is another matter.
Lack of Empirical Data
This brings me to my second point: that there is a 
significant lack of empirical data.
No one knows how many women there are in Britain 
who are in unrecognized unions – so-called nikah 
marriages where no civil ceremony has happened. 
No one knows what percentage of women in Muslim 
communities only seek relief through the civil courts 
or what percentage approach both the formal and 
the informal system. No one knows how many 
polygamous unions there are. No one conclusively 
knows why women approach sharia councils – is it 
deeply held faith, is it misinformation, is it community 
pressure, or is it all or none of these? No one knows 
the major reason why often highly educated women 
born and brought up here even agree to these nikah 
– is it because they are promised a civil marriage later 
which never happens and they are too invested in 
the relationship to demand their rights? Or perhaps 
because of some misplaced belief that nikah is the 
‘proper Islamic way’ – overlooking the prevalence of 
registration laws across the Muslim world?
We all speak anecdotally which is a poor basis for 
policy.
There is a methodological problem which has 
intrigued me. There are now several studies on 
women and the sharia councils which attempt to 
explain why they use them. But by definition, that is 
an exclusionary method. What about those women 
who never go to the sharia councils – why is their 
opinion never sought? Are they somehow not ‘real 
Muslims’ in the eyes of academics and policy 
makers?
This lack of empirical data regarding plural legal 
orders is global and something I have published 
on recently: a paper for the International Council 
on Human Rights Policy (2009) entitled When 
Legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, State and 
Non-State Law; a chapter on legal pluralism for UN 
Women’s bi-annual Progress of the World’s Women 
(Balchin, 2011a) which focuses on access to justice 
for women; and a paper for the Danish Institute 
of International Studies called Strengthening 
International Programming on Access to Justice for 
the Poor and for Women (Balchin, 2011b), which is 
a strong critique of donor policies. In a fairly broad 
sweep of the literature regarding the challenge of 
recognizing non-state law and advancing women’s 
rights, I found countless examples from every 
continent and context of policy being based on 
supposition (which I suggest is politically-motivated). 
The most common mistake was to conflate practice 
with moral preference. 
One of the most frequently cited examples used to 
support the recognition of non-state law relates to 
Pakistan, my second home, and is very relevant to 
our discussion of sharia councils in Britain. A woman 
who went through Pakistan’s formal courts is quoted 
as saying ‘I’d rather die than go through this again’. 
Thereafter, the woman is removed from the analysis, 
and her words used – by well-paid academics and 
researchers – to argue that the formal process was 
unresponsive to her cultural needs and thereby non-
state law should be recognized. We never find out: 
does she want the formal courts to be reformed so 
they are more sensitive to her needs; does she think 
only non-state forums will work for her; is she even 
representative of marginalized women in general; 
or is the problem unrelated to legal systems and 
simply that her family made her life difficult during 
the case? 
Are Sharia Councils a 
Problem or a Solution?
Justice system reform and the whole field of 
access to justice is subject to what the eminent 
– and quite feminist – legal anthropologist Franz 
von Benda-Beckman calls ‘pendulum swings’ in 
policy. I shall be less diplomatic and note that, from 
experience, I have seen this policy area plagued by 
fashions. Donors are trying to find quick and easy 
fixes to complex social development challenges. 
Government and non-state political forces all have 
a political axe to grind: whether it is a neo-liberal 
desire to privatize justice and relieve the state 
court system of the burden of ‘minor’ matters such 
as family disputes; or a desire by those with the 
absolutist agenda of identity politics to control their 
own communities, and define for instance what is 
and is not ‘Muslim’. 
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It is clear that legal pluralism is here to stay: it is a 
feature of life in developing as well as developed 
countries, and not just among minority migrant 
communities. Any legal matter that is settled outside 
the formal courts is part of legal pluralism. Therefore, 
pretending it doesn’t – or shouldn’t – exist is counter-
productive and misses examining people’s needs 
and practices on the ground. 
At the same time, it is equally clear that plural legal 
orders are problematic. I am summarizing the UN 
Women chapter on legal pluralism here:
a) As they currently operate, non-state laws 
and multiple parallel laws based on religion 
or custom tend to be more discriminatory 
towards women than unitary systems;
b) Aside from the content of laws in plural 
systems, the structure of plural legal 
orders very often creates discrimination – 
between women of different communities, 
and against women who do not fall into the 
neat identity categories that such systems 
depend on, for example women who marry 
across religious or sect lines. The Arbitration 
Act in the UK is a good example of structural 
problems. By permitting religious arbitration 
in ancillary family matters, it gives state 
sanction to non-state orders that operate in 
a discriminatory manner. It relies on one of 
the parties blowing the whistle if the process 
has been unfair – but how many women in 
Muslim communities have the social and 
financial resources to blow the whistle?
c) Plural legal systems are usually harder than 
unitary systems to reform towards equality 
and justice because usually, being identity-
based, there are high political stakes in 
silencing internal contestation.
I argue that ignoring the fact of legal plurality is both 
racist and deepens discrimination against minority 
women because it overlooks and doesn’t address 
how things work in . I also argue that the recognition 
of plural legal orders can promote racism – the 
presumption that, in the example I’m discussing, 
Muslims are ‘different’ is reinforced. It can also 
promote sexism since minority women are left at the 
mercy of a discriminatory community leadership. 
What Is the Way Out?
This brings me to my fourth point: what is the 
way out of these apparent dichotomies and 
essentializations? The simple answer is that there 
are no easy solutions! At the same time, I disagree 
with the postmodernist style teeth-sucking that ‘it’s 
very complicated’. Implying that ‘only experts can 
understand’ is another way of silencing rights-based 
critiques from within and from outside. There are 
solutions but they’re not always the ones that suit 
policy makers and the political elites of the majority 
and minority communities.
The solutions  include:
•	 First, recognizing that culture is a human 
activity, political, contested, and diverse across 
and within cultures;
•	 Second, keeping a commitment to the rights 
of the marginalized centre-stage in all policy, 
including within minority communities;
•	 Third, recognizing that legal pluralism is here to 
stay and analyse its impact on minority women, 
including strengthening empirical knowledge 
(both quantitative and qualitative);
•	 Fourth, avoiding unhelpful binaries and 
essentializations, and instead examine how 
rights activists the world over have transcended 
these binaries and developed rights-based 
approaches to culture in daily practice on the 
ground;
•	 Fifth, supporting internal cultural contestation 
where this advances human rights for all 
minority community members;
•	 Sixth, moving beyond culturalizing all minority 
problems and seeing them as having purely 
legal solutions.
As the numerous feminist groups that exist in all 
religious traditions prove, religion and culture do not 
have to be discriminatory. If we accept that culture 
is a human activity and is thus contested, if we 
accept that we all have intersecting identities and 
belong to multiple collectivities simultaneously, we 
have to logically accept that there will be political 
and social trends within all religions and cultures 
that are fully supportive of human rights, including 
gender equality and the equality of all ethnicities. 
While international human rights standards have 
also been affected by the simplistic cultural 
relativism v. universalism debate, today (thanks in 
part to the input of women from the global South), 
they also have language that can take a nuanced 
position on culture.
In concrete terms for policy makers, what do these 
solutions and a ‘nuanced position on culture’ look 
like?
Women in Britain’s Muslim communities are the 
primary users of the non-state sharia councils. 
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Introduction
We have been involved in a European project 
comparing the political debate and regulating of 
the Islamic veil (see www.veil-project.org). Doutje 
Lettinga and I constituted the Dutch team. Our 
contribution is based on the work we have done 
for VEIL. All over Europe, headscarves, or more 
generally the veil, have become a controversial 
subject.1 One important insight we gained from 
comparing national cases is that the controversies 
over the veil are in reality not so much about the veil 
as about national identity. That is, about European 
states reconfiguring and reconsidering themselves 
as they are becoming increasingly more multicultural 
and multi-religious societies in a globalizing world. 
There are national differences in the response to the 
veil, but over time a convergence can be identified, 
which we find worrying because, in the end, it is 
limiting the space for Islamic women to choose 
whether they want to veil. We will illustrate our claim 
with data from our research on headscarf debates 
in France and the Netherlands, and conclude with 
some comparative observations with reference to 
Britain.
Dutch regulation is by and large accommodative, 
while French regulation has been prohibitive, 
culminating in the prohibitive laws of 2004 that forbid 
the wearing of signs or clothing, such as the veil, 
which conspicuously manifest students’ religious 
affiliations in the realm of public schools. In this 
paper, we present an analysis of the political debates 
on the veil in France and the Netherlands covering 
the time period of 1989–2007. We review how the 
problem of the veil was defined and discussed in 
parliament to get a better understanding of these 
national differences in responses to the veil, and 
also to see whether a change occurred over time. 
The Netherlands
While the regulation on veiling in the Netherlands 
is largely accommodative, we are seeing a gradual 
decrease in tolerance. An example of this occurred 
in 1999, when a teacher-trainee was forbidden to 
wear a headscarf in the classroom. This sparked a 
small opposition party, Groen Links (the Greens), 
to argue that it hampers emancipation if women 
8. Headscarf Debates as a Prism for Conceptions of 
National Identity
Sawitri Saharso and Doutje Lettinga 
University of Twente Enschede/VU University Amsterdam
cannot wear their headscarf at work. Again, in 
2001, when a court clerk was refused to wear a 
headscarf, the Green Party’s MP, Femke Halsema, 
compared the headscarf to ethnicity, social class, 
or sexual preference. She claimed the idea that 
the headscarf might be a symbol of oppression is 
mistaken, as it is simply a symbol of identity. The 
underlying problem is the discrimination Muslim 
women face from mainstream society. Therefore, 
the Greens proposed that dress rules be adjusted 
so that Muslim women could participate in society. 
The right to wear a headscarf was confirmed in a 
policy directive in 2003.
In 2004, Stef Blok, the chair of the Commission 
Blok in charge of evaluating the integration policy, 
expressed the view which was dominant at the time: 
“The main point is that it is someone’s own choice. 
If you want to restrict it, you need to show good 
reasons for it.” Public neutrality was considered 
as an insufficient reason for restriction. It was not 
that the Dutch did not care about neutrality, but 
they did not perceive the headscarf as a danger to 
public neutrality. This view was laid down again in 
a policy document.  The preceding year saw cases 
in the courtrooms associated with the niqab. Two 
students brought a case before the Commission 
on Equal Treatment, which was then dismissed 
following the Commission’s judgment that a niqab 
is dysfunctional when teaching young children. 
However, in two other cases on the use of the niqab, 
the Commission on Equal Treatment ruled in favour 
of the women.
In 2005, right-wing politician, Geert Wilders, 
proposed a motion to the Dutch parliament to 
ban the burqa in public spaces. His proposal 
was strategically timed to be discussed during a 
national debate surrounding terrorism. The burqa 
became framed as a problem of security and 
public order. Liberal MP Frans Weekers said: ‘When 
people cover their face in public, whether this 
is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously 
affects other people’s feelings of safety, and the 
concern for a civil public order involves that we 
do not tolerate such face covers.’ The burqa was 
also framed as a symbol of gender inequality within 
Islam. A right-wing majority in Parliament voted 
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through a motion supporting prohibitive laws on 
the burqa. In 2009, the government announced its 
plans to introduce regulations that would forbid the 
wearing of all types of garments which cover the 
face (including balaclavas) in schools, both public 
and private, for school-goers and visitors alike. The 
reasons given included issues on interpersonal 
interaction, communication, public safety and active 
citizenship. A  directive has been sent to Ministerial 
departments to prohibit this type of clothing in public 
offices as well. Wilders’ initial motion (to ban the 
burqa in all public spaces) was rejected because 
it infringed on equality and religious freedom, and 
was considered disproportional. This explains the 
more moderate law of the current government.
France
In 1989, three Muslim girls were excluded from a 
College in Creil. In what later came to be known as 
the Creil affair, the socialist government condemned 
the ban on headscarves. Some wondered if this was 
inspired by the displays of Dutch multiculturalism , 
but the Socialists had other reasons to oppose the 
ban. They agreed with the Right that the Republican’s 
promise of equality could only be maintained if 
citizens were treated as abstract individuals, instead 
of as members of ethnic-religious communities. They 
defended their belief that the school would liberate 
Muslim girls. Michel Rocard (then prime minister) 
said: ‘I don’t believe a pure authoritarian procedure 
to be very effective, and despite the militant lay-man 
I am, I don’t accept a repressive aspect to be the 
dominant face of laicité. Laicité wants to convince, 
to persuade and to be shining. That is the laicité 
that should be maintained in our schools. (..) The 
aim of our public and lay school is to welcome, to 
persuade, to integrate, that means, to realize the 
goals of education in another way than through a 
politics of a priori exclusion.’ The Socialists saw 
causes of the headscarf problem to include social 
deprivation and alienation, and they did not want to 
further isolate Muslim girls in their communities. This 
was reflected in their policy (see table below). 
During the 1990s, the Socialists gradually lost their 
trust in the integrative and emancipative power of 
the public school, as Muslim girls stayed unwilling 
to give up their veil and hence appeared rather 
unassimilable on this point. The fact that girls 
insisted on wearing the headscarf was no longer 
considered as stemming from marginalization, but 
framed as expressing separatism and political Islam 
and. the policy changed accordingly.
At the turn of the 21st Century, the Socialists agreed 
with the analysis of the Right and  the left-wing 
parliamentary groups Republic et Liberté  (RL) and 
Radicale, Citoyen et Vert (RCV) that some Muslims 
rejected integration, secularism and the Republican 
project of equality. These fundamentalist groups 
forced their ideology upon others and particularly 
Table 1. The Netherlands
Time and 
conflicts
Frame Policy
1999
t e a c h e r 
t r a i n e e , 
court clerk
Headscarf
Not allowing headscarves hampers emancipation  & 
integration, the problem is discrimination by society 
(Green Party). Other parties: Mainly framed as 
conflicting with neutrality, but not strong enough to 
warrant a ban. (but socialists associated niqab with 
gender inequality within Islam)
Right to wear headscarves 
in schools and civil service 
confirmed in directive 2003
2004
police 
N i q a b 
(students)
In general: right to religion trumps public neutrality 
except for certain functions (dress signalling authority, 
impartiality) (all parties except List Pim Fortuyn)
Policy document: confirms right 
to wear the headscarf, except 
for court personnel and certain 
police functions
2005-2007
Burqa
Burqa framed as security & public order problem and 
as a symbol of submission. Must be banned therefore 
(Geert Wilders Freedom Party, followed by majority 
in Parliament)
2009 law in preparation to ban 
burqa and niqab in schools, labour 
market and public transport
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threatened the freedom and equality of young 
secular Muslim girls. We can clearly see this 
diagnosis in a legislative proposal of 2003, in which 
some Socialists proposed to ban all religious, 
political and philosophical symbols from schools 
(law proposition no. 2096 put forward by Georges 
Sarre (PS) and signed by Jaques Desallangre, 
Jean-Pierre Michel, Pierre Carassus and Michel 
Suchod). Donning the headscarf was framed as a 
‘contestation of French values and culture’ (referring 
to gender-equality and the freedom of individual 
conscience), and ‘a rejection, often imposed on 
young girls, of the Republican and laic model of 
integration’. A growing communalism in the suburbs 
would contribute to this fundamentalism that 
fragmented the nation into separatist and potentially 
violent communities where the rights of women 
were being undermined. On March 15th 2004, the 
French government passed the law that banned the 
wearing of conspicuous signs of religious affiliation. 
Comparison and 
Contextualization
Why is veiling more contested in France than in 
the Netherlands? It is often argued that the French 
adhere to a strict interpretation of public neutrality 
because of their Republican tradition. French 
secularism developed not only as a mechanism to 
free the state from religious influence, it also was a 
tool to emancipate individual citizens from (Catholic) 
communities seeking to control their members. 
The French Republicans sought to secure national 
cohesion by integrating citizens into a public realm 
where they were to share the same universal values 
of equality, freedom and solidarity (Scott, 2007). 
In contrast to France, Dutch secularism sought to 
protect the freedom of religious minorities from the 
liberal state. Furthermore, secular (leftist) liberals in 
the Netherlands were forced to make a compromise 
with Catholic and Calvinist minorities over political 
and social life. In the late 19th century, these had 
established local and regional politically organized 
religious subcultures to oppose the liberal’s secular 
nation-building project, later joined by the social 
democrats that likewise had begun to organize 
parties, professional and leisure time associations 
(Kersbergen & Manow, 2008). This resulted into the 
segmentation of Dutch society along confessional 
lines, known as pillarization. Given this background 
it is understandable why veiling is more contested in 
France than in the Netherlands. The two countries’ 
responses to the veil follow from their nation-building 
process.
It should be noted, however, that even in France 
there was a time when politicians did not consider the 
headscarf as conclusively incompatible with the laic 
public school. After 2003, Dutch tolerance towards 
veiling declined. This was in a context in which 
Table 2. France
Time & conflicts Frame Policy
1989
Creil affair, 3 girls 
expelled from 
school
Headscarf in public schools conflicts with public 
neutrality (laïcité) & integration: symbol of 
alienation (marginalization) & gender: the laïc 
school liberates (socialist party) 
Council of State: headscarves 
not necessary incompatible with 
laïcité, if not acts of pressure, 
provocation, proselytism, 
propaganda 
1994
Several conflicts in 
schools, strike on 
behalf gym teacher 
(no headscarf for 
safety reasons)
Integration: headscarf symbol communalism, 
rejection French values and political Islam 
And a symbol of gender inequality (socialists 
now follow right wing (RPR) + Republican left 
wing (Groups RL, RCV)
Decree Bayrou: ostentatious 
symbols not allowed in public 
schools, room to negotiate 
about ‘light’ scarves, bandanas
2004
Commission Stasi 
installed
Same frames, but become stronger (2002 Right 
wing UMP majority in parliament) + decree 
Bayrou ineffective, for still many conflicts  
Stasi commission Law: 
conspicuous religious signs or 
clothing prohibited in public 
schools. Headscarves always 
conspicuous.
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new political players had made their appearance 
on the Dutch scene (Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali).  The integration policy was blamed as being 
too multicultural, allowing Islamic radicalism. This 
was at a time when Islamic violence had not only 
manifested itself internationally, but also on Dutch 
soil. Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was murdered 
by a radical fundamentalist in 2004. In this climate, 
Dutch politicians felt the necessity, it appears, to 
distance themselves from multiculturalism. Re-
assertion of Dutch national identity and Dutch 
values became a theme. One way of doing this 
was by making a firm stand against the burqa. 
The change in attitude of Dutch politicians towards 
veiling that likened the Dutch political debate to the 
French debate was a reconfiguration of the Dutch 
ideal of a multicultural and multi-religious society in 
a globalizing world. The consequences for Muslim 
women were limitations on their freedom to wear the 
veil, due to manifestations of Dutch policy.
We did not research the British veil debates (see 
Kilic, 2008), and therefore limit ourselves to just a 
few comparative observations regarding Britain. 
In the literature on citizenship and immigrant 
integration, Britain and the Netherlands are usually 
lumped together as two multicultural countries and 
contrasted with France as an example of a civic 
assimilationist or universalist integration regime 
(see Koopmans et al., 2005). When we look at these 
countries through the lens of state-church relations, 
France gets characterised as following a model of 
strict secularism and the Netherlands as a case of 
principled pluralism. State neutrality means in the 
Dutch context of pillarization that the state does not 
ban religion from the public sphere, as in France, 
but that it does not discriminate between religious 
and non-religious institutions. Therefore, religious 
groups not only have the right to establish their own 
schools, but also receive full public funding. This 
gave Muslims and other newly-established religious 
minorities the opportunity to make  religious claims 
and get them accommodated. Treating Islam 
differently from the established religions would 
amount in Dutch eyes to discrimination. The UK is an 
altogether different case, as the Church of England 
is the established religious authority in England, but 
not for the rest of Britain. Yet despite the decline of 
formal ties between Parliament and the Church of 
England, there exist comparatively strong formal 
and legal ties between church and state. The British 
Monarch also represents the head of the church 
and has considerable authority in church affairs, 
such as the power to appoint archbishops. The 
church itself continues to have an important political 
role in the workings of the state, as some bishops 
have reserved seats in the House of Lords (see 
Monsma & Soper, 1997 and Fetzer & Soper, 2005). 
How this affects the space for the religious claims of 
Muslims, and in particular, how this plays out in the 
framing and regulating of the veil is not so obvious. 
First, the big difference with both France and the 
Netherlands is that in these two countries there are 
legal rules which restricts, in the case of France, or 
accommodates, in the case of the Netherlands, the 
wearing of the veil, while in Britain there is no formal 
regulation. There exists a rather accommodative 
or laissez-faire practice as Kilic (2008: 444) calls it 
towards the veil. Secondly, until 2006 when former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Jack Straw publicized his 
article (‘I want to unveil my views on an important 
issue’, The Lancashire Telegraph, 6 October 2006) 
in which he expressed his discomfort with women 
wearing niqabs (a garment that covers the face, 
but leaves the eyes uncovered), Britain had not 
experienced a widespread public debate on veiling 
(Kilic 2008: 434). Given the privileged position of 
the Church of England as the established religious 
authority, the absence of a public debate and the 
accommodative practice is surprising as one would 
expect that the space for Muslims’ religious claims 
would be limited in Britain.  This is the more so if one 
realizes that the multicultural framework in Britain 
is set by the Race Relations Act that determines 
the space for recognition of minority claims. As 
Muslims are considered a religious group, and not 
as a racial or ethnic group like Jews or Sikhs, this 
works to the disadvantage of Muslims (Modood 
2006). Yet this is not reflected in debates or 
policies regarding the veil. Up to this day, veiling 
in the UK is relatively uncontested and the policy 
reaction accommodative. While we were inclined 
on the basis of our comparison between France 
and the Netherlands to conclude that the framing 
and regulating of the veil is more determined by a 
country’s self image as a nation and the way state-
church relations are institutionalised in the nation-
building process than by its integration regime, 
this explanation certainly will not do for Britain, but 
neither is an explanation in terms of integration 
regimes.
Notes
1. We will use ‘the veil’ as a shorthand to refer to all 
forms of Muslim women’s head- and body- covering 
together, such as chador, jilbab or niqab. When we 
want to refer to a specific form of veiling, such as 
the headscarf or the burqa, this will be mentioned 
as such.
2. Fortuyn had founded his List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 
February 2002. After his assassination in May 2002 
his party gained a huge election victory (26 seats in 
Parliament). Hirsi Ali was in 2003 elected as a MP for 
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9. The Struggle of French Women of Migrant Muslim 
Descent in the Defence of Secular State Schools 
Marieme Helie-Lucas
Women Living Under Muslim Laws
Amongst the most determined defenders of 
secularism and of secular schools today are 
French citizens of migrant descent, whose families 
originated from Muslim countries or communities. 
In the words of the President of a prominent 
feminist organization, '[t]hose of us who came from 
other countries benefitted from secularism, and this 
is why we are so deeply attached to it'.1
As ‘Muslims’ are portrayed as victims of secular 
principles (considered as 'Western') in international 
English language media, and in British media, as 
well as in mainstream academic social science 
discourse,2 such a blatant contradiction should at 
the very least call for a re-examination of facts. 
The first source of misunderstanding is that 
different definitions of secularism are used on both 
sides of the Channel: while in the UK, secularism 
is conceived of as equal tolerance by the state 
vis-à-vis all religions, in France, the laws of 1905 & 
19063 instituted a total separation between church 
and state. 
In Article 1 of the 1906 law, the secular state 
guarantees freedom of religion, freedom of belief 
and of practice to the citizens of the secular 
republic, but Article 2 states that, beyond this, 
the state will not interfere with religions, nor grant 
them any recognition, nor fund them. In  the UK, 
the King or Queen is both the Head of State and 
the Head of the Anglican Church; in Germany, the 
Landers collect religious taxes; in the USA, one 
swears in court on the Bible; but in France, over a 
century ago, the State declared itself incompetent 
in religious matters. 
Regarding what pertains to the State mandate, 
secularism is the rule. Education, for instance, 
which from 1906 was made free of charge and 
compulsory (quite a unique revolutionary legal 
provision at that point in history), was to be entirely 
secular. Consequently, teachers and pupils are not 
allowed to display any sign of religious affiliation 
on the premises of State secular schools: they are 
there in their capacity as individual French citizens, 
not as representatives of divided and divisive 
'communities'. 
The first conclusion one can draw from this 
clarification of definitions is that it seems illogical 
to look at the application of these laws instituting 
'separation' today in France through the British lens 
of 'equal tolerance'. To avoid any further confusion, 
I will thus use the French word 'laïcité', when 
referring to secularism in France.
The second conclusion is that it is factually wrong 
to refer to the 2004 law that reiterated - in a weaker 
version4 - the principles set up in the 1906 law, as 
the 'law against the veil'. Not only was the initial 
law passed at a time when the Catholic Church 
was the only religion in France that could lay 
claim to political representation of State power 
(more than a century ago, Islam was not in the 
picture), but these laws banned equally all signs 
of religious affiliation, be it cross, kippa, headscarf 
or other. The fact that the ‘law against the veil’ is 
so widely adopted a label only shows the powerful 
ideological influence of the Muslim Right lobby, 
and the lack of historical knowledge on the part 
of left and human rights organizations, media and 
scholars that use this terminology.
The 1905-1906 laws on laïcité were followed by 
long battles with political forces of the right and 
far right, and with religious lobbies of the Catholic 
Church. Its opponents never ceased to attempt to 
undermine it and weaken it.5 The struggle for laïcité 
has been ongoing since, albeit with new players. 
Among the most vocal adversaries of laïcité is 
the Muslim Right. However among its leading 
defenders are the anti-fundamentalist citizens who, 
whether migrants themselves or of migrant Muslim 
descent, have direct or indirect experience of living 
under the boot of Muslim fundamentalists. 
This should not come as a surprise. An important 
percentage of citizens of migrant descent in 
France come from the Maghreb countries, mostly 
from Algeria. The economic migration started with 
World War I, when many unskilled Algerian workers 
became active in workers’ unions and parties in 
France. In terms of recent migration, movement 
has been for the most part politically motivated. 
In the 1990s, intellectuals, artists, journalists, and 
feminists had to flee both targeted assassinations 
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and massacres committed by Algerian Islamic 
Armed Groups.6 The political experience of French 
citizens of Algerian descent is a decisive factor in 
their stand for laïcité.
Laïcité is presently both under attack and 
instrumentalized by religious fundamentalists 
under the leadership of Muslim fundamentalism, 
but also by the French Right-wing government, and 
by the various political parties and organisations 
of the Far Right. Laïcité is also undermined by 
left-wing parties and human rights organizations 
in the name of religious rights, minority rights, and 
cultural rights.7
Sarkozy's government, in its attempt to gain 
the vote of all potential conservative voters 
– and among those, the ‘Muslim vote’- could 
not fail to give guarantees to various religious 
fundamentalisms. Under the right-wing government 
of Sarkozy, various adjunctions to the concept 
of laïcité emerged, all aiming at weakening 
it.8 References to 'positive laïcité', and 'open 
laïcité' were all very much in line with Canada's 
'reasonable accommodations'. Sarkozy himself 
made several public statements that infuriated 
even mild secularists in France, especially during 
his visit to the Pope when he declared that a 
teacher will never be as qualified as a priest to give 
moral guidance to children.9 He also took several 
measures in favour of confessional schools, such 
as granting equivalence to diplomas delivered by 
private confessional universities.
Similarly, doing away with all secular principles, 
Sarkozy set up an official representation of Islam 
with which he can conduct a 'dialogue', as if it 
were an elected body. This institution, the Conseil 
Francais du Culte Musulman,10 is supposed to 
represent all 'Muslims'11 in France. However, recent 
studies12 show that the vast majority of people 
erroneously labelled as 'Muslims' are, as Catholics 
in France, not very religiously inclined: 20 per cent 
declare themselves unbelievers (vs 28 per cent 
in the whole population, and among those who 
identify as believers in Islam, 21 per cent barely 
ever set foot in a mosque or attend any religious 
ceremony (vs 15 per cent in the whole population). 
It follows suit that the frequenting of mosques, on 
which the estimation of the representativity of the 
CFCM is based, is extremely low: only 5 per cent of 
declared believers participate in the consultations 
organized by the CFCM.
In a context in which the far-right parties are 
gaining momentum everywhere in Europe,13 
Sarkozy navigates a fine line in view of the April-
May 2012 presidential elections: on the one hand, 
he must give positive signals  to various religious 
fundamentalisms, including the Muslim Right, but 
on the other hand, he must cater to the needs of 
xenophobic far-right parties and newly-formed 
fascist-like groups.14 Hence, the need for these 
political manipulations: The French Government 
passes laws that confirm secular schools in 
their mandate, represses jobless youth riots, 
organizes the deportation of illegal migrants, 
especially those from Muslim countries,15 sets 
up a national consultation on 'French identity',16 
and bans full-face covering in public spaces, 
whilst simultaneously conducting 'dialogues' with 
'Muslims', and giving in to many of their demands. 
But small and very vocal radical subgroups on 
the right of the traditional far right are springing 
up, and in their view, the French State is far from 
taking a strong enough position vis-à-vis 'Muslims', 
be they fundamentalists or not. They demand that 
'Islam' be outlawed in France, that immigration 
from Muslim countries be stopped, and that 
discussions be held with Muslim countries so as 
to organize for 'French Muslims' to 'migrate' to 
'countries where they will be able to freely practice 
their religion'.17
These groups undertake provocative street actions 
against 'Islam', in response to equally provocative 
street actions taken by Muslim fundamentalist 
groups. For example, Muslim fundamentalists 
have organized public prayers every Friday for 
years in one predominantly North African area in 
the centre of Paris, during which they completely 
block the streets to traffic. The reason invoked is 
that they lack a big local mosque - while we have 
seen earlier that many mosques are under-used. 
In response, extreme-right groups organized 
'pork and wine' parties in the very same location, 
an action which was grandly announced through 
the media. Both the new extreme-right groups 
and Muslim fundamentalist groups are looking 
for physical confrontation that would rally and 
radicalize their troops. The State's police keep 
turning a blind eye on these illegal actions. 
Just to complicate matters, all the factions of 
the Right and far Right have appropriated the 
language of laïcité: Sarkozy, the National Front and 
the far Right groups18 all refer to it as a 'French 
value' that needs to be preserved and defended 
against aliens. Meanwhile, the Muslim Right, 
engaging Article 1 (but conveniently ignoring 
Article 2) of the 1906 law, attempts to use laïcité as 
Secularism, Racism and the Politics of Belonging 49
a legal means for religious entryism in the public 
sphere.
While manipulating the concept to their benefit, 
Muslim fundamentalists in France are today the 
spearhead of attacks against laïcité, while official 
representatives of Catholics and Jews rush in 
support of their numerous demands, all in the 
name of religious rights. It is very clear that they all 
hope to benefit from the weakening and eventual 
eradication of laïcité. The policy of the common 
cause prevails over antagonisms between different 
religions.
The 'right to veil'19 for girls under the age of 18 in 
State secular schools should not be examined in 
isolation. The veil in this context is only the visible 
political flag of a far-right political movement It 
should be placed among the numerous demands 
made by Muslim fundamentalist groups around the 
issue of separation of men and women in public 
spaces (schools, swimming pools, hospitals, etc.) 
and the replacement of democratically voted 
legislation applicable to all citizens by different 
religiously-inspired, non-voted laws, imposed by 
clerics for separate communities. It must also 
be seen as a replication of the steps taken by 
fundamentalist groups in Algeria,20 where they now 
represent one of the major political players. 
What is at stake? Issues such as women's place in 
the city; gender mixing in public spaces; violence 
against women being legitimized by culture 
and religion; the visibility of a far-right political 
movement; and strategies to inflecting the principle 
of democratically voted laws towards religious laws 
are all challenging the very principles of laïcité and 
of democracy. 
Launched towards the end of the 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s, the battle around the veil/
headscarf questioned the very roots of the secular 
republic by demanding that underage girls veil in 
State secular schools. Despite the limited number 
of girls concerned (a dozen initially), international 
media build this into a major issue.
Under the growing pressure of small but 
very vocal Muslim fundamentalist groups, 
the law on secularism was put into question 
and a Parliamentary Commission, the Stasi 
Commission,21 was appointed to advise the 
government about what was to be done with the 
girls who came to school wearing headscarves. 
Women of Muslim descent volunteered to testify 
before this commission: women's organizations, 
writers, journalists, and ordinary women from 
Muslim descent were heard. It is on their advice 
that France passed the 2004 law which reaffirms 
the principles of the 1906 secular laws.22
Following this controversy, new demands were 
made for separation of men and women in the 
public spaces such as schools, swimming pools,23 
and in hospitals.24  Major cities in France bent to 
this demand for sexual segregation by granting 
women-only hours (or days) in municipal swimming 
pools. As for hospitals, the scarcity of personnel 
does not allow for the allotment of exclusively 
female personnel to female patients and there were 
numerous incidents of physical violence occurring 
when husbands or brothers refused to allow even 
gravely ill women to be treated by male doctors 
and actually used physical violence against male 
nurses and doctors. On one occasion, a child died 
in delivery and the father was taken to court for 
deliberately risking the life of his wife and child.25
Various attempts were made to induce tribunals 
to accommodate or endorse religious views. An 
example of this was a demand for the annulment of 
a marriage between two French citizens of Muslim 
descent rather than a divorce by mutual consent: 
the reason was that the bride was not a virgin; 
virginity was thus qualified as 'an essential quality 
of the bride', and the annulment was a disguised 
repudiation.26
Under the influence of fundamentalist groups,  a 
rise in 'honour crimes' could be noticed in the poor 
suburbs around major cities. Teenage boys and 
young adults took it upon themselves to impose an 
'Islamic' dress code and 'Islamic' behaviour upon 
their sisters and neighbours. Transgression was 
severely punished by beating, burning and stoning 
- often ending with the death of the girl.27
In this context, the school has been at the 
heart of the battlefield. This is where the future 
generations are trained as equal citizens rather 
than as representatives of a ‘community’. Muslim 
fundamentalist groups demanded to put an end to 
co-education. The teaching of graphic arts, music, 
biology28 and sports were to be eliminated from 
the curriculum 'for Muslims'. They demanded the 
introduction of the teaching of Islam within secular 
schools: it was to be delivered not by historians as 
can be done for other religions and ideologies, but 
by imams.
In Algeria too, the school has been hijacked and 
instrumentalized by Muslim fundamentalism. 
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Between 1962 (the year of Algerian independence) 
and 1965 (which marked the fall of the first 
president Ben Bella to a military coup by Houari 
Boumediene), Arabic language Egyptian teachers 
were imported29 who were in fact part of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Not only did they give questionable 
education on religion, creationism, the inferiority 
of women or hatred of Jews, but they also trained 
pupils in primary school to denounce their parents 
as 'bad Muslims'. For instance, children were 
asked to report whether or not their parents were 
praying or fasting at appropriate times, and they 
were shown corks so as to detect which parents 
were drinking wine.30 Adults started fearing their 
own children, as being branded kufr/Kafir could 
implicate a death sentence. These 'teachers' 
‘educated’ young generations who were exhausted 
by the lack of perspective in terms of access to the 
labour market or to any personal accomplishment, 
and were reacting desperately to the contempt31 
displayed by the Algerian government and 
elites vis-à-vis the people. These youths turned 
to extreme right political parties, listened to the 
teachings of the Islamic Salvation Front, rioted and 
took arms.
The same process can be recognized in France 
where citizens of migrant Muslim descent are 
faced with acute discrimination in the housing 
and job market.32 As in Algeria, fundamentalist 
groups are taking over the social work33 that the 
state has ceased to supply, and they build on 
the discontent of the people. Citizens of migrant 
Muslim descent are aware what schools could 
produce if fundamentalist groups were to have any 
further influence on the French education system, 
as they have already experienced it, either directly 
for those who migrated recently from Algeria, or 
through family stories. They do not want to be 
confronted again by the very same political forces 
of the Muslim right they tried to leave behind, nor 
do they believe that social and political problems 
can be solved through 'religious' means. This 
is why they fiercely defend laïcité and more 
specifically secular schools.
As the theme of this conference suggests, laïcité 
and racism are often seen as being in conjunction 
one with another: either because one expects 
secularism to put an end to racism - and blames 
it for failing to do so - or because one sees 
secularism as eroding religious particularisms 
and freedom of thought. Laïcité only defines the 
position of the state with regards to organized 
representations of religions. It may not be a 
sufficient condition to put an end to discrimination 
and racism but it could well be a necessary 
condition for the process of doing so. 
Laïcité regulates the position of the state towards 
both individuals' beliefs, by asserting and 
protecting their right to holding these beliefs, 
and towards organized entities that pretend to 
represent these individual beliefs in the political 
sphere, by refusing to interact with them. 
Laïcité makes the distinction between individual 
beliefs and self-appointed unelected political 
representatives. It made this distinction in France 
a century ago, at a time when the Catholic Church 
was an overpowering political institution that 
dictated laws and curtailed people's power to draft 
their own social regulations through their vote.
It is still a very valid distinction to be made 
today, when the Muslim Right demands from 
the European states that separate laws or 
separate courts be instituted for presumed 
Muslims (presumed on the basis of their origin 
and names). The principle of one law for all the 
citizens of a country or the democratic principles 
that representatives of the people should be 
democratically elected rather than self appointed 
are being threatened. Isn't it ironic that democrats 
in Europe do not stand for these hard-won basic 
rights anymore? 
The very concept of belonging raises the question 
of choice. Does one only belong to one's birth 
given identity? Is one jailed and trapped forever 
into one's history? And on that note, when in the 
past have history and culture been frozen? Forging 
a new concept on the model of being 'under house 
arrest', I recently heard an Algerian man complain 
publicly that he felt 'under culture arrest'.34 By 
this he meant that he was forced to 'belong' to 
something he could not identify with any more, old 
rules that did not match the evolution of his own 
thinking, nor the times and place he lived in. Once 
upon a time, men used to beat their wives, once 
upon a time, men used to kill the unbelievers, once 
upon a time, men used to have the genitals of 
their daughters removed, once upon a time... that 
was 'their' culture. Did those who fought against 
such rules and succeeded in bringing about 
transformation betray their culture, or contribute 
to its living evolution? Did those who struggled for 
democracy against theocracy 'belong' less to their 
people? 
Today, the rightist dominant ideology condemns 
people to one single ethnic religious identity: 
acknowledging our multiple non-antagonistic 
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identities and the different possibilities of belonging 
makes one a traitor, or a kufr/Kafir. French citizens 
of 'Muslim' origin made the choice to belong to a 
secular republic. Democrats in Europe should 
respect their will and choice and acknowledge 
that, today, secularism is their culture.
Notes
* This paper exclusively discusses secular laws in state 
schools in France and their most recent implementation, 
i.e. the 1905, 1906 and 2004 laws which have 
repercussions on education. It does not discuss the 
2010 law banning full-face covering, which has nothing 
to do with education and could not be justified by 
implementing secularism; reasons invoked for passing 
this law were security and human dignity. Right-wing 
strategies lump these different laws together in order to 
discredit secularism.
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article by Karima Bennoune, Law Professor at Rutgers 
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the Law of the Brothers'. Published in WLUML, Dossier 
30-31, 2011. Available at: www.wluml.org/resource/
dossier-30-31-struggle-secularism-europe
2. Sihem Habchi, president of 'Ni Putes Ni Soumises' 
(Neither Whores Nor Submissive) press statement, 11 
April 2011. 
3. For a thorough discussion on the foundation of the 
secular state in France, with the Laws on Separation 
between State and Church (9 December 1905 published 
in the Journal Officiel on 11 December, and the following 
series of laws on separation in 1906, see Henri Pena 
Ruiz, France: Secularity and the Republic, siawi.org
4. The law  on religious signs in state schools was passed 
on 15 March 2004 and was published in the Journal 
Officiel on 27 May 2004.  Article L.141-5-1 states that 
‘ostentatious’ display of religious signs is forbidden 
whereas the 1906 law of separation forbade just any 
sign of religious affiliation – thus leaving space to 
interpretation and controversy:
 Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, 
le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves 
manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance 
religieuse est interdit.
5. These ongoing attempts by Christian churches to 
challenge the law of separation between church and 
state, over the past century in France, were discussed 
at length during the celebration of the centenary of the 
law in Paris in 2005.
6. The decade of the nineties is known among Algerians 
as 'the dark decade', or 'the war against civilians'. The 
battle between an indeed undemocratic government 
and a ruthless extreme right fascist-like political force 
working under the guise of religion and its various 
armed organizations, made approximatively 200,000 
victims. It is interesting to note that although men were 
the victims both of fundamentalist armed groups and 
of state forces such as police and army, women were 
massively victims of non-state actors armed groups.
7. Women Human Rights Defenders Coalition 
Consultation, Colombo, Sri Lanka, December 2005.
8. For various statements undermining laicité by Sarkozy 
or his government see the website of laicite-republique.
org
9. Déclaration de Latran : Quotations from the 
Statement by the President of the French Republic 
in the Palace of Latran, 20 December 2007: ‘ The 
school teacher could never replace the priest or the 
reverend’; ‘France’s roots are fundamentally Christian’; 
‘Laïcité does not have the power to sever France from 
its Christian roots’. See www.laicite-republique.org/
Sarkozy-au-latran
10. Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman was set up 
in 2003 with the support of Sarkozy, then Minister of 
Interior. Details about its finances and composition can 
be found at fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/conseil_français
11. France does not allow ethnic and religious statistics 
since World War II, when the German occupation 
authorities and the French police used such data to 
arrest and deport Jews. In most 'studies' and surveys, 
Muslimness is assumed on the basis of the country of 
origin or of the first name of people; a sort of ‘racial' 
category is created by assuming religious belief, as was 
done in the past with 'Jews'. The serious academic study 
referred to in note 12 took pains to ask people whether 
they believed in a specific religion or not and if so which 
one – not assuming any religious belief on the basis of 
origin. Its findings show a quite different picture of the 
so-called Muslims in France.
12. Patrick Simon, Trajectoires et Origines, joint study by 
INED-INSEE, 2008. Available on www.ined.fr
13.  'Traditional' far right xenophobic parties are fast 
rising in Western Europe: they score around 15 per cent 
of votes in France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Austria and Hungary, and more than 30 per cent in 
Switzerland and Serbia.
14. Marine Le Pen, daughter of the founder of the 
National Front party.
15. This refers to a recent example of borders being 
closed to Tunisian refugees coming by train and buses 
from Italy after the fall of Ben Ali, in breach of European 
agreements.
16. Consultation sur Identite Francaise: a national 
consultation on what is French identity was initiated 
on 26 October 2009 by the Ministry of immigration, 
integration and identity. Available at: www.
immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php%3Fpage%3Dactus%26id_
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17. Published on the website of Riposte Laique. 
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SECTION IV: FAITH 
COMMUNITIES AND ANTI-
RACISM
I personally do not understand why religion 
should be given this vast, expansive 
jurisdiction, so as to cover the whole of 
life and to prevent the legislature from 
encroaching upon that field. After all, 
what are we having this liberty for? We are 
having this liberty in order to reform our 
social system, which is so full of inequities, 
discriminations and other things, which 
conflict with our fundamental rights.
 (Dr BR Ambedkar in the Constituent 
Assembly in India, 1948)
Secularism has a bad name today in many circles 
including among irreligious academics and 
activists. To be ‘secular,’ is to be accused of virtually 
embracing authoritarianism, Western triumphalism 
and a racist belief in the superiority of the Western 
ideals descended from the Enlightenment. The 
attack on secularism has many antecedents 
beyond the scope of this paper, but what is clear 
is that it gained ground at a time when the idea 
of progress, and of support for large ideas of 
revolution or reform seemed to have ended. Today, 
the struggle for secularism has revived, carried 
along by mass movements for democratization. 
Long before the ‘Arab Spring’ made this question 
urgent again in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, an election 
in Bangladesh had led to a sweeping victory for a 
set of secular demands that emerged from a young 
politicized electorate. In short, large ideas, ‘grand 
narratives’ are back – on the street, in politics and in 
the courts. Only the academy stands aloof, having 
spent the ‘postmodern’ moment burying most grand 
narratives. 
These trends need to be understood and rooted in 
their relevance to Britain. Secular values are crucial 
to ensure freedom of religion and belief as well as 
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limitations on religious coercion. They inform anti-
racist struggles and develop a sense of belonging on 
the basis of equality, rather than subjecting people 
to a test of ‘values’ which demands not religious 
conformity (as is sometimes mistakenly argued) but 
enforced patriotism and political quiescence. They 
are crucial to women’s rights and to equality within 
minorities. 
The vexed question of what women should or should 
not wear immediately highlights all these issues. 
Wearing clothes without fear of attack, as the slut 
walkers1 show us is fundamental to challenging 
attitudes tolerating sexual violence. It is far wider 
than the question of whether there is ‘right’ to wear 
the hijab, burka or niqab. While Islamists have 
mobilized to promote women’s right to wear the 
hijab2  – using the feminist slogan ‘a woman’s right 
to choose’, it is clear that they don’t support the right 
to take off these clothes. The veil is an obligation, 
which must be supported by all Muslims. As a Joint 
Statement of Islamist organizations and scholars 
said, ‘The veil, irrespective of its specific juristic 
rulings, is an Islamic practice and not a cultural or 
a customary one as is agreed by the consensus of 
Muslim scholars; it is not open to debate3.  
As this statement shows, the very premise of ‘the 
right to choose hijab’ is that there is an underlying 
religious duty to cover. By implication, women who 
do not do so are to be regarded as objects to be 
attacked. In the London borough of Tower Hamlets, 
where the Jamaat e Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and other groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat 
operate, Muslim women in public life such as the 
MP, Rushanara Ali and a local councillor Shiria 
Khatun, have been attacked for not wearing ‘proper 
clothes, as have ordinary women living and working 
in Tower Hamlets4. 
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The circumstances in which there is a right to wear 
what you want, needs to be carefully distinguished 
from attacks on people for how they dress. Some 
of these attacks may be on grounds of sex, they 
may be on grounds of race (or both) – including 
attacks on Muslims or people who are thought to 
be Muslim. The first revenge attacks in the US after 
9/11 killed a Sikh man. Such attacks are criminal 
assaults which should be treated as such and may 
also be aggravated by racial hatred or religious 
hatred. Dealing firmly with such attacks should not 
be used as an excuse to justify as a religious ‘right’ 
the public exercise of sexual hatred and extreme 
misogynym,5  which inevitably accompanies ‘right 
to veil’ arguments. Individual women who cover may 
not support such violence, but they act as models of 
modern, political and pure Muslim women who in the 
exercise of their ‘right to veil’ immediately designate 
other women as ‘sluts’, or as Karima Bennoune 
argues in a long, complex account of human rights 
of veiling and unveiling, ‘their covering was my 
uncovering’.6  Nor should it be a surprise that many 
young women are firm about their choice to veil. The 
religious right in all its forms attracts articulate right 
wing women from Phyllis Schafly in the US to Sadhvi 
Ritambara in India. 
The choice of appropriate clothing is governed 
by numerous rules covering acceptable clothing 
- from the norms of the society, to uniforms worn 
at school or work, and notions of propriety, which 
vary between states and cultures. Political dress 
is subject to less human rights protection than 
religious dress and both should only be able to 
override ‘normal’ dress codes when they don’t 
conflict with other rights. Islamists and their liberal 
supporters have benefitted from the multicultural 
muddle regarding ‘the right to be different’. Anyone 
may choose to be different, but until it is normal to 
appear naked on the floor of the stock exchange 
or teach in Nazi uniform, the right to wear anything 
at all must continue to be circumscribed by other 
norms. If there is a conflict of rights, then freedom of 
religion or belief may be limited. Human rights law 
makes a useful distinction between the right to hold 
a belief which is absolute, and the right to manifest 
it, which is much more limited. The campaign to 
cover is clearly premised on gender segregation 
and discrimination however much it is packaged 
as a right. And that is why recognizing the wearing 
of hijab, niqab, etc., as a religious right is being 
developed: in order to enforce it as a duty, and 
make it an acceptable norm against which other 
Muslim women are judged. 
Threats to women who don’t want to cover in areas 
like Tower Hamlets, which has strong fundamentalist 
organizations, attract no attention from the 
proponents of ‘choice’, and are treated derisively 
by supporters of Islamists who, while attacking the 
manner in which the right wing press reports such 
threats, seek to explain away clear death threats 
and to accuse women who complain of having ‘an 
agenda’.7  As Rumy Hasan has pointed out, not 
even feminists have commented on such restrictive 
dress codes in England, including outspoken 
groups who oppose fundamentalism.8  There are 
a few exceptions. Maryam Namazie who founded 
the One Law for All campaign has blogged on the 
harsh enforcement of dress codes by Iran.9  Given 
that Khomeini admirers, the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission, are sometimes taken seriously as 
a human rights organization in the UK, it is worth 
understanding that their campaign on ‘rights’ does 
not extend to Iranian women being arrested or 
assaulted for being insufficiently covered. 
Another exception is British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy who have issued a paper on dress 
codes, in which they gently remind Muslim readers 
that in the most sacred of places during the hajj, 
men and women are not segregated, nor are their 
faces covered.10  Their view of veiling as a cultural 
practice which is not mandated by Islam contrasts 
sharply with the statement of the fundamentalist 
scholars quoted above. It is a critique of the anti-
racist argument which has turned ‘Islamophobia’ 
into one of the few acceptable  grand narratives 
of our times, by highlighting the right of Muslims to 
challenge fundamentalist narratives and offering 
genuine support to a wider range of choices by 
Muslim women. 
The connection between secularism and belonging 
has been clear, too, in the anti-colonial resistance 
of the early 20th century, because the history of the 
struggle for secularism is not merely a European 
story. As the opening quotation shows, the desire 
to be free from religious control has been crucial 
to freedom struggles. In India, the Constituent 
Assembly debated creating a uniform civil code 
to replace separate religious based family laws, 
codified under the British Raj. It was no accident 
that a clear lead came from the great Dalit leader, 
Dr Ambedkar, who chaired the drafting of the Indian 
Constitution. For those who had suffered gross legal 
discrimination sanctified by religion, the creation of 
a secular legal system was a chance to break free 
from the dominant orthodoxies of codified Hindu 
law. Ambedkar’s view of the value of secularism, and 
the desire for a common system of law, was radical 
in attempting to displace the colonial settlement on 
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family laws, and to create a new nation, based not 
only on foundational egalitarian principles of public 
citizenship such as universal suffrage, but also 
to promote equality in private matters – within the 
family.  Support for such a code came from various 
sources. For Minoo Masani, a Parsi, and Amrit Kaur, 
a Christian, the reform of personal law was the 
opportunity to create a nation through the promotion 
of equality – between citizens of different religions. 
For feminists such as Hansa Mehta, it was also an 
opportunity to promote equality between the sexes. 
Far from being a majoritarian idea imposed from the 
top, the idea of a uniform code beckoned those who 
had most to lose from living in a Hindu dominated 
country.11  
But for many legislators in the largest religious 
minority – Muslims – the issue was far more 
problematic. Many Muslim members argued for the 
retention of their customs, mentioning the Sheriat 
Act of 1937. This had been passed a mere eleven 
years before to substitute for customary laws 
governing Muslims. The arguments for reform of 
Muslim law were both to establish a religious rather 
than a customary foundation for law and to improve 
the rights of women. In codifying some aspects of 
Muslim law, many customary practices and juristic 
traditions were wiped out, helping to create a more 
homogenous legal ideal, which would mark out a 
communal Indian Muslim identity. The successful 
backlash against efforts to reform have left Muslim 
feminists in India struggling against  the idea that 
their lives should be governed by their ‘community 
leaders’.12   But the backlash that they face is a 
double one. The Hindu right in India embraced the 
idea of a uniform civil code and like those in Europe 
who fear that secularism is tainted by its association 
with majoritarian values, many liberal left activists, 
with a few exceptions, felt unable to create a 
separate discourse around a new civil code. Efforts 
to create internal reform continue with legal scholars 
and feminists from all religious backgrounds working 
to suggest different ways to reform the law.13 
The provision of a Uniform Civil Code remains in 
the Directive Principles of the Constitution, but more 
than 60 years after independence, it has yet to be 
realized. Instead the fusion between separate law 
and religious identity has become more entrenched. 
Systems of religious personal law apply in many 
countries of the world. Even where there have been 
reforms in the legal codes governing majorities 
such as the Hindu Code Bill of 1955 and 1956, in 
India which abolished polygamy and introduced 
divorce by mutual consent long before it was 
introduced into English law, the laws of the minority 
remain unreformed.. In Pakistan the Family Law 
Ordinance of 1961 brought about considerable 
reforms of personal law. The colonial Shariat Act no 
longer defined Muslim identity for Pakistanis whose 
sense of belonging lay in developing a new national 
identity. But it was one where Hindus, Sikhs and 
Christians were, at best, to be tolerated through 
indifference; and their laws were not reformed in 
Pakistan.
Where common codes were put in place, such as 
in Iraq, women have resisted the backlash against 
their legal status which came with the introduction of 
separate religious courts. As Sami Zubaida argues, 
‘Bridging the sectarian divide nurtured by the 
occupation and its Iraqi allies remains the biggest 
task facing the struggle of the Iraqi people for 
liberation and democracy’.14  For Iraqi women, the 
struggle against separate laws is a way not only of 
restoring the status quo ante, but also of supporting 
a common platform which resists this sectarian 
divide. 
Long before the ‘Arab Spring’, Nadje al Ali had 
identified the desire of some Copts to protect their 
status in a secular state. A Copt woman told her, ‘I 
still feel that the only salvation of this country is to 
go back to the 1919 revolution slogan: “Religion is 
for God, and the nation for its citizens”. I believe in 
a secular state where being Egyptian means to be 
a citizen.’15  Not only was secularism important as a 
way of integrating women’s and minority rights into 
the question of national belonging in 20th century 
struggles; it remains one of the pre-conditions for 
guaranteeing the success of the revolutions taking 
place in the  Middle East and North Africa today. 
In Bangladesh, the Awami League, elected to 
power under a secular mandate, backed by the 
Courts,16  has thrown away  the opportunity to return 
to the secular Constitution which was promulgated 
after independence. Although secularism remains 
in the directive principles (a compromise similar to 
the one arrived at in India in relation to the uniform 
civil code), Islam  remains the state religion, to 
the distress of the minorities and of other secular 
Bangladeshis. 
The return of the secular narrative has also come 
not so much as an embrace of international human 
rights discourses but of the particular traditions 
created by modernizing, anti-colonial projects. 
That is a lesson to feminists such as myself who 
examined the failures of the nation-state to fully 
include women as equal citizens. In discussions in 
Women Against Fundamentalism, in Britain, during 
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the 1990s, we were aware of the limited nature of the 
secular project, and critical of its many failures. But 
the struggle to establish nations which are not based 
on blood and soil or religious nationalism meant that 
the secular project, though highly contested, was 
embedded in anti-colonial struggles, particularly 
feminist ones. 
Long before second wave feminism in the West, 
representatives of newly decolonized states were 
crucial to the drafting of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Hansa Mehta, for instance, 
credited as one of the most important influences on 
it, insisted on the language ‘All human beings are 
equal in dignity and rights’… rather than ‘all men’ 
favoured initially by Eleanor Roosevelt.17 
That is just one of the reasons why the timidity of 
the UN agencies in defending their own standards 
on gender equality is particularly depressing. The 
other is that the struggle against the attempt to get 
‘defamation of religion’ accepted as an offence in 
human rights law is crucial to struggles to abolish 
blasphemy laws in countries like Pakistan. These 
laws are used primarily to legitimize attacks on 
religious minorities, but in Pakistan have also been 
used by Muslim groups to launch sectarian threats 
against each other. They are used as a tool to deny 
that any minority truly belongs. 
That is why it is particularly frightening that the term 
‘Islamophobia’ has achieved such wide currency. It 
concentrates minds on protecting a religion rather 
than people.  it is often deployed by people who 
refuse   to recognize intra community discrimination. 
It has invented a ‘new’ racism which has Muslims 
as sole targets, whereas the old racism, is alive 
and well. So  that even though Muslims face 
discrimination , they are not the sole targets of 
racialised methods of policing. Concentration on 
Islamophobia has caused many to fail to notice that 
increased police powers have often been used to 
pick up young African Caribbean men, rather than 
those seen as Muslims. Racism in its classical 
forms has not been completely displaced onto the 
policing of Muslims, heavy though that has become. 
Identity politics has been substituted for the struggle 
against entrenched discrimination; and ideology 
for an account of the way discrimination has either 
persisted or reinvented itself.
Islamophobia is a flawed concept, closely allied to 
the concept of blasphemy, which should have no 
place in a secular state. It is often used to shut down 
criticism of Islam as a religion, thus threatening 
freedom of expression. Criticism of  particular 
fundamentalist organizations may be silenced by 
claiming that  it is criticism of Muslims in general, 
protecting organisations  such as the Jamaat e 
Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood or salafi-jihadi 
groups from scrutiny. The lobbies promoting this 
term in Britain are themselves associated with those 
who are implicated in very serious crimes –  such 
as mass murder and rape, in Bangladesh in 1971. 
From former policemen such as Robert Lambert, 
to members of the Stop the War Coalition, the 
assumption that fundamentalists speak for Muslims 
has become pervasive in British politics, causing 
a complicit silence in their involvement in serious 
human rights violations.
The importance of protecting freedom of expression 
and secular politics is a matter of life and death 
for religious minorities as well as atheists and 
ex-Muslims. Fundamentalists from all religious 
backgrounds have targeted religious minorities in 
virtually every country in the world. Muslims, Hindus, 
Buddhists and Christians have all been targeted 
at various times across the Indian sub-continent. 
But in attacking different religions, fundamentalists 
attack the lived experience of their own religious 
traditions as well. No religious group is free from the 
aesthetic and cultural practices of those  with whom 
they live. share social space . Heterodox sects 
and small ancient religions that have flourished for 
centuries in Iraq or India find that their social space 
is squeezed by assumptions about who they are 
and which ‘community’ they belong to. Secularism 
protects ‘freedom for religion, as much as it protects 
‘freedom from religion’. That is why the protection of 
secular space and the return to the larger idea of 
secularism has become urgent again; and why the 
dismissal of secularism as a concept seems to be 
so very outdated.
Notes
1. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
jun/07/marching-with-the-slutwalkers
2. See, for instance, Assembly for the Protection 
of the Hijab, founded by Muslim Association of 
Britain associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
announced by Muslim Council of Britain associated 
with the Jamaat e Islami, http://www.mcb.org.uk/
features/features.php?ann_id=386
3. See Joint Statement about the veil from Muslim 
groups, scholars and leaders at http://www.mcb.
org.uk/uploads/Joint%20Statement.pdf
4. See Tower Hamlets: Muslim Woman Councillor 
receives death threats from other Muslims: http://
www.spittoon.org/archives/5481, See also youtube 
criticizing Rushanara Ali, http://www.youtube.com/
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I approach the issue of faith communities and racism 
from the perspective of having done historical 
and sociological research on British Jews. Jews 
are one of the oldest ‘minority ethnic’ populations 
in Britain, although their presence in the country 
was interrupted for a few centuries when they 
were expelled in 1290. The modern Anglo-Jewish 
community dates from the period of ‘resettlement’ 
under Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s. Its long history 
has meant that it is both a useful lens for examining 
faith communities in Britain, and that it has been 
treated, in different ways, as a model minority by both 
sociologists and in public discourse. And because 
of the long history of racism against Jews in Britain, 
it provides a useful optic for understanding British 
racism and its changing nature.
Faith Communities
I want to start by saying something about ‘faith 
communities’. The leadership of the Anglo-Jewish 
community historically defined itself in those terms: 
as a community of faith. I believe the term represented 
both an assimilationist and a communalist logic at 
work. The communal leadership were themselves 
highly acculturated in Britain, and did everything 
they could to ‘anglicize’, as they put it, the poorer 
Jewish immigrants. They understood themselves as 
‘Englishmen of the Jewish faith’, different from other 
Britons only by virtue of religion. But the crucial area 
of difference –  faith – was the grounds on which 
was based their right to lead and represent their 
‘co-religionists’. Faith legitimated their authority. In 
thinking about this, it is helpful to look at the inception 
of the modern Jewish community here. Jews had 
petitioned Cromwell that they may ‘meete at our said 
private devotions in our Particular houses without 
fear of molestation either to our persons famillys or 
estates’. The words ‘our private devotions’ and ‘our 
Particular houses’ are key here to understanding the 
terms on which Jews were tolerated in Protestant 
England. 
The presence of Jews was negotatied on the basis 
of Judaism as a private religion; the understanding 
was that only in this dimension would Jews be 
different from their fellow citizens. In other words, 
the normative public Protestant Christianity of the 
nation would not be disturbed. Jews were tolerated 
if their Jewishness was relegated to the private 
sphere; English tolerance was predicated on the 
invisibility of difference in public. 
There is considerable evidence that ordinary 
Jewish people in places like London’s East End or 
Chapeltown in Leeds understood their Jewishness 
very differently from this. Whether religious or not, 
they related to Jews suffering anti-Semitic violence 
in Russia and Romania as more than simply ‘co-
religionists’, as the communal leaders called 
them, but instead used terms like ‘brothers’ and 
‘sisters’; they saw fellow Jews as their kin. In today’s 
language, we would say that they conceived of 
Jews as an ethnic community rather than a faith 
community. In fact, the concept of ‘faith’ in the notion 
of a faith community is fundamentally Christian, and 
specifically Protestant, at odds with the practices of 
Jews, and indeed of Hindus, Muslims and other ‘faith 
communities’. While Christianity, and especially 
Protestant Christianity, understands religion as 
personal belief, for others (including Jews) religion 
is about practices: not what you believe but what 
you do. In the Jewish case, this includes practices 
liking keeping a kosher home, particular practices 
of dress, carrying out the mitzvot (commandments) 
that constitute a Jewish life, a whole daily, weekly and 
yearly cycle of ritual and commemorative actions. As 
with other non-Christian religions, these practices 
are fundamentally public or communal, and not 
about private devotions. Thus the very concept of 
‘faith’ as a way of defining identities conceals and 
reveals England’s normative Protestant Christianity.
Later in the twentieth century, when the language of 
ethnicity was being widely disseminated in society 
at large, communal leaders were very reluctant 
to use terms like ‘ethnic community’ for Jews, 
because it undermined the assimilationist logic 
and its repudiation of Jewish difference on which 
their politics had been based. In my documentary 
research, I found some voices on the edge of the 
communal mainstream using those terms from 
the late-1960s, but it was not until the 1990s that 
members of the communal leadership would use 
those terms, and even now it remains contested. 
What changed by the 1990s was a shift in the 
strategy whereby the communal leadership 
legitimated its authority. In work with my colleague 
Keith Kahn-Harris, we argue that the officially (if not 
of course actually) monocultural vision of Britain at 
the time when the community was being formed, and 
especially as it entered the 20th century, engendered 
a strategy of security among Anglo-Jewry. That is, 
especially after 1900, they emphasized secure 
11. Faith Communities and Racism: Some Reflections 
from the Anglo-Jewish Experience
Ben Gidley
University of Oxford
Introduction
Secularism, Racism and the Politics of Belonging 59
British belonging and citizenship. And, as the 
already assimilated, the already anglicized and 
successful, they were able to act as gatekeepers 
to secure British belonging and citizenship for the 
newly arrived  (Kahn-Harris and Gidley, 2010).
Communal Responses to 
Racism: From a Strategy 
of Security to a Strategy of 
Insecurity
As Jewish presence in Britain became increasingly 
visible, and Jewish difference began to exceed 
or refuse invisibility in public, the ‘anti-Semitism of 
tolerance’ of the early modern period was replaced 
by new forms of anti-Semitism, closely linked to 
racism against foreigners and migrants in general 
(‘aliens’). Jews were the main victims of the anti-alien 
movement that gathered force in the 1900s, and 
the main victims of new anti-immigration legislation 
driven by this movement, principally the Aliens Act 
of 1905 (Cohen, 2006). By the 1920s–30s, anti-alien 
groups like the British Brothers League had mutated 
into fascist movements like the British Fascists and 
later Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists, and 
violent attacks on Jews increased.
The way that communal leaders responded to 
fascism and anti-Semitism in the first half of the 20th 
century, for instance to both Mosley’s Blackshirts 
here in the UK and the Nazis on the continent in 
the 1930s, exemplify the strategy of security, with 
the leadership responding as quietly as possible, 
urging communal caution and even blaming the 
‘ostentatious’ behaviour of lower class Jews for 
the problem (Rosenberg, 1985). Only later, in the 
context of a shift away from monoculturalism to an 
official ethos of integration in the 1960s (defined by 
Roy Jenkins famously ‘not as a flattening process of 
assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied 
by cultural diversity’), Anglo-Jewish leaders began 
to belatedly shift away from the strategy of security 
to one of insecurity. After a long transitional period 
in the years after the Six Day War, we have identified 
a crucial turning point at the beginning of the 1990s 
when the strategy of insecurity became dominant. 
In the last two decades, communal leaders have 
highlighted various sources of insecurity and 
risk threatening the community. In the 1990s, as 
exemplified by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks’ book 
title, Will We Have Jewish Grandchildren?, the 
insecurities most often stressed were the rapidly 
declining rates of synagogue attendance and inter-
marriage, which were in part arguably results of the 
assimilationist ethos having been too successful. In 
the current century, the threats most often stressed 
have been those associated with anti-Semitism, 
and especially the new anti-Semitism, which has 
seen anti-Semitic incidents spiking a number of 
times after the start of the Second Intifada. The 
contrast between the frenzied communal reaction 
to the new anti-Semitism (Jonathan Sacks spoke of 
a ‘tsunami’ of anti-Semitism) and the early silence 
over Mosley and Hitler is instructive. Equally 
instructive, perhaps, is the dissent offered by 
communal radicals both then and now. Radical 
Jews in the Communist Party and other left and 
left Zionist groups led the fight against fascism 
when the communal leaders refused to act; where 
communal leaders emphasized security, communal 
dissenters emphasized threats. Now, left-wing Jews 
tend to minimize the danger of anti-Semitism; where 
communal leaders emphasize insecurity, communal 
dissenters exaggerate the comfortableness of the 
Jewish position in Britain. David Hirsh has used the 
apt term ‘the new conservatives’ to describe the 
denial of anti-Semitism from much of the Jewish 
left, pointing out how precisely it echoes the earlier 
position of the communal authorities (Hirsh, 2006).
Is Islamophobia the New 
Anti-Semitism?
One common trope used by the ‘new conservatives’ 
in denying or minimizing contemporary anti-
Semitism is the idea of Islamophobia as the 
new anti-Semitism. Last August, The Guardian’s 
Comment is Free section carried an article by 
Mya Guarnieri entitled ‘Islamophobia: the new 
anti-Semitism’, concluding: ‘In the past, there was 
anti-Semitism, roiling just below the surface. Now, 
there is Islamophobia’ (The Guardian, 26 August 
2010). Shlomo Sand, in an essay written around the 
same time for the Jewish Quarterly made the same 
point, in an article entitled ‘From Judaeophobia to 
Islamophobia’ (Jewish Quarterly, 23 July 2010). 
Across the Atlantic, Daniel Luban wrote an article 
in the Jewish magazine The Tablet entitled ‘The 
New Anti-Semitism: Recent Attacks on Islam in the 
United States Echo Old Slurs Against Jews’, noting 
that ‘the problem for the ADL is that there simply 
isn’t much anti-Semitism of consequence in the 
United States these days.... At the same time, many 
of the tropes of classic anti-Semitism have been 
revived and given new force on the American right 
[but] their targets are not Jews but Muslims’ (The 
Tablet, 19 August 2010).
More sophisticated accounts of Islamophobia as 
the new anti-Semitism have been developed by 
academics, such as Nasar Meer and Matti Bunzl 
(Meer and Noorani, 2008). They argue for some 
structural similarities between the two racisms, 
but also for a chronological framework in which 
(especially for Bunzl) anti-Semitism is largely a thing 
of the past while Islamophobia is a phenomenon 
of the now. There are of course similarities and 
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12. Racism, Religion and Community Action: The Work of 
the Jewish Council for Racial Equality (JCORE)
Edie Friedman
The Jewish Council for Racial Equality
It was over 35 years ago that I had a conversation 
about my interest in social justice.  I was taken aback 
when my Jewish acquaintance said that he was glad 
I did the Christian thing and loved my neighbour. 
Although it was easy to correct him by reminding 
him of Jewish teaching (the injunction to love your 
neighbour occurs 36 times in the Torah), it spurred 
me on to create a Jewish anti-racist organization. 
Given all the anti-racist organizations in Britain, why 
did I want to make this organization Jewish? In other 
words, why the J in JCORE?
To answer that, I need to go back to my own history. 
I was born in 1949 on the West Side of Chicago. 
My parents were first generation Americans born 
to Russian immigrants.  Like the East Side of New 
York and the East End of London, the West Side of 
Chicago was the area traditionally settled by newly 
arrived immigrants: Poles, Italians, Greeks and 
Jews.
Growing up in the 1960s, I, like many others of my 
generation, was profoundly affected by the civil 
rights and peace movements. At university I took a 
course called Judaism 101. We sat in our torn-off 
jeans and Che T-shirts, chewing gum and waxing 
lyrical about how it was possible to save the world. 
The rabbi who taught the class helped us to make 
the connection between our idealism and our 
Jewishness.
In the early 1970s I moved to Britain. In some sense, 
I felt I was a political exile from the America of the 
late 1960s.  The enthusiasm and the optimism of the 
early 1960s in the United States had given way to 
despair. Our endeavours to create a more just world 
had come to nothing.
I left an America still recovering from the poison 
of 1950s McCarthyism, rife with political conflict 
thanks to the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam, 
and a black population still disenfranchised from 
the American Dream. It was an America where 
student and political unrest were too often met by 
violent state response and which was scarred by 
the assassination of three of its most eloquent icons: 
John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther 
King.
I also left an America where Jews, whether religious 
or secular, played a disproportionately prominent 
role in many of the social movements that were 
struggling to create a country with humane domestic 
and foreign policies. 
When I arrived here, I found – in contrast to the US 
- that Britain had institutionalized outstanding social 
provision through the creation of its welfare state 
and National Health Service. But paradoxically, the 
Jewish community here was much less involved in 
issues of social justice than back home.
I was bewildered by the dearth of Jewish communal 
responses to social issues (as distinct from the 
large number of individuals involved), so radically 
different from my American experience. At the same 
time, I noticed that many of the Christians who 
were involved in human rights organizations readily 
quoted Jewish prophets as one of the main reasons 
for their involvement. I did not want this perception 
- that Christians had the monopoly on social justice - 
to go unchallenged.  We had to be more outspoken 
about our own tradition of social activism.   
It was in this climate that, in 1976, I started the 
Jewish Council for Racial Equality (originally known 
as the Jewish Social Responsibility Council).
But before jumping in and creating a new 
organization (being young, female and American 
was not the best combination to make waves in the 
Jewish establishment) I had to think critically about 
some of the reasons why responses to issues such 
as racism from British Jews were different from 
those of American Jews.    
One of the first things I had to recognize was that 
Jews in the United Kingdom felt more vulnerable 
than those in the United States.  They formed a much 
smaller minority of the population (under 0.5%, 
compared with the US’s 2%).  The actual proximity to 
the Holocaust (20 miles of English Channel were all 
that physically separated British Jews from the fate 
of French Jews and others) meant that its impact 
on the British Jewish community was much greater 
than on their American counterparts .  
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American Jews have been able to express their 
identity within a culture where ethnic diversity has 
been both acknowledged and celebrated. Though 
attitudes in the United Kingdom have changed in 
recent decades, British minorities have traditionally 
been more sceptical of outward celebrations of 
diversity for fear of reinforcing prejudice. Historically, 
the British Jewish establishment put pressure on 
people to conform to the majority culture.  But what 
also complicates this issue of ethnicity is the fact 
that most Jews in the United Kingdom are white, 
placing us in the majority white population, though 
our Jewishness, whether religious or secular, makes 
us a minority within it. This ambiguity inevitably 
affects how we and others see us. The question of 
whether Jews in the United Kingdom are an ethnic 
minority is still debated both by Jews and others.  
Then there is the vexed issue of anti-Semitism.  At 
times, Jews have been quite aggressively excluded 
from the anti-racist movement, particularly in the 
1980s when prejudice against Jews was seen as 
yesterday’s racism.  This was my experience as a 
trainer during racism awareness sessions with a 
variety of organizations.  The credentials of Jewish 
anti-racists were called into question as a result of 
the persistent conflation of Judaism, Jewishness and 
Zionism.  Jews in general could be held accountable 
for the actions of individual Jews (Home Secretary 
Michael Howard being a memorable example) in a 
way that, say, Christians clearly were not.   
And yet, I found that, despite these obstacles, and 
despite the lack of Jewish communal action, there 
was still a large number of individual Jews involved 
in human rights and social action.  Why was this?
First, I think, it was because of Jewish teaching, 
which places an emphasis on justice rather than 
charity, and emphasizes responsibilities towards 
individuals and to society. This has influenced 
observant and secular Jews.
Second, there is a Jewish tradition of debate and 
questioning, which has encouraged a culture of 
challenging government policy and the status quo.
And third is the Jewish experience of being ‘the 
other’ - whether as economic migrants, immigrants, 
asylum seekers or refugees. In Britain, Jews were 
the targets of the first anti-alien legislation in 1905. 
Recurrent discrimination, persecution and genocide 
throughout Jewish history have made many of us 
more sensitive and empathetic to others who have 
been oppressed. We feel a kinship with them and a 
responsibility to use our experience to assist them.  
So it was my feeling the Jewish community needed 
to be more outward looking and more engaged in 
social action that inspired me to start JCORE, and 
it was the combination of Jewish teaching, tradition 
and experience that was JCORE’s guiding principle 
then - and still is - more than thirty years later.
So what do we do, and what makes us different from 
other anti-racism groups?
In response to the many challenges of trying to 
create a fairer multiracial society, JCORE decided 
to concentrate its work in three main areas: race-
equality education; Black, Asian and Jewish 
dialogue; and asylum and refugee issues.
Jewish education needs to be more explicit in 
making the connections between Jewish values 
and our responsibilities to the wider world.  To help 
reinforce this connection, JCORE has developed 
a number of education packs, so that Jewish 
children can learn from a very young age and 
throughout their schooling about the relevance of 
Jewish teaching and history to the topic of racism. 
These educational resources encourage Jewish 
schoolchildren to see their individual and collective 
responsibility not only to combat racism, but to 
contribute to the development of Britain as a thriving 
multicultural society. 
To develop contact between Black, Asian and Jewish 
communities, JCORE initiated a dialogue forum 
to create an opportunity to consider connections 
between our different communities. 
Examining these connections can be a valuable 
exercise leading to greater insight.  It can however 
lead to unfair comparisons between communities. 
There are of course many differences between 
Black and Jewish experiences.  There can be a 
tendency to debate which group has suffered most 
in the past. Equity in victimhood is not something 
we should strive for, yet whether consciously or 
unconsciously, we often do precisely that. I know 
how difficult it can be for my community to ‘share’ 
the Holocaust both in terms of acknowledging its 
other victims, as well as making comparisons with 
other more recent genocides such as those in 
Cambodia or Rwanda. 
This can also lead to the inappropriate rating 
of which was worse: slavery or the Holocaust. 
The creation of Holocaust Memorial Days has 
heightened this debate. The teaching of the 
Holocaust was made mandatory in the National 
Curriculum in 1991; the teaching of slavery was not 
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13. Resisting Racism and Racialisation: The Case of 
Ireland’s African Pentecostals
Abel Ugba
University of East London
Introduction
The birth and spread of African-led Pentecostalism 
in Ireland have taken place against the backdrop of 
dramatic increases in immigration and of racially-
motivated hostilities towards immigrants and 
minority ethnic groups. At the heart of the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ economy were policies that encouraged 
direct foreign investment and repeated recruitments 
of foreign workers, including sub-Saharan Africans. 
Social and political instabilities in the African 
continent and the implementation of new refugees 
and asylum policies in Ireland also resulted in the 
increased and visible presence of refugees from 
sub-Saharan Africans from the late-1990s. During 
this period, racism and racially-motivated attacks 
on immigrants rose almost in equal proportion to 
anti-refugee tirades from anti-immigration groups, 
government officials and a section of the media. 
Sub-Saharan Africans quickly attracted the ire 
of anti-immigration activists because of their 
distinctive phenotypical features and increased 
social and cultural activities mostly in urban centres 
like Dublin. As Paul Cullen surmised in an article in 
The Irish Times: ’Black immigrants simply stand out 
more than other groups… black-skinned immigrants 
have nowhere to hide in the face of racist behaviour’ 
(Cullen 2002). In February 1999, The Irish Times 
also reported that 78 per cent of asylum seekers 
and 95 per cent of African asylum seekers had 
experienced racially motivated verbal or physical 
attacks. Some terrified African asylum seekers 
were too fearful to step out of their flats as a result 
of repeated attacks. Of the 622 people interviewed 
in an Amnesty International report, four out of five 
said they had been the victim of racism, most 
often on the streets or in shops or pubs. Racism 
was experienced in banks, schools, churches, 
buses and taxis, and from councils, housing and 
tax authorities (Amnesty International, 2001). While 
some African immigrants joined organized or formal 
protests against racism, many sought succour in 
the scriptures and among fellow worshippers. This 
paper explores the interpretation of and reaction 
to racism by Pentecostal African immigrants. It 
argues that churches and the company of fellow 
worshippers provided a ‘safe’ space from everyday 
racism while unique Pentecostal interpretations of 
the Bible formed the basis of intellectual response 
to church members’ direct encounter with racially-
motivated hostilities.
The empirical research that informs my arguments 
in this paper was conducted mostly in the Greater 
Dublin Area. Many of the themes I develop no doubt 
apply to immigrant religious activism generally. 
In the next section I offer a brief introduction to 
African-led Pentecostal groups in order to provide 
meaningful contexts to my arguments. This is 
followed by a brief historical and substantive 
explanation of Pentecostalism. In the conclusion 
I examine African Pentecostals’ experiences and 
interpretation of racism.  
Who are Immigrant African 
Pentecostals? 
The emergence of sub-Saharan African communities 
in Ireland coincided with the birth or formation of 
what Khalid Koser (2003) described as Europe’s 
new African diasporas. Koser used the term to 
describe the newer and more recent transatlantic 
migrations to and settlement of ‘black’ Africans 
in the West, distinct from and largely unrelated to 
the forced shipments of Africans to Europe and 
the Americas for the purpose of slavery. Although 
African immigrants were present in Ireland as far 
back as the 18th century (McKeon 1997), large-
scale immigration and the formation of communities 
did not happen until the 1990s. Whereas little is 
known about earlier migrations, the Africans that 
arrived from the mid-1990s consisted of asylum 
seekers, refugees, students, workers, diplomats 
and relatives of established migrants. The origin of 
African immigrant churches in Europe is traceable 
to the United Kingdom where students from mostly 
Nigeria started meeting for Christian worship in the 
1960s. 
Increased immigrations in the 1980s and 1990s 
resulted in dramatic increases in church groups, 
membership and a greater impact on the social and 
cultural landscape. Their activities quickly spread 
to continental Europe, particularly Germany and 
the Netherlands (Adogame, 2001; Ter Haar, 1998). 
Although the first African-led Pentecostal church 
was established in Ireland in 1997, it was not until 
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the early 2000s that they attracted the attention of 
the media and public (Ugba, 2011). Their arrival 
in Ireland represents a new dimension to what 
Adogame (2001) has described as ‘a quest for a 
space in the spiritual marketplace’ by members of 
the African New Religious Movement. Although there 
has been a tendency to rationalize the presence 
of these groups as a ‘natural’ consequence of 
the increased migrations of Africans to Europe, 
I argue for an interpretation that emphasizes the 
deliberateness, planned and highly aspirational 
nature of the quest by these churches for influence 
on the global religious landscape. Church leaders 
firmly believe that they are part of God’s plan to re-
introduce the gospel to Europeans, the very people 
who brought it to Africa about two centuries ago. 
The idea of reverse-mission and the conviction that 
there is a limited time to accomplish this work before 
God’s judgment arrives motivate the activities 
of many African-Pentecostal groups. Their self-
understanding aside, there is no doubt that their 
presence and activities in the nation-states of the 
West have re-defined the concept of community and 
complexified notions of boundaries, commonality 
and belonging, as I explain later in this paper.  
What is Pentecostalism? 
In this section I articulate a historical and substantive 
account of the main features of Pentecostalism 
in order to provide insights into the various ways 
that individual believers and groups engage with 
Pentecostalism’s main tenets and how beliefs and 
practices in turn shape the believers’ world views. 
It is perhaps easier to say who the Pentecostals are 
than what Pentecostalism is. Pentecostals are those 
who profess to be Pentecostals. In other words, 
people are Pentecostals if they say they are. There 
are no clear-cut and generally-accepted criteria 
for determining who is a Pentecostal. Outsiders, 
including academics and statisticians, have 
generally relied on the testimony or self-confession 
of believers or of their leaders/fellow believers. 
Pentecostals, even in small group settings, do not 
generally carry official identity cards. Membership 
of a group is established or affirmed by the regularity 
and levels of involvement in group activities, outward 
demonstration of fidelity to group beliefs and loyalty 
to the leadership. 
Pentecostalism, on the other hand, is a generic term 
for a wide variety of religious practices based on 
or inspired by that dramatic holy spirit experience 
of the first century Christians, as recorded in the 
Acts of the Apostles (Acts 2:1–36.) in the Bible. The 
account states: 
...Now while the day of the [festival of] 
Pentecost was in progress they were all 
together at the same place,  and suddenly 
there occurred from heaven a noise just 
like that of a rushing stiff breeze, and it 
filled the whole house in which they were 
sitting. And tongues as if of fire became 
visible to them and were distributed about, 
and one sat upon each one of them, and 
they all became filled with Holy Spirit and 
started to speak with different tongues, just 
as the spirit was granting them to make 
utterance. (New World Translation (NWT) 
of the Holy Bible)
Although the majority of Pentecostals cite the above 
Bible passages as the inspiration or the reference for 
their unique practices, there is a great divergence 
of interpretations and application. 
The diverse interpretations of doctrines and the 
conscious efforts of many groups to contextualize or 
make Pentecostal doctrines respond to and reflect 
their unique cultures and circumstances have created 
a collection of groups and churches across space 
and time under the umbrella Pentecostal banner. 
As Corten and Marshall-Fratani (2001: 7) note, 
‘each society, each group invests Pentecostalism 
with its own meanings.’ The divergence and 
differences that exist among the various groups are 
doctrinal, methodical, social, structural and racial. 
Pentecostal believers, as Anderson (1999) puts it, 
‘range from the fundamentalist and white middle 
class “mega churches” to indigenous movements 
in the Third World that have adapted to their cultural 
and religious contexts to such an extent that many 
western Pentecostals would probably doubt their 
qualifications as “Christian” movements’. Evidence 
of racially-motivated divisions in the development of 
African-led Pentecostalism in Ireland was equally 
noticeable. These groups are mostly populated by 
sub-Saharan Africans and participation of Africans 
in Irish-led Pentecostal groups has been short-lived 
mostly because ‘they do not pray the way we do in 
Africa’.
Modern-day Pentecostalism has been dogged 
by racial controversies from the very beginning. 
Pentecostalism, according to various sources, was 
either started in Los Angeles in 1906 by William 
Joseph Seymour, the self-taught son of a former 
slave, or it began in 1901 through the efforts of 
Charles Parham, a racist and anti-Semitic white 
American, who rigidly enforced segregation in his 
church (Anderson 1999; Hollenweger, 1976, 1999; 
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MacRobert, 1988). There is also a recurring debate 
on how much influence African traditional beliefs – 
transmitted through African slaves in the Americas 
– have had on the contents of Pentecostalism. 
Despite the divergence of views on the beginning 
and contents of Pentecostalism, classical 
Pentecostals are unified by what Poloma (2000: 
5-7) identifies as ‘a particular Christian world-view 
that reverts to a non-European epistemology from 
the European one that has dominated Christianity 
for centuries’. Pentecostals have not only sought to 
relocate the geographical centre of Christianity from 
its European axis to many centres around the world 
(Pentecostalism has experienced the most dramatic 
growths in the Majority World – Africa, Asia and 
South America), they have re-interpreted specific 
Bible teachings, mostly by grounding them in non-
European social and cultural practices. They have 
established alternative yardsticks for validating 
the Christian experience different from the long-
established ones that are saturated by European 
values and cultures (Cox, 2003; Kalu, 1998; Ter 
Haar 2003). 
Another trait that unites Pentecostals is their attitude 
towards the Bible. Most Pentecostals believe in the 
Bible as God-inspired and they often adhere to a 
literal interpretation of it. The Bible has relevance 
for their everyday conduct and experiences and it 
serves as a practical manual for life’s processes. 
Margaret Poloma (2000: 6) puts it like this: ‘The Word 
of the Scriptures and the Spirit of the living God are 
in dialogical relationship, playing incessantly within 
and among individuals as well as within the larger 
world’. The concept of spiritual re-birth or ‘born-
again’ is the last of the unifying traits or practices 
that I want to mention before I move on to the next 
theme. As Corten and Marshall-Fratani (2001: 11) 
remark: ‘The experience of getting born-again 
reproduces itself in an almost identical form across 
the world’. Every Pentecostal, even those born and 
brought up in Pentecostal families, affirms that this 
experience marks the beginning of a personal and 
intimate relationship with God.  Pentecostals are 
fairly uniform in the way they describe and interpret 
the transformative qualities of re-birth. They say it 
is a prerequisite for salvation. Therefore those who 
hope to escape the destruction that awaits this 
ungodly world and go to heaven to be with Jesus 
Christ must undergo spiritual re-birth. They identify 
the encounter between Jesus and Nicodemus, as 
recorded in the gospel of John, as the basis of this 
unique interpretation. That accounts reads:
...Now there was a man of the Pharisees, 
Nicodemus was his name, a ruler of the 
Jews. This one came to him in the night 
and said to him: ‘Rabbi, we know that you 
as a teacher have come from God; for 
no one can perform these signs that you 
perform unless God is with him.’ In answer 
Jesus said to him: ‘Most truly I say to you, 
Unless anyone is born again, he cannot 
see the kingdom of God’. Nicodemus said 
to him: ‘How can a man be born when he 
is old? He cannot enter into the womb of 
his mother a second time and be born, can 
he?’ Jesus answered: ‘Most truly I say to 
you, unless anyone is born from water and 
spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of 
God. What has been born from the flesh 
is flesh, and what has been born from the 
spirit is spirit. Do not marvel because I told 
you, YOU people must be born again’. 
(John 3: 1-7)
Pentecostal interpretation of this experience tends 
to include not only a deeper commitment to God 
but also a rupture with the past and many aspects 
of the present. They develop new scripture-centred 
interpretations of their present, past and future and 
of their relationship to the ‘other’. The person who has 
undergone spiritual rebirth is a ‘new creation’ who 
has forsaken ‘worldly’ or fleshly habits like drinking 
alcohol, smoking, visits to discos/pubs, sexual 
relations outside or before wedlock, quarrelling, 
fighting, resentment and enmity. The human race is 
one and fellow Pentecostals, especially members of 
the same group, are considered brothers and sisters. 
Ethnic, social and racial differences should pale 
into insignificance, replaced by love for humanity 
and concern for the ungodly. To buttress their 
point, Pentecostals often quote the Apostle Paul: 
‘Consequently if anyone is in union with Christ, he 
is a new creation; the old things passed away, look! 
new things have come into existence’ (2 Corinthian 
5:17). However, construction and negotiation of 
boundaries is more complex in practice. 
Experiencing and Resisting 
Racialization
Max Weber (1930) contends that the self-
conception/social orientation of the Calvinists was 
influenced by their beliefs of predestination and 
salvation. They believed that those whom God has 
predestined for salvation he favours with material 
wealth in this world. The work ethic resulting from 
this belief resulted to wealth accumulation and 
the development of a unique spirit of capitalism. 
Weber’s analysis emphasizes the contents of 
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beliefs and projects religion as a relationship 
between social actors and a super mundane being 
which has implications for the believers’ ethical 
and everyday conduct. His analytical framework 
differs from functionalism, which focuses mainly on 
the uses and role of religion in society. Like Weber, 
other scholars (e.g. Bellah, 1976; Berger, 1973; 
Toulis, 1997) have acknowledged the transformative 
capacity of religious ideas and their role in the 
social construction of reality. African Pentecostals 
consider Pentecostalism as their essential and 
perhaps only window on the world and the main 
mirror for self-analysis and projection (Ugba, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c). The salience of Pentecostalism as 
a central element for ethnic and religious identity 
formation, reproduction and maintenance has been 
affirmed among Ireland’s African immigrants.
For Pentecostal African immigrants, the experience 
of rebirth lays the basis for articulating a new and 
radical concept of self. This has direct implications 
for social actions and motives and for the way they 
construct or interpret commonality, connectedness 
and groupness (Brubaker, 2004).  Their new and 
religiously-inspired interpretation of self foregrounds 
Pentecostal beliefs and morality and subverts the 
dominant portrayal of them in media and popular 
discourse. It can therefore be argued that beliefs, 
in the case of Pentecostal African immigrants, 
provide a basis for an alternative, subversive and 
empowering articulation of self. In their self-definition, 
African Pentecostals are not the racialized minority 
immigrant group on the periphery of society but 
empowered agents of social and religious change 
in an increasingly secular West, where the younger 
generations have swapped the spirituality of their 
forefathers for drugs, alcohol and revelries in pubs. 
Commonality and groupness involve the dual but 
paradoxical tasks of simultaneously establishing 
and tearing down boundaries. Boundaries are 
generally erected to set Pentecostals apart from 
non-Pentecostals while bridges are mostly aimed at 
connecting one Pentecostal group to another. The 
boundaries set up by Ireland’s African Pentecostals 
are multidimensional and based mostly on their 
unique interpretation of the Bible. In some cases, 
the boundaries are also marked by moral and racial/
ethnic symbolisms. Such boundaries homogenize in 
order to essentialize sameness within distinct groups 
or the larger born-again family. The degree to which 
these boundaries are enforced depends on who the 
constitutive ‘other’ is. For example, the boundaries 
that separate Pentecostals from non-Pentecostals 
generally, or from the dominant society, are strongly 
articulated most of the times, while those that set 
distinct African Pentecostal groups apart can 
sometimes be blurred and weak. The boundaries 
between them and the larger society permit some 
connections and interrelationships, which some 
Pentecostals argue would facilitate their eventual 
integration into the larger or dominant society.
Experiencing and Resisting 
Racism
The policies and politics of Fortress Europe promote 
racism and racially-motivated attacks, many of 
them directed at sub-Saharan Africans. Whereas 
many of the churches that I have investigated 
have not participated in collaborative anti-racism 
actions, for example, protest marches (though 
individual members may have participated), they 
have provided a physical space where members 
withdraw for relative safety and support. Also, 
specific Pentecostal teachings have formed the 
basis of intellectual response to racially-motivated 
attacks, enabling members to come to terms with 
them. Pentecostal teachings on forgiveness, loving 
the ‘enemy’ and the oneness of the human family 
have helped members to be less bitter about their 
experiences and, where possible, to seek means 
of reconciliation. They blamed ‘ignorance’ and the 
devil for the racially-motivated hostilities that they 
suffered and said the solution lay in the conversion of 
the perpetrators to Pentecostalism. As one research 
participant put it: ‘We have only one enemy – the 
devil. Our fight is against the devil and his demons. 
They are responsible for all the wrongs that people 
commit’. In this sense Pentecostal teachings 
helped the members of these churches to assume 
a morally superior position by refusing to engage in 
retribution or openly expressing hatred towards the 
perpetrators.
Racial bias and discrimination often result in social 
isolation and the loss of societal recognition and 
prestige. Many Pentecostal African immigrants are 
successful professionals who had enjoyed respect 
and recognition in their home-countries. African-led 
Pentecostal churches have transpired into spaces 
where members could counter social isolation and 
reclaim a measure of the respect and recognition 
they once enjoyed in their home-countries, as 
Mella (1994) argues in relation to Chilean Catholic 
immigrants in Sweden. These churches are perhaps 
the only institutions in Irish society where Africans 
experience a sense of ownership and full belonging. 
This sense of ownership and belonging engenders 
trust and a sense of security and freedom that 
African immigrants do not experience in the larger 
society. 
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Many of those working with and for migrants today are 
associated with religious currents. This is perplexing 
for some people of an avowed secular persuasion. 
In the case of Britain, for decades the state itself – as 
an essentially secular institution – played a central 
role in advancing rights which benefited migrants, 
especially refugees. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
governments approved arrangements for asylum 
and welfare rights which endorsed international 
agreements like the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees - the Geneva 
Convention. This was largely uncontroversial – part 
of an agenda for change said to be associated with 
the ‘Age of Rights’, an era of reform during which 
governments and international bodies recognized 
human rights as foundational issues. Refugees were 
presented officially as admirable people who should 
be accommodated by a democratic order – they 
were often lauded as heroic figures whose struggles 
for freedom were associated with the values of free 
and open societies like those in which they sought 
protection.
People embraced as figures who captured the 
spirit of the age are now, however, targets for 
official hostility. For today’s politicians, refugees 
in particular are a ‘burden’ and international 
agreements which once shaped national policy 
should be revised.  It was in this context that, in 
2001, former Home Secretary Jack Straw urged 
that the Geneva Convention should be reformed: 
“We need some radical thinking if we are to ensure 
that the principles of the 1951 Convention are to 
be applied effectively in the modern age,” he said. 
Successive governments have since stripped most 
applicants for asylum of entitlements to work and 
to welfare support, so that little more than the legal 
skeleton of the Convention remains.
There is high scepticism about claims for asylum. 
Those who make such claims are in effect under 
suspicion, often viewed as potentially or actually 
dishonest - they are said to be engaged in illegal 
activity or even to be criminal in intent. People 
whose ‘irregular’ means of travel to states such 
as Britain was earlier presented as courageous 
risk-taking to be rewarded by security and later 
by citizenship are now viewed as illicit entrants to 
de detained and/ or deported. Notwithstanding 
the value of such migrants to important economic 
interests (acknowledged unofficially), they are 
vilified and targeted for exemplary measures which 
greatly increase their vulnerability.  More and more 
migrants live in a shadowy area of semi-legality and 
heightened insecurity.
These developments have been under way for 
some 20 years, producing a profound crisis of the 
asylum/protection regime and driving hundreds 
of thousands of people to the margin of society. 
Among the responses are many ‘faith-based’ 
initiatives which advocate for and support vulnerable 
migrants - some organized at the institutional level, 
many others emerging from local congregations or 
informal networks. Is this a move by civil society into 
areas of social welfare abandoned by governments 
keen to find providers that will substitute for the 
state? In the case of Britain, is it primarily the result of 
imposing neo-liberal principles which underlie both 
Blair’s ‘Third Way’ and/or Cameron’s ‘Big Society’? 
Has a shrinking state ushered religious currents into 
spaces it eagerly vacates? 
There is some weight in this argument. Furbey 
et al. (2006, 2007) and Rochester (2007) have 
shown how ‘faith capital’ has been mobilized as 
‘service provision’. Churches and charities have 
been encouraged to address urban deprivation 
and support of marginalized and vulnerable 
groups – part of a sustained attempt, in my view, to 
displace responsibility for the effects of economic 
crisis and social instability away from those with 
political authority onto institutions, networks and 
individuals which retain active welfare agendas. 
There is much more, however, to the engagement of 
religious organizations with migrant issues – notably 
the impact upon them of decades of sustained 
immigration, and re-emergence of ideas about 
protection which were once integral to religious 
belief and practice.
New Congregations
In the 1960 and 1970s, many abandoned churches, 
chapels and synagogues were demolished or 
became warehouses or bingo halls: more recently 
they have been re-consecrated by active Christian 
currents or converted into mosques or temples. 
Religious practice in British cities has been 
revitalized, largely by immigrant congregations. 
One priest who recently returned to South London 
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after many years’ work abroad as part of a Catholic 
order observes that his parish is unrecognizable 
from the one he left two decades before. Services 
are full to overflowing, he says, with local people 
of African, Asian and Latin American origin; 
Colombians and Filipinos are most numerous 
among those who have replaced the largely Irish-
heritage worshippers of an earlier generation. 
The new congregations bring historic concerns 
of immigrants worldwide: problems of legal and 
economic status, employment, housing, welfare and 
(sharpened by the current crisis in relation to asylum) 
marginalization and general insecurity. They also 
bring religious traditions of the Global South which 
have not hitherto had a large following in British 
society, notably revived Catholicisms influenced 
by the Liberation Theology of Latin America, and 
the Pentecostalisms of Africa. The latter have 
established novel organizational forms (including 
structures of priestly authority), new liturgies and 
pastoral activities associated directly with migrant 
agendas. They have grown fast, sometimes at the 
expense of the established Church.  In many British 
cities, Pentecostal, Evangelical and ‘new church’ 
movements have been animated by large and 
energetic congregations in which migrants are a 
very important component. 
In parallel developments, migrants from regions in 
which Islam is the dominant cultural influence have 
been making space for their traditions. This has 
sometimes been a painful and difficult process, 
conducted against a background of hostility 
encouraged by national and local politicians and 
media, and increased levels of Islamophobia 
associated with international affairs. In Muslim 
communities worldwide, mosques have long had 
broad social agendas which address education, 
local commerce, health, welfare, mutual support 
and pilgrimage. In the British context, some of these 
functions, especially provision of Islamic education, 
have taken on added significance. At the same time, 
some mosques have become reception centres for 
newly arrived migrants - places of orientation and 
support. Islamic traditions mean that organizational 
structures and liturgies may be less amenable to 
modification than those undertaken by Christian 
currents: certain mosques are nevertheless 
especially responsive to migrant concerns. 
These are not novel developments. There is ample 
research to demonstrate that religious groups and 
institutions are of central importance for migrants in 
many contexts.  In the case of Britain, 19th century 
Irish immigration to England and Scotland had long-
term effects on religious institutions and networks. 
Local parishes of the Roman Catholic Church 
rapidly consolidated as key networking centres 
for the migrants and soon increased the influence 
of the Church, most importantly in education - 
from the 1840s the state funded a Catholic Poor 
School Committee which established national 
school networks under direction of ecclesiastical 
authorities (Grace 2002). Similar developments took 
place in relation to Jewish immigrants from Russia 
and Eastern Europe: the first Jewish school opened 
in 1853 following demands for equality of provision 
and as Jewish immigration accelerated in the late 
19th century a series of schools was established – 
though here the influence of mainstream religious 
institutions was much less pronounced (Miller 2001).
For today’s migrants, especially for the most 
vulnerable, ‘faith capital’ is a key resource.  There 
is increasing evidence that assets realized through 
religious links are mobilized against a background 
of the rapid decay - in some cases near-collapse 
– of long-standing community networks. Since the 
1980s most British cities have lost core industrial 
employment and (an issue which has received much 
less attention) structures and forms of action which 
earlier played a key role in local social and political 
life. Collective organization in the workplace, local 
trade union groups and networks, trades councils, 
labour clubs and associated sporting and cultural 
activities have been greatly diminished. Migrants 
never found them easy to access but now they 
are rarely an option. Years of central and local 
government budget cuts have in addition removed 
community and day-care centres, nurseries, drop-
in groups, legal advice and race equality centres. 
For many new migrants there are few points of 
contact with the wider society (for those with 
children, schools play an increasingly important 
role) and every reason to maximize the possibilities 
provided through co-religionists. Church, mosque 
and temple assume more and more significance - 
and more emphatically take on the agendas of their 
congregations and of those with institutional roles in 
lay office or as priests/ pastors.
Sanctuary
These are the contexts in which religious institutions 
and networks have become increasingly important 
for immigrants in Britain. But they are only contexts 
– how do religious currents address the detail of 
migrant concerns?
A key issue is that of basic security – how migrants, 
especially people newly arrived and experiencing 
various forms of vulnerability – cope with their 
circumstances. Here, religious traditions have 
much to say, notably about refuge, protection and 
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sanctuary. The great religions have vast resources 
of scriptural material, ritual practice, legal code, 
institutional history and popular memory. They are, 
in effect, detailed records of human conduct across 
the millennia. Notwithstanding claims from those 
who assert the uniqueness of divine authorities and 
the value of certain practices, dominant religious 
traditions have common principles, especially in 
relation to social solidarity, reciprocity and protection. 
These predate even the ancient Jewish texts, which 
first set them out in detail.
Epigraphic evidence from Egypt suggests that 
5000 years ago religious practice was associated 
with specific sacred spaces. These were located 
principally in temples, where statues and paintings 
of the deities were imbued with the latters’ special 
powers. This space was inviolable: artefacts and 
persons within it were secure from theft, damage, 
assault or abduction, and those who offended 
against these principles offended against the gods. 
The authority of priests and others with special roles 
was associated with such places – their practices 
confirmed and reasserted the status of the gods and 
the special character of sacred space. Ritual served 
to demarcate such space, establishing boundaries 
between the sacred and non-sacred or profane. One 
of the most celebrated theorists of religion, Mercea 
Eliade, calls this ‘hierophany’ or ‘manifestation of 
the sacred’ – means by which certain spaces are 
identified with supernatural forces and with the 
values and integrity of the wider community (Eliade 
1987: 11). 
The institution of sanctuary was described at length 
in the ancient Hebrew scriptures. Six settlements 
in the region of the River Jordan were identified as 
cities of refuge. Here, fugitives, including people 
alleged to be guilty of capital offences, could secure 
protection while they agreed means of atonement. 
Similar practices seem to have been general across 
the Middle East and the Mediterranean region 
throughout the Ancient and Classical periods. 
They are formalized in Islamic texts: the hijra, the 
journey of the Prophet Muhammed and his early 
disciples from Mecca to Medina in the 7th century 
CE – a foundational episode in Islamic history - is a 
successful search for protection. During the era of 
the Prophet, all those seeking refuge in a mosque 
or among the Muslim community were assured 
of security and ideas about both sanctuary and 
commitments to hospitality and protection were later 
inscribed in both hadith and shari’a (Arnaout 1987, 
Eickelman & Piscatori 1990).
The institution of sanctuary was similarly of 
great importance to the Classical Mediterranean 
civilizations. It was a key aspect of socio-cultural 
and political arrangements in Greece – here the 
physical space of the sanctuary, in the inner zone 
of the temple, was identified with the integrity of the 
community at large and especially of the city-state. 
The sanctuary was inviolable – subject to the widely 
held convention of asylon or ‘unplunderability’, 
the Greek word providing the basis for the later 
term ‘asylum’. So too, in the case of the Roman 
Empire, in which the innermost areas of the temple 
were sanctum sanctorum – sacred zones in which 
no one should be threatened. Extension of the 
empire across Europe generalized and formalized 
sanctuary. Following Christianization of the empire 
in the 4th century CE, the institution was established 
within Canon Law, the code of the Church under 
which for the next 1000 years fugitives, victims of 
civil conflict and war, and those alleged to be guilty 
of certain crimes, secured protection on religious 
sites – cathedrals, abbeys, monasteries, churches, 
shrines and homes of members of the priesthood.
It was not until the early modern era that this 
form of refuge, Church Sanctuary, was limited by 
other authorities which had their own interests in 
formal means of protection. Powerful families were 
attempting to establish kingdoms which unified 
large territories under a single monarch. Clashing 
with the Church, they sought to limit the authority 
of ecclesiastical institutions by seizing the latters’ 
rights, including the entitlement to guarantee 
protection. In England, Henry VIII identified eight 
towns as the sole locations of sanctuary sites - 
nowhere else could fugitives claim protection. In the 
17th century, James II formally abolished sanctuary 
as a competence of the Church: when formal 
protection reappeared as ‘asylum’ in the 1680s it 
was the state itself, in the form of parliament, which 
offered refuge, so that the nation-state in effect 
replaced the Church as sole guarantor of physical 
security.
These developments were repeated across Europe. 
The Church attempted a series of rearguard actions, 
the Pope threatening with excommunication those 
who introduced sanctuary reforms. But by the 19th 
century, religious authorities had been entirely 
excluded from national codes of law associated 
with security of the citizen. Although there was 
no national legislation on refuge - and indeed no 
international agreement on refugee rights until the 
mid-20th century – in practice the Church had been 
forbidden to offer protection on the basis of ancient 
principles of protection.
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Popular Practice
The state forbade religious authorities to guarantee 
refuge – but ideas about sacred space, inviolability 
and refuge remained within popular memory and 
practice. People continued to seek protection in 
churches, especially in cathedrals and monasteries, 
in the expectation that these places had special 
status which offered some form of security. It was 
not until late in the 20th century that police and other 
state officials began to enter churches, mosques 
and temples in countries of Western Europe to 
remove those who invoked ancient ideas about 
sanctuary. 
Today, new sanctuary movements have emerged 
to revitalize the older tradition. These have been 
especially effective in France, Germany and Britain 
– but in each case they owe their inspiration to 
sanctuary activism in North America. From the 
1960s, churches in the United States played a key 
role in providing protection for fugitives – initially for 
young men attempting to avoid conscription into 
US forces mobilized for war in Vietnam. In a famous 
speech in 1966 Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr, the 
chaplain of Yale University, invoked conventions of 
the Church in medieval England:
Now if in the Middle Ages churches could offer 
sanctuary to the most common of criminals, 
could they not do the same today for the most 
conscientious among us? And if the Middle 
Ages they could offer forty days to a man who 
had committed a sin and a crime, could they not 
today offer an indefinite period to one who had 
committed no sin? 
Coffin and fellow activists maintained that Christian 
morality provided a basis for protection - that the 
exercise of individual conscience by members 
of a congregation rendered the space of their 
church a refuge which should be inviolable. They 
challenged the state itself: after centuries during 
which parliaments had claimed sole rights to 
determine who could legitimately seek protection, 
activist churches maintained that they could create 
new spaces of asylum delineated by their own 
members. By the 1980s, this movement had become 
widespread in the United States and Canada, 
further inspired by the Civil Rights Movement, the 
impacts of Liberation Theology and the presence of 
millions of migrants from Latin America who lived 
precarious and uncertain lives in American cities. 
The new activists called themselves ‘sanctuarians’, 
professing commitments to poor and vulnerable 
people, especially irregular migrants in danger from 
state and federal authorities because of their legal 
status.
It is this movement which, since the late 1990s, 
has inspired European activists. In Germany, the 
Ecumenical Committee on Church Asylum attempts 
to protect irregular migrants; in France and Belgium, 
a series of movements in solidarity with sans-papiers 
has mobilized around churches as protected sites; 
and in Britain the City of Sanctuary campaign seeks 
to support vulnerable migrants, most of its activists 
originating in Christian currents. 
Outside these formal movements are a host of 
activities which usually go unrecorded, such as 
initiatives of local churches to address the pressing 
needs of congregants for housing, employment, 
education and welfare support. These are linked 
to the uncertain legal status of many migrants and 
the aspirations of family, friends and community 
networks to provide security by asserting traditions 
of sanctuary – offering what American researchers 
call ‘evasion services’, including protection from 
intrusive actions by forces of the state.  Here the 
relationship between religious organizations and 
vulnerable urban populations moves far beyond 
agendas encouraged by government. Invoking 
both ancient traditions and moral imperatives, 
activists propose that they can establish novel 
spaces of protection in which asylum is realized by 
the exercise of will.
This challenge to political authorities is an outcome 
of the drift from state to non-state actors in 
assertion of rights to asylum and more generally 
of principles of protection. Twenty-five years ago 
Bau (1985: 2) commented that the initiatives of 
American sanctuarians were “shocking” to those 
who assumed that sovereign power was vested 
solely in the state. After years of further erosion of 
asylum, combined with erection of new exclusionary 
migration regimes, their activities in North America 
and Europe have even more striking implications. 
Notes
1. See “An Effective Protection Regime for the 
Twenty-first Century: Speech to IPPR, 6 February 
2001”, in The Guardian, Tuesday 6 February 2001.
2. See “An Effective Protection Regime for the 
Twenty-first Century: Speech to IPPR, 6 February 
2001”, in The Guardian, Tuesday 6 February 2001.
3. See the report on migrant employment in the 
British economy commissioned by the Trades 
Union Congress and published by the Centre for 
Migration, Policy and Society (Compas): Anderson 
& Rogaly (2005).
4. See Fekete (2009).
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Introduction
The debate on racism, migration and secularism 
in contemporary UK needs to be explored in both 
global and historical contexts. This is especially 
important because in the hegemonic form of racism 
today, at least in the West, discourses on migration 
and religion have merged together to construct 
the exclusionary boundaries of racist autochthonic 
politics of belonging of which I expand more below.
They have merged in at least two very different ways. 
Firstly, in that many of those who’ve migrated to the 
West in the post World War II period often came from 
different religious backgrounds which continue to 
play important roles in assigning particular people 
and groupings as belonging or not belonging to the 
national collective. Secondly, because – especially 
since the 1989 ‘Rushdie Affair’ - religious belonging, 
especially Muslim belonging, has come to be seen 
as constituting an alternative political project of 
belonging to those of citizenship and nationalism. 
Islam, therefore, has come to be seen as a political 
enemy, rather than just as a cultural ‘other’.
At the same time, religion – all religions – have 
also come to play a more dominant role in western 
civil societies, even in those in which most of the 
population do not practise religion in their everyday 
lives. As such, religious organizations have come 
to play a growing role in both racist and anti-racist 
social movements as well as in government policies 
aimed at dealing with migration and minority 
communities.
It is within this context that the debate on secularism 
arose, asking whether secular discourse needs to 
be seen as a necessary condition for anti-racism 
(see especially Sami Zubaida’s contribution)  while 
others would argue the opposite (e.g. Haleh Afshar). 
I shall now try to expand briefly on each of these 
points.
Nationalism and Religion
Religions have had several contradictory 
relationships with nationalist movements and states 
which often shifted historically even in relation to 
the same national collectivities – of conflation, of 
exclusion as well as of co-existence in different 
social and political spheres.
According to most ‘modernist’ theorists, nationalism 
constitutes a modern alternative to religion, which 
emerged at the time of enlightenment and will, 
eventually make it redundant (e.g. Althusser, 1971; 
Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). Ben Anderson, 
for example, when wanting to explain the power 
of nationalism, explained it in quasi-religious terms 
– that its emotional powers and the willingness of 
people to kill and die for it are exactly because there 
is no instrumentalist value of self interest in it, but 
rather it is sacred (1983).
This view of religion, however, is problematic in several 
different ways. Firstly, it denies the implicit reliance 
on religion as a hegemonic cultural tradition which 
plays an important part even in states with secular 
constitutions – whether in determining national 
festivals, national symbols or civil exclusions. The 
debate on the possible inclusion of Turkey, whose 
population is mostly of Muslim rather than Christian 
origin, for example, into the EU, has highlighted this 
relationship and brought back to public memory the 
fact that the original 1957 Treaty of Rome, which 
brought the European Economic Community, later 
the EU, into existence, was blessed by the Pope. 
There was an implied assumption then that Europe 
is a Christian continent or, even more narrowly, one 
that followed non Orthodox forms of Christianity that 
characterized Eastern European societies under 
the Byzantine Empire (with the notable exception 
of Greece, the ‘cradle’ of ‘European civilization’ and 
enlightenment which was the only Orthodox Christian 
country then considered for EU membership, and 
even this only in 1979).     
  
Moreover, when we view the states in the world as 
a whole, only in a minority of them  is there a full 
separation of religion and the state. Even when there 
is no formal incorporation of at least some arenas 
of religious laws into state laws, and there exists an 
explicit secular republican ideology as in France, 
there is a reliance on Christian festivals, for example, 
as in the formal state holidays (after the abortive 
attempt during the French revolution to provide 
alternative ‘festival of reason’). There have been 
numerous cases where nationalist movements, rather 
than distancing themselves from local hegemonic 
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religions, relied upon them to legitimize themselves 
as representing ‘the people’ and launching war 
against the ‘enemy’ and/or ‘foreign oppressors’. 
This was true in Ireland and Poland, as well as in 
India and Algeria and the Jesuit order in Paraguay. 
Some national movements presented themselves 
as modernizing agents of religious as well as other 
cultural traditions (like in the cases of both the pan-
Arab national movement and the Zionist movement), 
and have often fought against traditional religious 
leaderships for domination in the civil as well as 
political domains. In recent years, however, as a 
result of various factors, local and global, these 
power relations seem to be undergoing a significant 
reversal and ‘authentic’ authority is being ‘restored’ 
(in a selective and ‘invented tradition’ way) to 
religious leaderships in many countries among both 
majority and minority populations.
In the UK the separation of religion and the state 
has never been complete. The British king or queen 
is the head of the Anglican (and Scottish) church, 
as historically the foundation of the nation – and 
consequently of the empire – was a product of 
the formation of an alternative national version of 
Christianity which enabled not only Henri VIII  to 
divorce his wife but also for him and his aristocracy 
to appropriate the local wealth and property of the 
Catholic church. Bishops (and the Chief Rabbi) 
occupy official places in the House of Lords and 
it is a legal grey area whether a non Christian (or 
even a non Anglican – Tony Blair did not convert 
to Catholicism until after he finished his office as 
a Prime Minister) can act as a Prime Minister, as 
it is part of his role to appoint (under the symbolic 
authority of the royal) the Archbishop of Canterbury.
It is a grey area, because at the same time that the 
English and British are officially a Christian nation, it is 
also a parliamentary democracy. Since the time that 
Catholics (and following them Jews and members 
of other religions) were allowed to be elected to the 
British Parliament, affiliation with different religions 
is not perceived as contradicting – at least officially 
– membership in the British national collectivity, 
something which obtained new meaning under Tony 
Blair’s government, as will be discussed later in the 
article. 
Religion and Civil Society
One of the reasons for the relative success of 
religious political movements in recent years both 
locally and globally is the fact that in most modern 
states, especially secular ones, religion was seen 
as either non political or as a neutral political force 
with an agenda not competing with or threatening 
the political agendas of the ruling parties. In 
Israel, for example, different governments used 
to rely, especially before the 1967 war, upon the 
religious parties as convenient coalition partners 
with no autonomous agenda except for getting 
more resources for their educational institutions. 
It was only many years later that it became clear 
that many of the graduates of these schools 
and yeshivot constituted the popular basis of 
settler fundamentalist movements. Similarly, in 
India, although a member of the RSS (Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh) murdered Ghandi, it was 
not until many years later that the graduates of 
the schools of this religious movement were at the 
forefront of the rise of BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), 
the political wing of the RSS, originally founded in 
1951, as an alternative hegemonic political project 
in India in the 1990s. This ignorance also applied 
to the ways that religious movements were used 
by external political powers. The USA funded 
the mojahidins who fought against the USSR in 
Afghanistan (including Osama Bin Laden) and 
thus created the political climate which allowed the 
Pakistani military (with largely Saudi money) to fund 
the madrassas that became the basis for the training 
of the Taliban and other movements associated with 
them and Al Quaeda. Similarly, it was the Israelis 
who originally funded and trained Hamas, as a 
counter political power to that of Fatah and the PLO 
among the Palestinians. They indeed became such 
a power, and won the Palestinian elections, to the 
chagrin, and consequent economic and military 
conflict, with the Israelis who found them much less 
malleable than Fatah.
A somewhat similar phenomenon can be seen also 
in the economic arena where international economic 
and international aid organizations and bilateral 
and multilateral aid agencies, have developed 
growing bonds with various religious organizations 
(not differentiating usually between fundamentalist 
and non fundamentalist organizations) as part 
of the wider phenomenon in which NGOs are 
often seen and used not only as part of the civil 
society but as the civil society. Religious NGOs 
are gradually seen as the more sustainable civil 
society organizations. The most visible sign of 
influence of the religious Right on development aid 
was through George Bush’s PEPFAR (President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) which prohibited 
funds going to organizations (and countries) that 
supported abortion rights, and instead actively 
promoted abstinence programmes rather than 
sexual health and education programmes and 
the promotion of condom usage. Inevitably these 
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policies meant denying funding to progressive 
NGOs and extending funding to religious – mostly 
Christian – NGOs.  Christopher Pallas (2005) 
describes also how this process has been taking 
place in the World Bank and traces its beginning 
with the growing interest of the World Bank in civil 
society and poverty and the naturalized association 
between poverty and religious organizations and 
those which are engaged in various civil society and 
welfare activities among the poor. 
And indeed, in addition to education, part of the 
populist attraction of fundamentalist and other 
religious movements is the fact that so many of 
them are engaged in and are committed to welfare 
services in the community, especially in societies 
and communities where state services are either 
non existent or very poor. Regular charity activities 
– both financial and as personal involvement – are 
often seen as religious duties as well as a way of 
reaching potential new recruits for the movement. 
The sanctuary movement in the UK, USA and 
elsewhere has played a major role in defending and 
rescuing migrants and refugees since the time of 
slavery.
At the same time these charity activities can be 
very exclusionary and directed only towards 
those who belong – actually or potentially – to 
their constituency. It is well known, for example, 
that Mother Teresa’s organization in India refused 
to take care of girls who were damaged by illegal 
abortions. Also, the individualistic nature of such 
charity work also means that it is not usually seen 
as relating to the overall political goals of those 
religious organizations.
As AWID (2009) reported after their 160 countries 
comparative action research:
...Women’s rights activists in Egypt, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan 
list numerous examples of religious 
fundamentalisms providing basic services 
where the state has failed to do so or where 
social divisions breed structural poverty. 
Many note, however, that such remedies 
are temporary and superficial, do not 
address the root causes of inequality and 
create dependency among those served 
by humanitarian or charity drives. Although 
service provision appears to be a relatively 
more popular recruitment strategy in the 
Middle East and North Africa region, it is 
also a feature of Catholic and Christian 
fundamentalisms. Evangelical Christian 
sects active in communities in Latin 
America, Asia and the former Soviet Union 
provide food as well as employment and 
educational opportunities to disaffected 
groups. (AWID, 2009)
Racism and Religion
As mentioned above, when I discussed the 
relationship between nationalism and religion, 
religion can signify belonging to a particular 
collectivity as well as being a signifier to an 
alternative political project of belonging which 
transcends ethnic boundaries and national 
borders. However, even when such boundaries are 
transcended, exclusionary boundaries continue 
to operate. Dante allocated all non Christians to 
be eternally excluded from Heaven and doomed 
to stay in Limbo, whatever they did during their 
lifetime, and Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 
7/7 bombers in London spoke in his pre-suicide 
bombing video of ‘his people’ as the Muslim Umma 
all over the world but did not hesitate to randomly 
murder whoever was in the underground in London 
at that time. However, racism has two ultimate logics 
– one, indeed, is that of exclusion which ultimately 
can end up with mass murder and genocide. 
The other, however, is that of inferiorization and 
subordination, the ultimate of which is slavery. While 
the missionaries attempted to convert everyone to 
Christianity and while many of them were engaged 
in humanitarian aid of individual people, they did 
not overall question the systems of colonialism and 
empire within which they generally worked. While 
many religious people are engaged in anti-racist 
struggles as a result of their beliefs, no matter what 
religion (if any) is that of those they help, others 
confine their charity to those who share their own 
religion and others use religious discourse in order 
to justify subjugating as well as excluding migrants 
and asylum seekers from the right to belong and get 
equal citizenship rights.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, in the UK’s history, 
religion has played both roles, of exclusion (e.g. 
the expulsion of the Jews in 1290) and of growing 
incorporation in recent times. Until recently Muslims 
and members of other non Christian religions, except 
for Jews, were virtually excluded from having state 
support for their schools or carrying out marriage 
and divorce. Under New Labour, and continuing 
under the coalition government, there has been a 
major shift. This shift has been motivated both by 
an attempt to co-opt ‘moderate’ Muslims into the 
hegemonic majority as an anti-terrorist preventative 
strategy, but even more generally, has resulted 
from a major shift in state–society relations under 
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the hegemony of global neo-liberalism. With the 
growing privatization of the welfare state, religious 
organizations came to be seen as reliable and 
sustainable civil society agents which can shoulder 
some of the responsibilities previously held by 
the state. Moreover, in the Blairite discourse of 
classless, post-racist post feminist Britain, religious 
differences came to signify probably the only 
‘natural’ legitimate differences among communities 
in an agenda in which multi-faith social cohesion 
replaced the previously hegemonic multiculturalism 
(Yuval-Davis, 2009). Moreover, religions, or rather 
religious leaderships (often self appointed), have 
come to be seen as the anchor for any moral claims 
and authority.
This has often worked in favour of migrants and 
ethnic and racial minorities, when religious authority 
has been exercised in anti-racist statements. 
Religious leaders have come to be active in most 
public organizations which have campaigned for 
the rights of migrants and racialized minorities. 
Moreover, as large sections of these sections of 
the population see themselves as part of specific 
religious communities, attending religious services, 
benefitting from religious communal services and 
getting social and moral solidarity and support, have 
helped many to survive daily realities of hardship, 
precariousness and discrimination.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, religious 
affiliation has also come to play a major role in 
racialized politics of exclusion. Much of recent 
autochthonic racist politics of belonging of 
organizations such as the English Defence League 
draw the boundaries of who belongs and who do 
not against the archetypical ‘Other’ – the Muslim.
Concluding Discussion: 
Secularism and 
Citizenship Rights
So what general analytical and political conclusions 
can we draw from the above concerning the debate 
on the role of religion and of secularism in the fights 
against racism and for equal citizenship and human 
rights of migrants and asylum seekers?
In our introduction to our book Refusing Holy 
Orders, Gita Sahgal and I differentiated between 
two very different notions of the secular which are 
very important in any attempt to answer the above 
question (Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992/2001).
One meaning of secularism is that of atheism (denial 
of the existence of God) or, at best, agnosticism 
(indifference to the existence of God or belief that its 
existence or not can never be proven). This denial 
or indifference rejects a construction of separate 
transcendental or sacred sphere and sees it as 
an irrelevance at best, or as a dangerous illusion 
at worst, as the title of Christopher Hitchens’ book 
(2007) states: God is Not Great: How Religion 
Poisons Everything.
This kind of secularism relates to a view of the world 
which is associated with the ‘age of enlightenment’, 
of scientism and extreme rationality. What cannot 
be observed, at least in principle, does not exist 
or is meaningless. Therefore there is no meaning 
to the notion of God except for the various roles – 
social, emotional, political and economic – it has 
played in people’s lives. Any morality and principles 
of good and bad, if they exist, need, according to 
this perspective, to be anchored in other ontological 
bases than that of God. 
This meaning of secularism is related to, but 
is vastly different from, the second meaning, 
which is basically political, rather than existential-
philosophical and concerns the principle of the 
separation of religion from the state.
The best known example of such a principle can be 
found in the constitution of the USA – a constitution 
which was written for a society which was largely 
established by religious communities but with no 
one hegemonic religion. This meaning of the secular 
is not unique to the American constitution, however. 
It has been a basic political principle, applied in 
different ways, of other pluralistic states, such as 
India and South Africa, where the motivating drive 
for it has not been atheist secular ideologies, but 
rather, like in the USA, the defence of religious and 
communal pluralism.
Historically in Europe, the principle of the separation 
of religion and the state emerged as a result of two 
distinct stages. The first principle to emerge was 
that local political authority could determine the 
religion of its population. The Latin phrase Cuius 
regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion) comes 
from the Peace of Augsburg 1555, which ended a 
battle between Catholicism and Lutheranism and 
allowed German princes to choose whichever 
religion they wanted within their domain. The 
space for Protestantism and secularism was further 
enhanced after the 30 Years War of 1618 to 1648 
in which large parts of Western Europe broke away 
from the power of the Vatican, although there is still 
no full separation of religion and the state in most of 
Europe. 
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